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This book is dedicated to the founder of Cleanroom software engineering, 
Dr. Harlan D. Mills ( 1919-1996), 
whose insights into the mathematical foundations of software 
have had a profound and enduring impact on countless students, 
practitioners, managers, organizations, 
and the entire software engineering profession. 
~STACY J. PROWELL, 
CARMEN J. TRAMMELL, 
RICHARD C. LINGER, 
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Preface 
This book is about Cleanroom software engineering technology and manage-
ment. It provides an overview of Cleanroom for application to software engi-
neering projects, and a road map for software management, development, and 
testing as disciplined engineering practices. It serves as an introduction for 
those who are new to Cleanroom software engineering and as a reference guide 
for the growing practitioner community. 
The book is organized into three parts as follows: 
1. Part I: Cleanroom Software Engineering Fundamentals is a presenta-
tion of Cleanroom theory and engineering practice. The principal 
Cleanroom practices are described: incremental development under 
statistical quality control; function-based specification, development, 
and verification; and statistical testing based on usage models. The 
Cleanroom Reference Model (CRM) is introduced as a framework for 
an overall Cleanroom engineering process. A small example, the secu-
rity alarm, is used in Part I to illustrate practices and work products. 
2. Part II: The Cleanroom Software Engineering Reference Model pro-
vides a process model that can be adopted, tailored, and elaborated by 
a software engineering organization. The CRM is expressed in 14 
Cleanroom processes and 20 work products. Each process is defined in 
terms of an augmented ETVX (Entry, Tasks, Verification, Exit) model. 
The CRM is a guide for Cleanroom project performance and process 
improvement. Chapter 11 relates the CRM to the Key Process Areas of 
the Capability Maturity Model for Software. 
3. Part III: A Case Study in Cleanroom Software Engineering presents a 
large example, the satellite control system, that includes key technical 
ix 
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work products produced in a Cleanroom project: a box structure speci-
fication and design, a usage model and usage model analysis. 
In many situations, Cleanroom technologies can be applied without special 
tools. For example, box structure specifications and designs can be recorded 
using conventional word processors and templates. It is often the case, however, 
that tools can simplify and improve Cleanroom practice, and help enable scale-
up to larger systems. Accordingly, the principal examples in this book are aug-
mented with output from Cleanroom tools to provide additional analysis and 
insight. 
This book is intended to give managers and technical practitioners an 
understanding of Cleanroom technologies, and to provide an overall process 
framework for managing Cleanroom projects. Part I describes the underlying 
theory and the methods of practice, and is recommended for all readers . Part II 
defines Cleanroom processes and may be used as both a reference and as a 
guide for management activities. The large case study in Part III will help read-
ers to understand what is produced in a Cleanroom project and to envision how 
Cleamoomcan be applied to their own projects. 
We also recommend this book for both undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents in computer science and software engineering programs. It is important 
for students to understand the value and necessity for intellectual control in 
large-scale software engineering, and the importance of the technologies and 
processes used to achieve it. Of special importance for students is an apprecia-
tion of the incremental development life cycle, methods for precise specifica-
tion, design, and verification, and application of usage-based testing to certify 
software. 
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Introduction 
Our Software Society 
From its modest beginnings some 50 years ago, computer software has become 
a critical element of modern society, with global reach and impact on virtually 
every aspect of human endeavor. Software technology is a principal enabling 
agent in business, industry, government, and defense, and permeates products 
and services of all kinds. Every day, trillions of tasks are performed by soft-
ware, ranging from personal computer applications to large-scale, worldwide 
networked systems of astonishing complexity. Economic sectors such as manu-
facturing, banking and financial services, communications, health care, energy, 
transportation, and education, as well as national defense and government, rely 
on software for the conduct of daily operations. It is no exaggeration to say that 
the progress of modern society is dependent totally and irrevocably on software. 
As a result, software has become a pivotal component in the global econ-
omy. The computer hardware industry relies on software to bring its machines 
to life, and industries and services of all kinds depend on software to increase 
productivity and unleash the creativity of millions of workers. Software is a 
profound agent of change, enabling reengineering of corporations and jobs on 
an unprecedented scale. It is driving deep structural changes in the global econ-
omy through automation and augmentation of mental tasks, much as the indus-
trial revolution in the past century transformed society through automation of 
physical tasks. In short, software has become a critical resource- vital to well-
being and competitiveness. 
With the increasing societal dependence on software has come increasing 
risks of software failure. The vast majority of software today is handcrafted by 
xi 
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artisans using craft-based techniques that cannot produce consistent results. 
These techniques have little in common with the rigorous, theory-based pro-
cesses characteristic of other engineering disciplines. As a result, software fail-
ure is a common occurrence, often with substantial societal and economic 
consequences. Many software projects simply collapse under the weight of 
unmastered complexity and never result in usable systems at all. 
Software development is a task that challenges the limits of human under-
standing and control. There is, however, a substantial body of science and engi-
neering knowledge that points the way to disciplined processes for software 
engineering. This body of science and engineering knowledge is the foundation 
for Cleanroom software engineering. 
Cleanroom Software Engineering 
Cleanroom is a theory-based, team-oriented process for the economic produc-
tion of high-quality software. Cleanroom is theory based because sound theo-
retical foundations are essential to any engineering discipline, and no amount of 
good management can substitute for their absence. Cleanroom is team oriented 
because software is developed by people, and theory must be reduced to practi-
cal application to harness human creativity and cooperation. Cleanroom deals 
with economic production of software because real-world business constraints 
and resource limitations must be satisfied in software engineering. Finally, 
Cleanroom deals with production of high-quality software because high quality 
improves manageability, reduces risks and costs, satisfies customers, and pro-
vides a competitive advantage. 
Development and Demonstration 
The theoretical foundations of Cleanroom were established in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, when Harlan Mills, an accomplished mathematician and IBM 
Fellow, related fundamental ideas in mathematics, statistics, and engineering to 
software. Influenced by Edsger Dijkstra on structured programming, Nicholas 
Wirth on stepwise refinement, and David Parnas on modular design, Mills 
defined the scientific foundations for an engineering approach to software. 
Two fundamental insights drove Mills' work: first, that programs are rules 
for mathematical functions and second, that potential program executions are 
infinite populations requiring statistical sampling for quality certification. The 
first insight opened all of function theory to software development and led to 
the technologies of box structure specification and design, function- theoretic 
correctness verification, and incremental development. The second insight 
opened all of statistical theory to software testing and led to the technology of 
statistical usage testing and quality certification. 
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Mills' ideas were refined and demonstrated in collaborations with col-
leagues Alan Currit, Michael Dyer, Alan Hevner, Richard Linger, Bernard Witt, 
and others in IBM's Federal Systems Division. Structured Programming: 
Theory and Practice (by Linger, Mills, and Witt), published in 1979 by 
Addison-Wesley, introduced function-theoretic methods for software specifica-
tion, design, verification, and reengineering. Principles of Information Systems 
Analysis and Design (by Mills, Linger, and Hevner; Academic Press, Inc., 1986) 
introduced box structure methods for system specification, design, and verifica-
tion, and introduced incremental development for project management. In 1987 
these ideas were integrated under the masthead Cleanroom- a term borrowed 
from the semiconductor industry to reflect an emphasis on defect prevention 
rather than defect removal. "Cleanroom Software Engineering" (by Mills, Dyer, 
and Linger) was published in the May 1987 issue of IEEE Software. 
The first Cleanroom software project was managed by Richard Linger of 
IBM in the mid 1980s. The COBOL Structuring Facility project developed a 
commercial software reengineering product that exhibited remarkable levels of 
quality and reliability in customer use, and provided an initial validation of the 
Cleanroom process. 
Validation and Practice 
In 1990 Richard Linger established the IBM Cleanroom Software Technology 
Center, where further improvements in Cleanroom methods, automation, and 
technology transfer were achieved. In the early 1990s a mass storage control 
unit adapter developed using Cleanroom was introduced by IBM. Thousands of 
units were sold, and after an extended life the product was retired in 1997 with-
out a single field failure reported against the Cleanroom microcode. The devel-
opment was led by Mike Brewer, and included Paul Fisher, Dave Fuhrer, Karl 
Nielson, and other team members. Certification testing was led by Joe Ryan and 
Mike Houghtaling. Today, the testing laboratory in IBM's Storage Systems 
Division is arguably the world leader in the practice of statistical usage testing 
of software. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the highly regarded Software Engineering 
Laboratory (SEL) at theN ational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) conducted a series of Cleanroom experi-
ments under the guidance of Vic Basili, Scott Green, Rose Pajerski, Jon Valett, 
and others. The SEL series of Cleanroom experiments are considered by some 
to be the single most complete research study conducted to date in the field of 
software engineering. Four ground-control software systems of increasing size 
were developed using Cleanroom engineering, with results showing consistent 
improvement in quality and productivity over the already impressive NASA 
GSFC baseline. 
During the formative period of the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
ARPA STARS Program (Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems) 
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in the mid 1980s, Cleanroom was selected as a key technology for development 
and commercialization by STARS leaders, including Dave Ceely, Dick Drake, 
BillEtt, Joe Greene, John Foreman, Jim Moore, and others. The company Dr. 
Mills founded with Arnie Beckhardt to advance Cleanroom-Software Engi-
neering Technology, Inc. (SET)-was selected as the STARS vehicle for com-
mercializing Cleanroom technology. Significant advances in Cleanroom methods 
and tools were made by SET under STARS support. 
At the same time, Dr. Mills was consulting with L.M. Ericsson AB in 
Europe on the use of Cleanroom in their establishment of a company called 
Q-Labs that would transfer new software engineering technologies from the 
research laboratories of the world into Ericsson. Q-Labs and SET were business 
partners from the early days of both companies, and the two enterprises were 
merged into Q-Labs in 1998. 
In the early 1990s the US Army Picatinny Arsenal conducted a Cleanroom 
project during which a 20:1 return on investment in Cleanroom technology 
introduction was realized. In 1996 the DoD Data and Analysis Center for 
Software reported a substantial cost and quality advantage for Cleanroom in a 
comparative analysis of software methods. Other organizations with historical 
data on software productivity and quality have conducted large projects using 
Cleanroom and have published the results in the open literature. Cleanroom 
practices have produced dramatic improvements in software project outcomes 
in IBM, Ericsson, NASA, the DoD, and many other organizations. The data on 
Cleanroom are in, and they consistently show that substantial improvement in 
software team performance is possible under Cleanroom discipline. 
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University 
has provided substantial national leadership for improvement in software engi-
neering practice. The SEI Capability Maturity Model for Software (CMM) has 
become an accepted and widespread management model for improving soft-
ware engineering practices. In 1996 the SEI completed a project to define a 
Cleanroom Reference Model and map the engineering technologies of Clean-
room into the management processes of the CMM. The principal finding of this 
work was that Cleanroom and the CMM are compatible and mutually support-
ing. This work was disseminated in two SEI technical reports: Cleanroom 
Software Engineering Reference Model (by Linger and Trammell 1996), and 
Cleanroom Software Engineering Implementation of the Capability Maturity 
Model (CMM) for Software (by Linger, Paulk, and Trammell 1996). The 
Cleanroom Software Engineering Reference Model is incorporated in this book 
with the permission of Carnegie Mellon University. 
Cleanroom technology has been taught by Mills and his colleagues Vic 
Basili, Alan Hevner, Richard Linger, Jesse Poore, Dieter Rombach, Shirley 
Becker, Richard Cobb, Michael Deck, Chuck Engle, Philip Hausler, Ara 
Kouchakdjian, John Martin, Dave Pearson, Mark Pleszkoch, Stacy Prowell, 
Steve Rosen, Kirk Sayre, Alan Spangler, Carmen Trammell, Gwen Walton, and 
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James Whittaker in university and industrial courses throughout the world. 
Numerous others have contributed to advances in practice through extensive 
field application, including Mike Brewer, John Gibson, Mike Houghtaling, 
David Kelly, Jenny Morales, Rob Oshana, Jason Selvidge, Wayne Sherer, and 
Tom Swain. Each of these persons has contributed to the maturation of 
Cleanroom as a true engineering discipline for software. 
Continuing Evolution 
The evolution of an engineering discipline is based on its grounding in science. 
Refinements in practice flow from following first principles to derive practices 
and from the thread of connections between bodies of science. Refinements and 
advances in Cleanroom practice have occurred in exactly this manner, and are 
ongoing. 
A major stream of research to refine the Cleanroom specification method 
has come to fruition and is incorporated in this book. Mills' use of function the-
ory, inspiring David Parnas' work on sequence (trace) analysis and domain par-
titioning, in turn inspiring Hailong Mao's work on canonical sequence histories, 
have all paved the way for Stacy Prowell and Jesse Poore's definition of 
sequence-based specification that is presented in this book. 
In a separate stream of research, Gwen Walton and Jesse Poore have con-
nected Markov chain-based usage models to optimization methods in operations 
research. Their work on a constraint-based approach to usage modeling holds 
great promise for increasing control and value in Cleanroom statistical testing 
practice. 
Other work is in progress to harness decision theory, advanced statistical 
designs, modeling and simulation, and other relevant areas of theory and engi-
neering practice. Continuing improvements to Cleanroom software engineering 








1.1 Economic Production 
of High-Quality Software 
Cleanroom software engineering is the practical application of mathematical 
and statistical science to produce high-quality software in an economical man-
ner. The Cleanroom name was borrowed from the hardware cleanrooms of the 
semiconductor industry, where defect prevention rather than defect removal is 
pursued through rigorous engineering processes. The emphasis in Cleanroom is 
on development of software that is correct by design, followed by certification 
of software quality in testing. Cleanroom methods are rooted in science, and 
constitute an engineering process that can be applied to achieve productivity in 
software development and reliability in software performance. Cleanroom soft-
ware engineering is designed to achieve two critical goals: a manageable devel-
opment process and no failures in use. 
1.1.1 Manageable Development 
Cleanroom methods enable managers and technical teams to maintain intellec-
tual control of software development projects. Intellectual control requires that 
at each step in development, the status of work in progress is absolutely clear. 
It requires that work products accumulate into the final product in a predic-
table way during development, and that the integrity of the product is main-
tained throughout its life. Intellectual control requires teamwork based on 
well-defined engineering processes. It results in managing complexity, reduc-
ing risks, avoiding rework, and meeting business objectives for schedule and 
budget performance. 
3 
4 Cleanroom Overview 
Intellectual control depends on the technologies employed by development 
teams. Inadequate technologies and processes can result in perplexing and frus-
trating muddles in software development, where nothing works and no one is 
to blame, and no amount of good management seems to set things straight. 
Cleanroom provides methods for precise specification and design, correctness 
verification, usage testing, and measurement of software quality and reliability. 
Cleanroom is rooted in theoretical foundations that help guarantee the critical 
properties of work products that are essential for project manageability and suc-
cess: mathematical completeness and consistency, verifiable correctness, and 
traceability among work products. 
1.1.2 No Failures in Use 
The contemporary attitude toward software failures is to regard them as in-
evitable. Postproduction defect correction is an institutionalized and accepted 
process in many software organizations, involving substantial operations that 
drain productivity and profitability. The tangible costs of software failures-
tracking problems, finding and correcting defects, distributing fixes, and so on-
are not quantified in most organizations, and are far greater than most people 
imagine. The intangible costs of software failures in diminished customer con-
fidence and loyalty are difficult to quantify, but obviously drive the total cost 
even higher. 
Most software failures are avoidable. Software failures are the result of 
ineffective specification and development practices that permit introduction and 
survival of defects, and testing practices that permit defects to remain unde-
tected, only to be discovered in field use. In Cleanroom, development teams use 
rigorous specification, design, and verification practices, coupled with testing 
practices that provide valid measures of development performance in approach-
ing the goal of zero defects. The payoff is improved manageability, reduced 
rework, and sharp reductions in direct and opportunity costs of defect correc-
tion over the market lifetime of products. 
1.2 Cleanroom Foundations 
Cleanroom theoretical foundations are drawn from mathematics. Harlan Mills 
identified the appropriate science base for software development with his in-
sight that a computer program implements a mathematical function. His early 
papers, such as "Mathematical Foundations for Structured Programming," "The 
New Math of Computer Programming," and "How to Write Correct Programs 
and Know It," explained that software development is based in mathematical 
·~Jto .. 
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function theory. Similarly, Mills identified the appropriate science base for soft-
ware testing with his insights about its statistical nature; in other words, soft-
ware testing amounts to sampling from a usually infinite population of possible 
uses. His early papers, such as "On the Statistical Validation of Computer Pro-
grams," enabled the application of statistical science to software certification. 
Mills ' recognition of the scientific foundations for software has enabled Clean-
room software engineering to evolve as a true engineering discipline for soft-
ware. The reader who would like firsthand exposure to Mills' foundational ideas 
may be interested in the 1988 publication of these and other early papers in 
book form in Software Productivity (published by Dorset House) . 
1.2.1 Function Theory 
Cleanroom development methods are based on mathematical function theory. A 
function defines a mapping from a domain set to a range set. Each element in 
the domain is mapped to exactly one element in the range. A deterministic pro-
gram likewise defines a mapping from a domain set (with elements that are 
every possible input sequence for the program) to a range set (with elements 
that are the corresponding outputs). The specification for a program is thus the 
specification of a function , describing the intended mapping from the program's 
domain (or input sequences) to its range (or output space). 
A well-defined function exhibits properties of completeness, consistency, 
and correctness. Because the specification for a program describes an intended 
function , the specification should also be complete, consistent, and correct. 
Mathematical completeness requires that each element of the domain 
be mapped to at least one element of the range. That is, every possible 
input history must be defined and associated with an output. 
Mathematical consistency requires that each domain element be 
mapped to at most one value in the range. That is, every input history 
must be mapped to only one output. 
Correctness of specifications against requirements is a matter of judg-
ment by domain experts. Given a correct specification, however, the 
correctness of a design with respect to its specification is verifiable 
using reasoning based on function theory. 
The application of mathematical function theory to software development 
as presented by Linger, Mills, and Witt ( 1979) was recast as the box structure 
method for Cleanroom software development by Mills, Linger, and Hevner 
(1986), in which three functional forms of black box, state box, and clear box 
were treated explicitly. 
------= 
6 Cleanroom Overview 
1.2.2 Statistical Theory 
Cleanroom testing methods are based on statistical science. Statistical testing 
methods have enjoyed decades of extensive and successful application in engi-
neering. In situations when it is economically or technically infeasible to test all 
items in a large population, statistical sampling methods are used instead. If the 
statistics reveal that quality goals are not being met, the production process 
can be adjusted as necessary. This feedback loop from product measurement to 
production process is well understood, widely applied, and supported by a sub-
stantial body of statistical theory. How can it be applied to software? In manu-
facturing, the statistics lie in physical variation of items produced; in processes 
(like package delivery), the statistics lie in deviations from prescribed handling. 
Where are the statistics in software? 
In software, the population to be sampled is the set of all possible scenarios 
of use. Each element of the population represents a possible execution of the 
system. The statistics lie in measuring the ability of the system to carry out cor-
rectly a sample of these executions. Because this population is infinite, exhaus-
tive testing is impossible, and statistical methods must be used to obtain valid 
inferences regarding system performance for the entire population. No testing 
process, no matter how extensive, can sample more than a minute fraction of 
possible input sequences. All software testing is really sampling from an infi-
nite population. 
In Cleanroom, statistical testing supports both product measurement (results 
of a single development process cycle) and process measurement (results across 
multiple development process cycles). Cleanroom employs the iterative process 
of incremental development, which permits the consistency of performance to 
be measured and improved. 
1.2.3 Cleanroom Team Operations 
Cleanroom teams perform three principal operations- namely, system spec-
ification, development, and certification. Teams are generally small, often on 
the order of three to eight people, to minimize coordination and to simplify 
communication. A team member is designated as the team leader. Tasks are 
assigned and agreed to within a team according to overall team responsibili-
ties and schedule priorities. For small-scale projects, a single team may be 
sufficient. In this case, all members of the team may perform specification, 
development, and certification activities at various phases during system devel-
opment. For medium-scale projects, a team-of-teams approach may be neces-
sary. An initial team is formed, typically comprised of the most experienced 
people, to specify and define an architecture for the system, to develop and cer-
tify an initial increment or two, and to create specifications for subsystems. 
These team members can then serve as leaders for new teams formed to develop 
and certify the subsystems. The initial team can always be reconstituted as nee-
~ 
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essary, for a day or a month or more, to deal with changes in user requirements 
or development strategies at the system level. For large-scale systems, the team-
of-teams approach is required, perhaps with specializations such as specifica-
tion teams, development teams, and certification teams. Thus, three initial 
teams might be formed: one to specify a system, one to develop its initial 
increments, and one to certify the increments. Members of these teams can 
then lead new specialized teams at the subsystem level. Whatever the organi-
zation, all team members require education in Cleanroom technologies. Ed-
ucation can be augmented with on-the-job training under the guidance of 
experienced team leaders. 
Reviews are a crucial part of Cleanroom team operations. Every work 
product is subject to repeated team review as it is developed from initial concept 
to final form. Two types of reviews are employed. The first type is called a 
development review. Development reviews focus on technical strategies, better 
ideas, and team education and communication. For example, a team member 
may convene a development review for an initial program design strategy sum-
marized in a page or two. The discussion at this point is on strategies for control 
and data structures, algorithm trade-offs, and so on. The best ideas are then 
incorporated, perhaps leading to a five-page elaboration for the next develop-
ment review. Initial development reviews can be short, often on the order of a 
half hour or so, and may gradually increase in duration as work products evolve. 
A given work product may go through many development reviews. Efficiencies 
are gained and time is saved through cumulative knowledge transfer at succes-
sive reviews, so that evolving work products become increasingly familiar to 
team members as the reviews progress. Final work products produced by a team 
member ultimately incorporate the best ideas of all team members. 
Simplification of all work products is an explicit objective in team reviews. 
The first idea is almost never the best idea, and a key goal of reviews is to 
develop better ideas in specification, design, and certification. For example, a 
better idea found early may result in a 1,000-line design instead of a 5,000-line 
design. It is far easier to verify (and maintain) 1,000 lines than 5,000, and 
redesign for simplicity and better ideas is almost always an efficient strategy. 
Simplification often results from identification and reuse of systematic struc-
tures, the verification of which can be done once and for all. 
The second type of review is called a verification review. These reviews 
focus on correctness and completeness of work products through a formal veri-
fication process. These verifications are usually carried out through verbal 
assertions, with the designer articulating the reasoning required to show that 
function-based correctness conditions are met. Every condition is checked by 
the team in turn, with unanimous agreement required. Any changes required 
must be reverified at a subsequent review. A work product is regarded as correct 
and complete when no changes are necessary as a result of a verification review. 
At this point, the entire team assumes ownership of the work product, and any 
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subsequent errors are the responsibility of the team. Verification reviews gain 
efficiency through the previous knowledge transfer that occurred during devel-
opment reviews, whereby every participant becomes familiar with the structure 
and content of the work product being verified. In addition, reused patterns of 
specification and design can often be employed, with substantial portions of 
their verifications likewise reusable. 
1.3 Cleanroom Technologies 
Cleanroom software engineering is characterized by three principal technolo-
gies: incremental development under statistical process control; function-based 
specification, design, and verification; and statistical testing and software certi-
fication. These technologies can be used separately or together, and can be 
introduced in any order to improve software practice. 
1.3.1 Incremental Development under 
Statistical Process Control 
Incremental development is based on the engineering principle of controlled 
·nera:iron ·m product deve1opment. Rather than a single pass through the develop-
ment process, incremental development involves a series of smaller, cumulative 
development passes. Each pass (increment) is cumulative, involving all work in 
previous increments plus some new work. Incremental development is essential 
to the ability of the development team to maintain intellectual control of a proj-
ect. Team members thus focus on only a portion of the work at any given time 
rather than trying to keep all things in mind at once. 
An incremental development plan organizes a Cleanroom project into an 
orderly sequence of development cycles, with some amount of end user func-
tion developed in each cycle. The evolving product can be demonstrated to the 
customer at the end of each increment. With such concrete visibility into a proj-
ect, the customer can reconfirm or clarify requirements in an informed way, 
minimizing surprises for either party at the project's completion. 
The driver in increment planning is the system architecture. In a mature 
product line, a reference architecture may dictate the high-level structure and 
interfaces so that increments are devoted to reusing, modifying, or developing 
components with a known place in the architecture. In new developments, the 
top-level architecture will either precede the first increment or be the focus of 
the first increment, and subsequent increments elaborate stubs (placeholders) in 
the architecture. In a legacy system, the increment plan may dovetail with a 
reengineering plan, enabling changes that improve rather than destabilize the 
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system over time. In a maintenance environment, fixes and enhancements are 
treated as a continuation of incremental development, using the same process 
discipline that would be applied in new development. 
Given a system architecture, numerous factors remain as considerations in 
increment planning. In an embedded system, coordination with the hardware 
development schedule may be a factor. In a graphical user interface (GUI) 
system, the first increment is often devoted to prototyping the user interface, 
arguably the most volatile aspect of requirements. Because scaffolding is avoided 
in incremental development, allocation of development tasks across increments 
nearly always involves some consideration of functional dependencies: A file 
must be parsed, for example, before its individual tokens can be used for other 
purposes. Risk, complexity, novelty, reuse, and usage frequency are other fac-
tors that may affect increment planning. If possible, the greatest areas of un-
certainty are addressed in early increments so that impact on the schedule is 
understood sooner rather than later. 
In addition to the benefits of intellectual control, customer feedback, and 
risk management, incremental development enables the project team to employ 
tatistical process control. Product quality is measured at the end of each incre-
ment and is compared with the team's quality goals. The deviation between 
actual results and goals is used to determine whether the development process is 
under control. A minor deviation confirms that the project is on track, whereas 
an unacceptable deviation occasions a careful performance review. If problems 
are identified, the team can make process changes to improve performance in 
the next increment. 
1.3.2 Function-Based Specification, Design, 
and Verification 
Cleamoom employs development methods that are both theoretically sound and 
highly practical. Specification begins with an external view (called the black 
box), is transformed into a state machine view (called the state box), and is fully 
developed into a procedure (called the clear box). These distinct but behav-
iorally equivalent forms are known collectively as box structures. Box struc-
rures are object based and support key software engineering principles of 
information hiding and separation of concerns. 
A black box specification defines the required external behavior of a sys-
tem or system component in terms of a mapping from the stimulus history 
input) to its correct response (output). Only the external behavior is defined; 
no descriptions of internal state or implementation details are necessary or 
included. A black box focuses exclusively on defining the user view of a system 
or system part, where the user may be a person, hardware unit, or another pro-
gram. Figure 1.1 depicts a conceptual view of a black box. SH represents the 
stimulus history and R represents the corresponding response. 
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Figure 1.1 Conceptual view of a black box 
A stimulus sequence is a series of individual inputs that might be presented 
to the system. A single stimulus may originate with a human user (e.g., a key 
press or a mouse click), a hardware component (e.g., a clock pulse or a signal 
from a sensor), or another software component (e.g., the operating system or a 
database). A series of these stimuli forms a unique stimulus sequence, which 
must be mapped to a single response. The black box consists of the stimulus list, 
the response list, and a stimulus history to response mapping rule for all possi-
ble histories of use. A black box is a state-free, procedure-free representation of a 
function, and the mapping must be complete, consistent, and traceably correct. 
The state box specification, derived from the black box, is the first step 
toward implementation. The state box defines the elements of stimulus history 
that must be stored as state data to achieve the external behavior specified by the 
black box. A state box defines the required behavior of a system or system part 
as a mapping (transition) from the current stimulus and old state to the corre-
sponding response and new state. After state data have been defined, it is no 
longer necessary to consider the stimulus history. Figure 1.2 depicts a concep-
tual view of a state box. 
The state box describes only the response and state update of a system or 




Figure 1.2 Conceptual view of a state box 
. 
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Figure 1.3 Conceptual view of a clear box 
nor included. As with the black box, the state box must be complete, consistent, 
and traceably correct. 
A clear box specification implements the corresponding state box in proce-
dures that carry out the state box mapping rule, and may introduce new black 
boxes to represent major operations. The procedure must be sufficient to per-
form necessary state updates and to create required responses. Figure 1.3 de-
picts a conceptual view of a clear box, shown as a sequence control structure. 
Alternation (branching), iteration (looping), and concurrent control structures 
can appear in clear boxes as well. Any new black boxes introduced are subse-
quently refined into state and clear boxes. 
As with the black box and the state box, the clear box must be complete, 
consistent, and traceably correct. Clear boxes can be defined in design lan-
guages or in the target language for a system. 
1.3.3 Correctness Verification 
In box structure specification and design, a black box is defined to record re-
quired behavior, then a state box is refined from the black box to define required 
state data, and finally a clear box is refined from the state box to define required 
processing. Each box structure is subject to correctness verification in develop-
ment team reviews. The team verifies the correctness of each refinement step 
with respect to the previous step using reasoning based on function theory. In 
other words, the development team confirms that the stimulus- response map-
ping defined in one step is preserved in each subsequent step. 
For example, in clear box procedure verification, a function-theoretic Cor-
rectness Theorem defines conditions to be met for achieving correct programs 
(Linger, Mills, and Witt 1979). These correctness conditions are verified in men-
tal and verbal proofs of correctness in development team verification reviews. 
Clear box procedures can contain an infinite number of paths that cannot all be 
checked by path-based inspections or software testing. However, the Correctness 
Theorem is based on verifying individual control structures rather than tracing 
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paths. Because procedures contain a finite number of control structures, the Cor-
rectness Theorem reduces verification to a finite number of checks, and permits 
all software logic to be verified completely in all possible circumstances of use. 
All Cleanroom-developed software is subject to function-theoretic correct-
ness verification by the development team prior to release to the certification 
test team. A practical and powerful process, verification permits development 
teams to verify completely the correctness of software with respect to specifica-
tions. The verification step is remarkably effective in eliminating defects, and is 
a major factor in the quality improvements achieved by Cleanroom teams. 
1.3.4 Statistical Testing and Software Certification 
Cleanroom testing methods are grounded in the fundamental statistical princi-
ple that sampling must be used when a population is too large for exhaustive 
study. A usage model is developed to represent the (usually infinite) population 
of all possible system uses, and test cases are generated from the usage model. 
Because the test cases are a random sample of the population, valid statistical 
inferences can be made about expected operational performance of the system. 
A usage model represents all possible events in system use and their proba-
bilities of occurrence. Usage models can be conveniently expressed in a number 
of forms, including Markov models and formal grammars. In the Markov 
approach, a usage model consists of a set of usage states connected by transition 
arcs that represent possible stimuli to the system under test, with a probability 
value associated with each arc. The probability represents the likelihood of 
choosing a specific transition arc from a given usage state. Test cases are gener-
ated by traversing the model from start state to end state, randomly selecting 
stimuli to include in the test case based on the transition probabilities. Figure 
1.4 depicts the look and feel of a usage model. The arcs represent stimuli and 
the nodes represent usage states. The arcs are labeled with stimuli and probabil-
ities of occurrence. 
Usage models are reusable project assets capable of generating any number 
of test cases. In practice, a number of usage models may be developed to test a 
system, and various probability distributions may be employed with a given 
model. For example, many systems provide infrequently used functions with 
high consequences of failure, such as functions to shut down the reactor in a 
nuclear power plant. Such functions are typically associated with low probabil-
ities of execution in models of normal usage. Models of safety-critical usage, 
hazardous usage, malicious usage, or other special usage circumstances are 
developed when required for focused testing on high-consequence functions. 
Statistical usage testing can be readily combined with other forms of testing. 
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Figure 1.4 A simple usage model 
1.4 The Cleanroom Process 
The Cleanroom Reference Model (CRM), developed by the Software Engineer-
ing Institute (Linger and Trammell 1996), defines a set of integrated processes 
and work products for Cleanroom project performance. The CRM process flow 
· depicted in Figure 1.5. The CRM is composed of 14 individual processes for 
oftware management, specification, development, and certification: 
The management processes are Project Planning, Project Management, 
Performance Improvement, and Engineering Change. 
The specification processes are Requirements Analysis, Function Speci-
fication, Usage Specification, Architecture Specification, and Increment 
Planning. 
The development processes are Software Reengineering, Increment 
Design, and Correctness Verification. 
The certification processes are Usage Modeling and Test Planning, and 
Statistical Testing and Certification. 
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The four management processes shown at the top of Figure 1.5 affect all 
other processes. During the Project Planning process, the team tailors the 
Cleanroom process for the project environment, and creates and maintains soft-
ware development plans. These plans are used during the Project Management 
process for managing and controlling incremental development and certifica-
tion. The Performance Improvement process is used to assess project perfor-
mance continually and to identify and to implement improvements. The 
Engineering Change process provides configuration management and engineer-
ing discipline for all change activity. 
The Architecture Specification process likewise spans the life cycle and 
defines architectural structures and strategies. Aspects of a project from require-
ments to low-level design may be affected by architecture. 
The Requirements Analysis process is used to create an initial definition of 
customer requirements. This definition is then expressed in precise terms in the 
Function Specification process (producing a specification of external behavior) 
and the Usage Specification process (producing a specification of users, usage 
environments, and patterns of use of the software system). The Increment 
Planning process allocates specified software functions to a series of incre-
ments, and schedules their development and certification within the structure of 
the overall project schedule. 
The development and certification processes are shown on the right side 
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Software Reengineering process prepares existing software for use in an incre-
ment. The Increment Design and Correctness Verification processes are em-
ployed to develop the design and code for an increment, and to verify their 
correctness. The Usage Modeling and Test Planning process is conducted in 
parallel with development activity in each increment, and produces test cases 
generated from usage models. The Statistical Testing and Certification process 
is employed to assess an increment's fitness for use. On completion of each 
increment, the customer evaluates the executing system and provides feedback 
for requirements validation. As shown by the feedback loop from the completed 
increment to the beginning of the process, high-level specification processes 
may be revisited prior to each increment to incorporate clarifications to require-
ments resulting from customer evaluation of an increment. 
1 .5 Relationship of Cleanroom 
to Other Practices 
Many of the best software engineering practices currently in use are strongly 
supported by the Cleanroom process. 
1.5.1 Object Orientation 
Cleanroom processes provide manageability and technical rigor for object-
oriented development (Ett and Trammell 1995). Objects are essentially state 
machines with encapsulated data and a set of services. A Cleanroom component 
is defined in a black box view (an object's external behavior), a state box view 
(an object's encapsulated data), and a clear box view (services that process 
external requests and access encapsulated data). A Cleanroom component is an 
object in the most technical sense. Cleanroom box structures can help produce 
complete, consistent, and correct specification of object behavior. Moreover, 
box structures help define and manage data and control flow among objects. 
In Cleanroom, mathematical formalisms underlie specification, design, 
correctness verification, and certification testing. These mature formalisms 
can add rigor and predictability to comparatively heuristic object-oriented 
approaches. Cleanroom is a process for application engineering rather than 
domain engineering. The common strength of object-oriented methods is their 
pursuit of abstractions and relationships that are characteristic of applications in 
a domain. Cleanroom application engineering can be complemented by object-
oriented domain analysis. 
16 Cleanroom Overview 
1.5.2 Software Reuse 
Successful reuse of software components requires precise definition of compo-
nent functional semantics, and certification of component quality and reliability 
for particular usage environments. Without this knowledge, reuse can be an 
unpredictable and risky undertaking. 
Cleanroom black box specifications can be used to define component 
semantics in all possible circumstances of use. If the scope of intended reuse is 
narrower than the scope ofthe component (e.g., reduced variable range), a spec-
ification of reduced scope can be developed by restricting the domain of the 
black box function. A "wrapper" (a component to contain the reused compo-
nent) may be created to enforce preconditions for component invocation. 
More often, the fitness of an existing component for reuse is assessed 
through execution experiments. Cleanroom certification through statistical usage-
based testing can provide measures of component quality and reliability for 
given environments of use. Statistical testing allows assessment of component 
reliability at specified levels of confidence for specified usage conditions. 
A quantitative approach to reuse analysis has been advanced by Poore, 
Mills, and Mutchler (1993) in connection with Cleanroom reliability planning. 
With this approach, component reliabilities and transition probabilities in the 
top-level design are established. A quantitative analysis of the top-level compo-
nent network is performed, yielding information about the upper bound on sys-
tem reliability given the reliability of components. The results of this analysis 
may be used to evaluate the viability of component reuse. 
1.5.3 Software Architectures 
Among the many definitions of software architecture, one theme is constant: An 
architecture defines primary system components and their connections. Clean-
room provides a process for precise definition of the functional semantics of an 
architecture-what the components are and what kind of connections they have. 
The high-level internal design issues in the Cleanroom state box and clear 
box concern primary system components and their connections: Primary data 
objects are invented in state box design, and primary operations on data objects 
are invented in clear box design. The final, high-level clear box design embod-
ies major elements of the system architecture. 
Cleanroom specification and design involves systematic exploration of a 
system's solution space. The black box to state box relationship is one to many. 
A set of objects must be chosen. The state box to clear box relationship is 
also one to many. A set of object operations must be chosen. Classifications of 
design patterns are emerging from the evolving field of software architectures, 
and the Cleanroom practitioner's design choices during box structure system 
design will be facilitated as design patterns are cataloged. 
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In short, Cleanroom systems have always had explicit architectures, but 
they have been unnamed (other than "system top-level clear box"). The naming 
and characterization of design patterns that is occurring in the study of software 
architectures will expedite the evaluation of design choices in Cleanroom proj-
ects as it will in software projects in general. 
1.5.4 Inspections and Reviews 
Cleanroom correctness verification permits additional technical rigor and pre-
cision in inspections and reviews. Beyond local checklists that may be used, 
a Cleanroom review of design and code artifacts employs reasoning based on 
function theory: A program (the code) implements a function (the specifica-
tion). The purpose of a Cleanroom review is to verify that the correctness of the 
function specification has been preserved in the implementation. Code is never 
reviewed in a vacuum; it is always reviewed against the function specification it 
implements. 
Cleanroom specification and design produce artifacts with built-in traceabil-
ity. Peer review is employed at each step in box structure specification and 
design. Every work product is reviewed; every team member is responsible for 
the correctness of every work product. Ultimate successes are regarded as team 
successes, and failures as team failures. The combination of technically sound 
practices and team accountability for correctness results in an extremely effec-
tive approach to defect prevention. 
1.5.5 Software Testing Methods 
Cleanroom testing based on usage models produces statistically valid infer-
ences about expected operational performance of a given version of the soft-
ware. Cleanroom usage models can be configured for other testing objectives as 
well, such as maximizing coverage or emphasizing critical functions. Usage 
models provide a scientific basis for model coverage testing, random testing, 
importance testing, partition testing, and other forms of testing. 
Crafted testing can be used within a Cleanroom process as well. There are 
compelling reasons for creating special test cases that can remove uncertainty 
about how the system will perform under specific circumstances. Additionally, 
code coverage tools that run in the background may be used as a complement to 
usage testing. Regression testing, structural (white box) testing, and other tradi-
tional testing approaches are compatible with Cleanroom. 
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1.6 Cleanroom Project Experience 
First demonstrated in the IBM Federal Systems Division in the early 1980s, 
Cleanroom methods have now been used in industry and government software 
organizations around the world. The award-winning National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) at the Goddard 
Space Flight Center conducted a well-documented series of Cleanroom proj-
ects, concluding that Cleanroom results improved on the SEL baseline. The US 
Army Picatinny Arsenal demonstrated a return on investment in Cleanroom 
technology of more than 20:1 over a five-year period. Ongoing research and 
technology transfer by the University of Tennessee has produced a stream of 
advances in Cleanroom methods that have extended Mills' original ideas, with 
powerful connections to related areas of science. 
The effectiveness of the Cleanroom process has been demonstrated in proj-
ects from embedded software systems for computer hardware and telephone 
switches to software language and computer-aided software engineering tool 
products. Published accounts of Cleanroom projects by AT&T, Ericsson, IBM, 
Texas Instruments, the US Army, the US Navy, and others are listed in the read-
ing list at the end of this chapter. 
Organizations have reported significant gains in productivity and quality, 
as well as additional benefits in improved development team morale and confi-
dence. In an era when software projects are notoriously unpredictable, Clean-
room organizations are exhibiting not just control but steady improvement. 
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2 
Cleanroom Management 
by Incremental Development 
Incremental development under statistical quality control is the Cleanroom 
approach to establishing and maintaining management control of a software 
project. Incremental development was proposed by Mills in the early 1970s, but 
did not gain prominence until the late 1980s when Cleanroom articles and field 
reports by Mills and associates began to appear. In his influential commentary 
on software practice, "No Silver Bullet: Essence and Accidents of Software 
Engineering," Fred Brooks described the profound effects of the incremental 
development approach. 
Some years ago Harlan Mills proposed that any software system should be 
grown by incremental development [Mills 1971]. That is, the system should 
first be made to run, even if it does nothing useful except call the proper set of 
dummy subprograms. Then, bit by bit, it should be fleshed out, with the sub-
programs in turn being developed-into actions or calls to empty stubs in the 
level below. 
I have seen most dramatic results since I began urging this technique. 
Nothing in the past decade has so radically changed my own practice, or its 
effectiveness. The approach necessitates top-down design, for it is a top-down 
growing of the software. It allows easy backtracking. It lends itself to early 
prototypes. Each added function and new provision for more complex data or 
circumstances grows organically out of what is already there. 
The morale effects are startling. Enthusiasm jumps when there is a run-
ning system, even a simple one. Efforts redouble when the first picture from a 
new graphics software system appears on the screen, even if it is only a rectan-
gle. One always has, at every stage in the process, a working system. I find that 
teams can grow much more complex entities . .. than they can build. (Brooks 
1987, p. 18) 
Brooks' observations have been borne out in industrial practice. Incre-
mental development enables early and continual quality assessment and user 
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feedback, and facilitates process improvements as development progresses. The 
incremental approach avoids risks inherent in component integration late in the 
development cycle. Incremental development also permits systematic incorpo-
ration of requirements changes throughout the development cycle. 
The technical basis for incremental development is the property of refer-
ential transparency. In the context of software development, this property re-
quires that a specification and its implementation define the same mathematical 
function. When this property holds, a design can be shown to be correct with 
respect to its specification. The key ideas in incremental development are sum-
marized in the following section. 
2.1 Benefits of Incremental 
Development 
Large software systems are organized collections of parts. The way a system is 
composed from parts has a critical impact on project success. Incremental 
development is a top-down approach to development in which a software sys-
tem is developed and tested as a succession of cumulative subsets of function. A 
minimal system is developed in the first increment, and function is added in 
each successive increment until the system is complete. This controlled growth 
of a software system benefits customers, managers, and technical staff alike. 
2.1.1 Visibility into Progress 
With incremental development, each increment implements one or more end 
user functions . Each increment contains all previously developed functionality 
plus some new function; the system is "grown" in cumulative increments. At the 
end of the first increment, for example, one can be confident that 20% of the 
system is 100% complete, rather than speculating that 100% of the system is 
20% complete. 
2.1.2 Intellectual Control 
Incremental development enables intellectual control over system development 
through referential transparency. This property-substitution of equals for 
equals-is satisfied when subspecifications for functions to be implemented in 
later increments are embedded in the procedural logic of the current increment. 
When referential transparency holds, a system part can be implemented from its 
subspecification with no need for backtracking. There is no rework of previous 
increments. This strategy enables correctness verification of each increment 
within a complete system context. 
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2.1.3 Incremental System Integration 
Cleanroom incremental development permits continual integration of referen-
tially transparent user- function increments over the entire development life 
cycle. Because the design of each increment is based on a verified subspecifica-
tion and a tested interface in a prior increment, deep design and interface errors 
are rare. The system evolves in well-defined increments throughout the devel-
opment process. Testing and certification activities begin early in the develop-
ment cycle. 
2.1.4 Continual Quality Feedback through 
Statistical Process Control 
Incremental development as practiced in Cleanroom provides a basis for sta-
tistical process control. Each Cleanroom increment is a complete cycle of the 
process, involving specification, development, and verification of new user 
function plus testing of all work completed to date. As is typical in statistical 
process control, measures of performance in each iteration of the process are 
compared with performance targets to determine whether or not the process is 
"in control" (i.e., occurring as expected). 
Typically, a Cleanroom team uses measures of product performance in test-
ing as a gauge of process control. Measures such as errors per 1,000 lines of 
code, mean time to failure (MTTF), or reliability and confidence are commonly 
used. Other measures of process control might relate to management issues 
rather than product quality. Schedule conformance, budget conformance, con-
formance to the staffing plan, and so forth, all compare actual performance with 
performance goals in the increment. The standards against which Cleanroom 
increments are measured represent the specific level of process control a team 
requires to continue a project as planned. If standards are not met, the team can 
examine performance data from the increment to identify problems, adjust proj-
ect plans if necessary, and modify the software development process to prevent 
recurrence of the problems identified. For example, if testing of an increment 
reveals that the process is "out of control" (i.e., quality standards are not being 
met), testing ceases and developers return to the design stage. If the process is in 
control, work on the next increment can continue. 
Statistical process control (SPC) is a mature engineering practice affording 
well-developed techniques for data collection and analysis . A wealth of meth-
ods and tool support is available to those who wish to pursue advanced practice. 
Rudimentary practice of SPC, however, requires little investment or effort, and 
can result in substantial payoffs. The essential events in any application of sta-
tistical process control are simple: Measure performance in each process cycle, 
compare actual performance with predefined performance targets, identify the 
causes of unacceptable deviation, and address causes through process changes 
intended to improve future performance. 
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For example, if a Cleanroom team customarily produces a product that 
exhibits three or fewer failures per 1,000 lines of code in testing, then an incre-
ment exhibiting five failures per 1,000 lines is likely to represent an unaccept-
able deviation. On investigation, the team may discover that the failures were 
caused by errors that were in fact found during verification, but that the code 
was not reverified to confirm the correctness of changes. From this analysis, the 
team realizes that verification should not be regarded as complete until all 
changes to erroneous code have been verified to be correct. The team modifies 
the verification process accordingly, determined to prevent failures caused by 
incorrect fixes in future increments. In this way, feedback produced in each 
increment is used to improve the process in the next increment. 
The strength in SPC lies in the ongoing examination of actual versus 
planned performance, identifying the causes of unacceptable deviations, and 
making specific process changes to regain or improve control. A Cleanroom 
team practices these fundamentals, and goes further. Each Cleanroom incre-
ment is tested against expectations of perfection. Any failure is regarded as 
unacceptable. Errors causing failures are analyzed carefully for what they 
reveal about the development process. What was the source of the error? Why 
was the error missed in team review? How can the process be improved so that 
similar errors are not made in the future? Cleanroom teams genuinely strive for 
perfection, and SPC is the engineering discipline for gauging and advancing the 
team's efforts. 
2.1.5 Continual Functional Feedback 
through Customer Use 
Incremental development enables early and continual feedback by customers 
on the executing functionality of an evolving system, to permit changes if nec-
essary. Because the increments execute in a system environment and represent 
subsets of user function, early increments can be exercised by users for feed-
back on system functionality and usability. Such feedback helps avoid develop-
ing the wrong system and builds user acceptance of the eventual product. 
2.1.6 Accommodation of Change 
Incremental development allows systematic accommodation of inevitable 
changes in system requirements and the project environment. At the completion 
of each increment, the impact of accumulated changes in system requirements 
can be assessed in terms of current specifications and increment designs. If 
changes are isolated to future increments, they can often be incorporated within 
the existing incremental development plan, with possible adjustments to sched-
ules and resources. If changes affect completed increments, modified system 
development can begin from the top down, usually with substantial (often total) 
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reuse of code from existing increments, with adjustments to schedules and 
resources as required. 
2.1.7 Schedule and Resource Management 
Project resources can be allocated in a controlled manner through incremental 
development. The available schedule is a factor in determining the number of 
increments to be developed and their size. With a short schedule, a small num-
ber of increments will help maintain sufficient intervals between increment 
deliveries to the certification team to permit an orderly testing process. 
However, this places a greater burden on the development teams to design and 
implement larger, more complex increments. Schedule and complexity trade-
offs can be reflected in the incremental development plan. In addition, feedback 
from successive increments provides management with objective measures of 
process and product performance to permit accommodation of shortfalls or 
windfalls in development and testing. 
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
of Incremental Development 
Incremental development as practiced in the Cleanroom process is based on the 
principle of referential transparency. Referential transparency means that the 
only thing that matters about an expression is its value, and any subexpression 
can be replaced by any other that is equal in value. Referential transparency 
implies that the relevant lower level details of an entity are abstracted rather 
than omitted in a particular system of higher level description, so that the higher 
level description contains everything needed to understand the entity when 
placed in a larger context. The concept of referential transparency has been 
applied in a wide range of areas, such as computer science, linguistics, mathe-
matics, and logic. 
2.2.1 Referential Transparency in Arithmetic 
Referential transparency is the property that guarantees that evaluation of 
lengthy arithmetic expressions one term at a time will produce the right answer. 
For example, in the expression (6 + 2) X (5 -3), because 6 + 2 = 8, the expres-
ion is equivalent to 8 x (5 - 3), and because 5 - 3 = 2, it is also equivalent to 
8 x 2. Finally, because 8 x 2 = 16, it is equivalent to 16. Referential trans-
parency guarantees that one can replace (6 + 2) by 8 unconditionally; without 
worrying, for example, about whether the result will go on to be multiplied by 
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(5 - 3), or subtracted from 17, or whatever. Referential transparency is estab-
lished once and for all in the formal logic of arithmetic. 
Note that because of referential transparency, each step, properly done, 
progresses toward the correct answer. Thus, in this three-step problem we can 
say with confidence that after the first step is finished, the solution is one-third 
complete; that is, previous steps need not be revisited to complete subsequent 
steps. In addition, because each step has no side effects on other steps, terms at 
the same level can be evaluated in any order. Thus, the property has analogs to 
important software concepts of abstraction, specification, progress toward solu-
tion, and absence of side effects. 
2.2.2 Referential Transparency in Software 
The basis for incremental development in software lies in the view of programs 
and program parts as rules for mathematical functions (Linger, Mills, and Witt 
1979). This view regards program development as a top-down refinement of 
functions (specifications) into control structures and subfunctions (subspecifi-
cations). Such refinement may result in object-based or functional decomposi-
tions, or a combination of the two. For example, a given function (specification) 
f could be refined into any of the following 
do fl; f2 e nddo 
i f p t hen fl else f2 endif 




where fl and f2 represent subfunctions (subspecifications) for further refine-
ment. The successive function refinements must maintain functional equivalence 
for correctness verification at each step. For example, in the previous sequence 
refinement, the composition of subfunctionsfJ and/2 must be equivalent in net 
effect on data to the original function f Referential transparency requires that 
any function (f, fl, or f2) specify completely the required net effect of process-
ing at the point it appears in the design, and no further information or reference 
to other design parts be required for its independent refinement. 
Because of referential transparency, the verification of any refinement step 
can be conducted independently of any other refinement step. This means that 
the system architecture can be verified in early increments, before most of the 
system components have been written, and that the architecture need not be 
reverified in later increments. Note, however, that the specifications of system 
components enter into the architecture verification, and in fact provide the pre-
cise interface documentation required to guarantee that the system as a whole 
will perform as required when coding is complete. 
.~»' 
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An illustration of function refinement with referential transparency at the 
programming level is shown in Figure 2.1. The two-step refinement on the right 
side of the figure maintains function equivalence at each step. First, the initial 
specification f is refined into loop initialization code g and subspecification k, 
where k completely specifies interfaces and the required net effect of processing 
at that point in the design. Next, subspecification k is refined into an iteration in 
a second step. These expansion steps are referentially transparent, and represent 
possible increment definitions. In this case, the first increment would contain 
the loop initialization code represented by g, with the subspecification k defined 
and connected in the sequence for verification against f, but stubbed off in the 
code. A crucial point is that the sequence of code gfollowed by subspecification 
k is functionally equivalent to the original specification f The second increment 
would refine k into the whiledo iteration, which is functionally equivalent to k. 
Other design strategies, such as the one given on the left side of Figure 2.1, 
would violate referential transparency and forfeit intellectual control of top-
down design. The difference between these approaches may seem minor in this 
simple example, but if g and k represent 50,000 lines of code (KLOC) and 500 
KLOC respectively, with a complex interface between them, referentially trans-
parent increments could mean the difference between success and failure of 
the project. 
--
NO path f: YES th 
---~ Specification ~ pa 










k: -- Loop subspecification 
YES path 
[f] = [g; k] 
f--+ 
[while p do h enddo] of- [g; while p do h enddo] [g; k] = [g; while p do h enddo] 
Figure 2.1 An illustration of referential transparency in refinement 
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2.3 Increment Planning in Practice 
The overall objective of and constraint on incremental development is to grow a 
system with each new increment as an elaboration of the functions implemented 
in prior increments. That is, new functions in an increment should "plug in" to 
the previous increment at predefined points in its structure and should satisfy 
the subspecifications associated with the processing requirements at those 
points. This process of function allocation is the practical application of refer-
ential transparency to incremental development planning. Thus, logical alloca-
tion of functions to increments based on relationships among functions and 
intrinsic functional dependencies will predominate in the definition of incre-
ment content. In a database system, for example, functions to add data would 
typically precede functions to delete data. In a statistical system, functions to 
collect and enter data would ordinarily precede functions to analyze data and 
report results . 
Within the framework of functional dependencies exhibited by a system, 
increment planning is also influenced by a wide range of management and tech-
nical factors in a project. These factors are discussed in the following pages. 
2.3.1 Customer Needs 
The customer may wish to place certain system functions into operational use 
prior to system completion. Such functions are likely candidates for early in-
crements. 
2.3.2 Clarification of Requirements 
The common motivation behind iterative development methods is the fact that 
requirements can rarely be established with certainty at the outset of a project. 
With incremental development, customers provide feedback on an evolving 
system by direct operation of user-executable increments. The relative clarity of 
requirements may influence an increment plan in two ways. Volatile require-
ments may be implemented in an early increment so they can be clarified. 
Alternatively, unstable requirements may be planned for later implementation, 
when questions affecting the requirements have been settled. If the user inter-
face is not well established, for example, it is an ideal candidate for an early 
increment. (Some would say that the user interface is invariably the most vola-
tile aspect of the system and should always be implemented in the first in-
crement.) On the other hand, requirements to be settled by concurrent research 
(e.g., performance benchmarking) might be scheduled for a later increment, 
after research results are known. 
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2.3.3 Operational Usage Probabilities 
A functional usage distribution is developed as part of a top-level Cleanroom 
specification. Expected usage probabilities of system functions are established 
from historical data and estimates provided by customers. System functions 
with high expected usage probabilities will receive the greatest exposure in the 
field and may therefore benefit from the greatest exposure to testing. Because 
increments are cumulative, the functions developed in early increments will be 
tested every time a new increment enters the testing process. System functions 
expected to receive the greatest operational usage by customers, therefore, are 
candidates for early increments. Some functions expected to receive low usage 
may even be regarded as optional, and may be scheduled for development in the 
final increment if time permits. 
2.3.4 Reliability Management 
Increasingly, customers are specifying formal software reliability requirements. 
Poore, Mills, and Mutchler (1993) described an approach to increment planning 
based on reliability requirements for subsystems in a high-level design. Given a 
total system reliability requirement and transitional probabilities between sub-
systems, the reliability requirement for each subsystem may be calculated. Sub-
systems with the highest reliability requirements will have the greatest impact 
on total system reliability, and may be candidates for early increments. 
2.3.5 Systems Engineering 
Controlled iteration is a key engineering principle in hardware development. 
The minimal machine is often constructed in the first iteration and then 
enhanced in subsequent iterations until the complete machine has been built. 
Incremental development of software is entirely compatible with this standard 
approach to hardware development. Machines with embedded software must be 
developed as a coordinated effort between hardware and software engineers, 
and incremental development is an ideal framework for this coordination. A 
machine must be powered on, for example, before it can be used. The software 
for system start-up, therefore, would likely be among the functions imple-
mented in the first increment of an embedded software project. 
2.3.6 Technical Challenges 
~ ovel or particularly complex components may pose a risk to the schedule or 
even the viability of a project. If such work is scheduled for an early increment, 
the experience obtained will either lend support to existing plans or suggest 
revisions. If aspects of a project are not novel or complex in absolute terms, but 
are indeed novel or complex relative to the experience of the team, an early 
gauge of team performance and schedule feasibility is still desirable. 
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2.3.7 Leveraging Reuse 
The Cleanroom process emphasizes economy of effort through reuse of com-
ponents across projects, and identifies opportunities to develop "common ser-
vices" for use in multiple places within a system. When existing components 
are identified as potentially reusable, the development team must evaluate the 
relative effort required to tailor them for use in the new system versus develop-
ment of new components from scratch. If the evaluation is in favor of reuse, the 
team may want to include the components in an early increment to validate their 
expected performance. New common services may be desirable candidates for 
an early increment as well. Because common services are used in multiple 
places in a system, they may have a greater impact on system reliability relative 
to other single-instance components. Because existing objects may be reusable 
components, the rationale for object development in an incremental develop-
ment plan follows the rationale for reusable components in general. 
2.4 Incremental Development in Practice 
An illustration of an application developed under incremental development is pre-
sented in Figure 2.2. The successive increments in Figure 2.2 represent an un-
folding of the "stacked" increments in the CRM work flow diagram in Figure 1.5. 
The incremental development plan in Figure 2.2 divides the project into 
four increments with reuse of existing components in several increments. The 
top-level architecture is established during increment 1. Three lower level sub-
systems are defined, and one is implemented. The implemented subsystem in-
cludes a reused component. Stubs are used for the subsystems that will be 
implemented during later increments. The stubs are not merely placeholders; 
they include an interface specification and function specification so the rela-
tionship between implemented functions and stubbed functions is well defined. 
On completion, increment 1 is evaluated by the user. As a consequence of user 
feedback, a component in increment 1 is slated for change during increment 2. 
A second subsystem is implemented during increment 2, replacing a stub in 
increment 1. Another preexisting component is used in increment 2, and modi-
fied to accommodate one additional function. The additional function is speci-
fied in increment 2, but is not slated for implementation until the final increment. 
Implementation ofthe third subsystem begins during increment 3. The 
third subsystem includes one new component, one reused component, and one 
stub. User evaluation of increment 3 results in a change to one component dur-
ing increment 4. 
Increment 4, like all preceding increments, is the accumulation of all work 
so far, plus some new work. During increment 4, all remaining stubs are imple-
mented. As the final increment, increment 4 represents the completed system. 
.., 
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The treatment of stubbed parts of the system is critical to the integrity of 
the design. Correctness verification of each increment requires that specifica-
tions for later increments appear in the procedural logic at their proper points of 
execution. The completeness of the design in each increment ensures the smooth 
integration of new work as development progresses. 
Figure 2.3 shows the incremental development portion of the schedule for 
the project. After top-level specification, an incremental development plan is 
established. Both the specification and the incremental development plan are 
subject to revision after each increment based on development experience, qual-
ity measures, and customer feedback. After each increment is fully specified, 
designed, and verified, it is submitted for independent certification testing. The 
measures of quality in certification testing (e.g., MTTF, reliability, errors per 
KLOC) are gauges of development process control. If measured quality meets 
established standards, development proceeds. If not, problems are assessed and 
action is taken to improve the development process. 
After increment 1 is submitted for certification testing, development of 
increment 2 begins based on its embedded specification in increment 1. If more 
than one development team is available, parallel development of increment 3 
may also begin. 
Incremental development affords customer feedback on the evolving sys-
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Figure 2.2 An example of incremental development and feedback 
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schedule and budget. User feedback on each increment is a gauge of whether 
the right system is being built, and quality measures in each increment are a 
gauge of whether the system is being built right. Product quality and process 
control are both supported. 
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A fundamental change in the way computer programs were written occurred 
in the 1970s. Prior to that time, the absence of engineering foundations for 
program development, coupled with the increasing demand for large pro-
grams, had led to growing use of arbitrary control logic, with a complexity that 
defied human understanding. This complexity was addressed by the theory and 
practice of structured programming. Programs of any complexity whatsoever 
could be designed by nesting and sequencing just three fundamental control 
structures-namely, sequence (do), alternation (ifthenelse), and iteration 
(whiledo)-again and again in a hierarchical structure. Structured program-
ming was an engineering process that benefited not only developers, but man-
agers as well. In particular, managers of large software projects found that work 
could be structured and measured through top-down development in a system-
atic way. 
Software system development, however, requires more than systematic 
control flow. Today's large-scale systems involve massive amounts of data and 
operations to store, retrieve, transmit, and process data on an enterprise-wide 
basis. In the absence of engineering foundations for system development, these 
operations can accumulate into data complexities with a similar loss of intellec-
tual control. This chapter describes three system structures for specification and 
design-black box, state box, and clear box-known collectively as box struc-
tures (Mills 1988; Mills, Linger, and Hevner 1986, 1987). These structures 
embody important concepts of data encapsulation and information hiding. Box 
structures are developed in a stepwise refinement and verification process that 
integrates both system control and data operations. Systems can be developed 
by nesting and sequencing these structures again and again in a provable way. 
As a result, both developers and project managers benefit from improved intel-
lectual control of software development projects. 
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3.1 Box Structures for Cleanroom 
Specification and Design 
Box structures are descriptions of functions that exhibit properties essential for 
effective system specification and design. Figure 3.1 depicts the three box struc-
tures of black box, state box, and clear box. These structures exhibit identical 
external behavior but increasing internal visibility. A black box specifies the 
external behavior of a system or system component. A state box refinement of 
a black box specifies state data required to achieve the black box behavior. 
A clear box refinement of a state box specifies procedure designs required to 
achieve the state box behavior, and may reuse existingblack boxes or introduce 
new black boxes for subsequent refinement. (Clear boxes are composed of pro-
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refinement is verified against the previous step. Box structures thus separate 
three aspects of system development (specification of behavior, data, and proce-
dures) yet relate them in a coherent process of refinement and verification. 
3.1.1 Black Box Behavior 
The black box specification of a system or system component defines its 
required external behavior. A system accepts a stimulus, S, as input from its 
environment and produces a response, R, as output to its environment. The 
response depends not only on the current stimulus, but also on the history of 
stimuli received so far. For example, consider the external behavior of a hand 
calculator. Suppose a computation is in progress, and a current stimulus of 5 
is entered on the keypad. If the history of stimuli when the 5 is entered is, 
say, C718 (C for clear), then the response is 7185; that is, the calculator will 
shift the current digit display one place to the left and insert the 5 in the units 
position. However, suppose instead that the history of stimuli is C718+. In 
this case, based on a different stimulus history, the calculator will begin a new 
digit string with 5 in the units position. Thus, the response of a system is 
uniquely determined by the current stimulus and the history of stimuli received 
up to that point. 
Systems and their constituent components can be viewed in terms of their 
behavior. For example, a workstation accepts stimuli from keystrokes and 
mouse clicks, and produces corresponding responses that may change the con-
tent of current windows or display new windows. The user experiences only the 
timulus- response behavior, and may have no knowledge of internal operations 
in the workstation itself, or in other machines to which it may be linked in a 
communications network, all of which support the behavior experienced. 
The mathematical semantics of black box behavior is a function written as 
stimulus history ~ response 
or simply 
SH~R 
where SH is the complete stimulus history, including the current stimulus. 
A black box definition is state free and procedure free. It defines externally 
\isible behavior experienced by users solely in terms of history of use. As such, 
a black box focuses on the user view in addressing questions of system behav-
ior, and does not require decisions on state and procedure design. A black box 
specification defines required behavior in all possible circumstances of use. 
That is, the correct responses for all possible combinations of current stimuli 
and stimulus histories are defined in a black box specification. Black box speci-
fications have three principal uses in Cleanroom projects, all of which are criti-
cal to effective system development: 
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1. For system owners and users, black boxes define required behavior for 
analysis and agreement prior to committing resources to development 
and testing. 
2. For system developers, black boxes define required behavior to be de-
signed and implemented. 
3. For system testers, black boxes define required behavior to be vali-
dated during testing. 
Black boxes can be defined in a tabular format, with columns organized by 
stimulus, condition on history, and response. The tables can be specified in any 
appropriate form-from natural language to set theory. Consider the informal 
black box definition depicted in Table 3 .1. This low-level black box specifies a 
sales forecasting system based on a simple 12-month running average, which 
might be used to forecast sales for thousands of items in an inventory control 
system. The sales forecasting system accepts stimuli composed of a monthly 
sales value for a particular product, and produces appropriate responses. Black 
box rule 1 specifies correct behavior for fewer than 12 months of sales values 
for a product. Rule 2 specifies correct behavior when at least 12 months of sales 
values are available. The table expresses behavior in an informal manner and 
distinguishes important entities in angle brackets for later refinement and defin-
ition. Such a table might be developed in the early stages of system specifica-
tion for discussion and analysis with users to reach a consensus on required 
behavior before committing resources to a more precise specification. For 
example, discussions of rule 1 could lead to additional requirements to com-
pute, say, three- and six-month running averages as well. Discussions of rule 2 
could result in requirements to include, say, a month designation with each 
stimulus for use in identifying inadvertent omissions in the set of sales values 
prior to computing their average. These changes could result in new behavior to 
be specified. Black box specifications are intended to encourage such discus-
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sions early in development, both to avoid wasting resources and to prevent 
developing the wrong system for the user. 
3.1.2 State Box Behavior 
The state box specification of a system or system component provides an inter-
mediate view that defines its state space. State boxes encapsulate stimulus his-
tory as state data, but are procedure free. A state box maps an old state, OS, and 
a stimulus, S, to a new state, NS, and a response, R. The new state thus becomes 
the old state for the next transition. The semantics of state box behavior is a 
transition function written as 
(old state, stimulus) -7 (new state, response) 
or simply 
(OS, S) -7 (NS, R) 
A state box is refined from and verified against the corresponding black 
box. The state represents information from the black box stimulus history that 
must be retained to preserve the black box specification. By retaining this infor-
mation as state, the state box does not require stimulus history in its definition. 
Every black box has a state box description because every stimulus history can 
be represented as a state. Also, many different state boxes can be designed to 
satisfy the requirements of a given black box because different representations 
and access methods are possible for the state. 
State boxes can be defined in a tabular format, with columns for old state, 
stimulus, new state, and response, plus a column to trace back to the corre-
sponding black box rule. Consider the state box of the sales forecasting system 
shown in Table 3.2, which corresponds to the black box specification in Table 
3.1. In this case, analysis of the black box stimulus history conditions leads to 
the straightforward definition of a state item named <sales file> to retain the 11 
most recent sales values for each product. Each record of <sales file> can be 
identified by <product>, and can contain an array of 11 sales <value>. Only 11 
months of sales values are required because the current stimulus will complete 
the total of 12 values required to compute the running average. No earlier stim-
uli need be retained, thus subsequent monthly stimuli will result in deletion 
from the state of sales values older than 11 months. Transition 1 in Table 3.2 
defines the behavior required when the stimulus introduces a new product. 
Transition 2 defines the behavior when the product is known to the state box, 
but 11 months of sales values have not yet been accumulated. Transitions 1 and 
2 produce literal messages as responses to the user. Lastly, transition 3 defines 
teady-state behavior in computing running average responses. Note that each 
transition requires appropriate state updates to prepare for processing sub-
sequent stimuli. For example, transition 3 manages accumulation of state by 
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Table 3.2 State box excerpt: sales forecasting system 
Black Box 
State Box Trace 
Transition Rule 
No. Old State Stimulus New State Response No. 
<sales fi le> <sales>, In <sales file>, "<sales> for 
does not con- <product> record is added <product> 
tain record for for <product> accepted, 
<product> and <sales> is running 
added as its average not 
newest <value> available" 
2 <sales file> <sales> For <product> "<sales> for 
contains record <product> record in <sales <product> 
for <product> fi le>, <sales> accepted, 
with less than 11 is added as its running 
monthly <value> newest <Value> average not 
entries available" 
3 <Sales fi le> <sales>, For <product> Average of 2 
contains record <product> record in <sales current <sales> 
for <product> file>, oldest stimulus plus 
with 11 monthly <value> is 11 monthly 
<value> entries deleted and <value> entries 
<sales> is for <product> 
added as its 
newest <Value> 
deleting the oldest <value> and adding the current stimulus as the newest 
<value> in the <product> record in <sales file>. 
A state box is verified by deriving its black box behavior and comparing 
the derived black box for equivalence to the original black box from which the 
state box was refined. The black box behavior of a state box is derived by trans-
forming its state operations into stimulus history form. 
3.1.3 Clear Box Behavior 
The clear box design of a system or system component defines the processing 
required to achieve its corresponding state box behavior. A clear box is a com-
puter program or set of programs that accepts a stimulus, S, and, based on the 
program's internal state, OS, produces a new internal state, NS, and a response, 
R. The processing is defined in terms of the fundamental control structures of 
structured programming-namely, sequence, alternation, and iteration-plus a 
concurrent structure if parallelism is to be introduced. A clear box defines the 
computation of the response and new state in terms of these control structures. 
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Many different clear boxes can be defined to satisfy the behavior of a given state 
box. The semantics of clear box behavior is a transition function written as 
(old state, stimulus)~ (new state, response) by procedure 
or simply 
(OS, S) ~ (NS, R) by procedure 
Clear box procedures may reuse the services of existing black boxes, and 
may introduce new black boxes for subsequent refinement into state and clear 
box forms. Definition of a clear box is a critical step because it defines the pro-
cedure that organizes and connects the usage of the black boxes of subsystems 
and components at the next level in the box structure hierarchy. This explicit 
connection helps maintain intellectual control as development proceeds by 
defining the precise context of every black box use. In addition, components 
and their connections are derived from local processing requirements in a clear 
box design. In essence, the message of box structures is not "divide and con-
quer," but rather "divide, connect, and conquer." 
A clear box is verified by abstracting its operations into a derived state box 
form and comparing the derived state box for equivalence with the original state 
box from which the clear box was refined. Clear box design and verification are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.1.4 Box Structure Hierarchies 
A box structure hierarchy evolves through stepwise refinement and verification 
as described earlier. This is a usage and not a parts hierarchy; that is, every use 
of a box occupies a distinct place in the hierarchy, and all processing is defined 
by sequential and concurrent uses of boxes. Of course, a usage hierarchy does 
not imply that the code is replicated wherever it is used in the implementation. 
The example in Figure 3.2 depicts an initial black box that is refined into a 
tate box and then into a clear box, with a control structure that embeds and 
coordinates the operations of, in this case, six black box uses at the next level. 
These uses could all reference the same black box, different black boxes, or 
some combination. Usage hierarchies of system components are helpful for 
maintaining intellectual control in managing system development. 
3.1.5 Box Structure Principles 
Four key principles that guide development and analysis of box structures 
Ylills, Linger, and Hevner 1986, 1987) are summarized in this section. The first 
o principles are enforced by the box structure refinement process; the last two 
rinciples articulate good design practices. 
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Figure 3.2 A box structure usage hierarchy. BB = black box; SB = state box; 
CB = clear box. 
Principle of Referential Transparency: During the delegation of 
a system component for development, all requirements for the com-
ponent should be specified completely, so that no further specification 
is logically required to complete the component. 
A black box should define all required external behavior for a system or 
system component. Referential transparency is maintained when a state box 
implements correctly the behavior required by the black box, and similarly 
when a clear box implements correctly the behavior required by the state box. 
These three forms focus on behavior, state, and procedure respectively, yet are 
complete and behaviorally equivalent definitions of a system or system compo-
nent, with no behavior left out. This referentially transparent hierarchy permits 
deferring details without losing them. Clear boxes play a key role in maintain-
ing referential transparency by organizing and connecting the operations of 
embedded subsystems and components at the next level. 
Effective project management requires organizing myriad details into coher-
ent structures for delegation and development. Referential transparency in box 
structures permits crisp delegation and accountability by providing complete and 
consistent specifications of work to be done. Components can be delegated to 
development teams with confidence that all component commitments are spec-
ified and accounted for. In addition, referential transparency simplifies and 
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streamlines communication among project members by eliminating much of 
the discussion and coordination required by imprecise definitions of responsi-
bilities. 
Principle of Transaction Closure: The transactions of a system or 
system component must be sufficient for the acquisition and retention 
of all its state data, and its state data must be sufficient for the comple-
tion of all its transactions. 
A transaction is a description of high-level behavior that may be composed 
of a series oflow-level transitions. For example, the transaction "reconcile bank 
statement" might be composed of individual transitions such as "access 
account," "reconcile deposits," "reconcile withdrawals," and so forth. Trans-
action closure defines an iterative analysis process that ensures the sufficiency 
of the transactions and the retained state of a system or system component dur-
ing its specification. The process begins with the principal transactions carried 
out by primary users , and the definition of the state data needed to support those 
transactions. The supporting state data will require additional transactions for 
initialization and update, leading to more state data, and so on. The iteration 
continues until no additional state data requirements are identified, at which 
point transaction closure has been achieved. 
Principle of State Migration: System data should be migrated to 
and encapsulated in the smallest system parts that do not require 
duplicating updates. 
State migration enables the location and encapsulation of state data items at 
their proper level in a system to limit the complexity of both system specifica-
tions and the resulting system structures. For example, consider a clear box that 
contains state data item Tthat invokes a black box at the next level. If Tis refer-
enced only within the state box refinement of that black box, it can be migrated 
downward and encapsulated there with no duplicate updates necessary. Alter-
nately, upward migration to a common parent box may be necessary, as a design 
unfolds, to eliminate duplicate updates. 
Principle of Common Services: System parts with multiple uses 
should be considered for definition as common services. As many 
opportunities as possible for reuse should be created within and 
among system parts. 
Common services are found everywhere in software systems. For example, 
a GUI acts as a common service for the programs that use it in managing inter-
nal state representations of user interfaces and updating displays as required. 
Opportunities for common service definition emerge frequently in box structure 
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development. For example, a weather forecasting system may process measure-
ments from a large set of distributed sensors. Operations to initialize, update, 
retrieve, and delete measurement data will be required at many points in the 
system. The measurements could be encapsulated as state in a new box struc-
ture hierarchy that provides these common services to all using programs. This 
design decision isolates and protects the measurement data, enhances integrity 
by providing controlled access, and helps prepare for future, unforeseen uses of 
the data. Such reuse of software components affords an opportunity to improve 
productivity and reliability. 
3.1.6 The Box Structure Development Process 
The general development process for box structure refinement and verification 
is summarized in the following list based on the foregoing descriptions. This 
process is illustrated in the security alarm example presented in this chapter and 
in a more extensive satellite control system example in Part III. 
Box Structure Development Process 
1. Define the system requirements. 
2. Specify and validate the black box. 
• Define the system boundary and specify all stimuli and responses. 
• Specify the black box mapping rules. 
• Validate the black box with owners and users. 
3. Specify and verify the state box. 
• Specify the state data and initial state values. 
• Specify the state box transition function. 
• Derive the black box behavior of the state box and compare the 
derived black box to the original black box for equivalence. 
4. Design and verify the clear box. 
• Design the clear box control structures and operations. 
• Embed uses of new and reused black boxes as necessary. 
• Derive the state box behavior of the clear box and compare the 
derived state box to the original state box for equivalence. 
5. Repeat the process for new black boxes. 
It is important to note that this process can be tailored and adapted to par-
ticular project environments and objectives to make the best use of project 
resources. For example, behavior-rich systems may be best specified and ana-
lyzed in terms of their external behavior. In this case, black box specification 
should be emphasized. Subsystems that implement extensive data operations 
may embody simple black box behavior, but may exhibit complexities in state 
structure, storage, and retrieval. In this case, state box definition should be 
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emphasized. Components that implement extensive mathematical operations 
may exhibit simple black box behavior and use simple state definitions, but 
exhibit considerable complexity in their clear box structure and operations. In 
this case, clear box design should be emphasized. 
Large-scale systems composed of many subsystems and components will 
thus adopt various approaches in carrying out this process. But whatever the 
emphasis, system development should begin with the best possible understand-
ing of required external behavior and agreement among stakeholders before 
committing further resources. It is important to note that comprehensive require-
ments are almost never known at the outset of system development. The box 
structure method is compatible with a requirements discovery and elicitation 
process, often carried out through incremental development of prototypes with 
user feedback. Even for prototypes, however, the partial set of requirements to 
be implemented should be known at the outset, both to achieve effective use of 
resources and to minimize risk. 
3.2 The Sequence-Based 
Specification Process 
A number of approaches can be used to develop specifications. The new theory 
of sequence-based specification defines one process for stepwise construction 
of complete, consistent, and correct black box and state box specifications, and 
this is the approach that is discussed in this book. 
In the sequence-based specification process, all possible sequences of 
timuli (stimulus histories) are enumerated systematically in a strict order, as 
timulus sequences of length zero, length one, length two, and so on. As each 
equence is mapped to its correct response, equivalent sequences are identified 
by applying a reduction rule, and the enumeration process terminates when the 
ystem has been defined completely and consistently. 
Based on the work of Mills (1975), Parnas (1992), Mao (1993), Prowell 
1996) , and Poore (Prowell and Poore, 1998), sequence-based specification 
makes a tractable problem of the astronomical number of use cases arising from 
the combinatorial effects of software use. Through sequence enumeration, de-
\·elopers consider all combinations and permutations of system stimuli. Each 
sequence represents a scenario of use. During the stepwise process of enumera-
tion, possible scenarios are distinguished from impossible scenarios, intended 
uses from erroneous uses, and reducible sequences from irreducible sequences. 
These irreducible sequences- canonical sequences- are the basis for a precise 
-pecification of software behavior that is mathematically complete and consis-
ent, and traceably correct: 
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The literal enumeration of sequences provides straightforward verifi-
cation of completeness. One can follow the sequences of length one, 
length two, length three, and so on, to verify that all combinations and 
permutations of stimuli have been mapped to a response. 
The orderly enumeration of sequences ensures that a given scenario of 
use (i.e., sequence of stimuli) appears only once. Consistency, like 
completeness, is a direct consequence of enumeration. 
Every element of a sequence-based specification is traced to its origin 
in the requirements. If the correct response for a sequence cannot be 
found in the requirements, the expected behavior must be clarified and 
the requirements modified. 
The work flow in sequence-based specification supports requirements anal-
ysis, black box specification, and state box specification in a seamless process 
with a substantial possibility of automated support. The steps in the work flow, 
described briefly in the following subsection, are exemplified in Section 3.3 . 
3.2.1 Black Box Definition 
Tagged Requirements. Requirements are tagged (numbered) for use in veri-
fying the correctness of each element of subsequent work products. The 
methodical consideration of sequences in the enumeration process forces the 
exposure of ambiguities and omissions in the requirements. Clarification of 
requirements is a natural by-product of sequence-based specification. 
System Boundary Definition. The system boundary determines which com-
ponents are inside and outside the system to be specified. The entities outside 
the system are the sources of stimuli and the destinations of responses. 
Identification of stimuli and responses often begins at an atomic level. After fur-
ther consideration (including, perhaps, an initial enumeration), abstractions are 
often invented to simplify the enumeration process. 
Abstractions are used to hide well-understood details, to reflect natural par-
titions in the problem, or to reduce a large set of elements to a smaller set. The 
elements of the larger set must have a well-defined mapping to the elements of 
the smaller set. A stimulus set (or response set) may be of mixed granularity-
some atomic, some abstract. Whatever the level of granularity, the elements of 
the stimulus set (or response set) must be mutually exclusive. 
Sequence Enumeration. Sequences are enumerated in order of length (zero 
stimuli, one stimulus, two stimuli, etc.), with all combinations and permutations 
considered systematically. As each sequence is examined, the following evalua-
tions occur: 
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1. Sequences that are impossible (e.g., a stimulus prior to system start) 
are marked as "illegal." Any extension of an illegal sequence will itself 
be illegal, so sequences marked illegal are not extended further in the 
enumeration. 
2. The correct response for each sequence is documented, as is the re-
quirement on which it is based. If there is no requirement that addres-
ses the sequence in question, a derived requirement is stated. Derived 
requirements represent assumptions or clarifications, and must be con-
firmed with the originator of the requirements. 
3. Two sequences are equivalent if their responses to future stimuli are 
identical. Since extensions of the two equivalent sequences exhibit the 
same behavior, it is not necessary to extend both, and only the shorter 
is extended. 
The enumeration stops when all sequences of a given length are either illegal or 
equivalent to a previous sequence. 
The completed enumeration represents the mathematically complete and 
consistent, verifiably correct black box specification for the system. The speci-
fication is complete because all sequences have been mapped to a response, it is 
consistent because each sequence has been mapped to only one response, and it 
is correct on verification by domain experts that the behavior specified for each 
sequence and traced to the requirements is the intended behavior. 
Canonical Sequence Analysis. Legal sequences in the enumeration that are 
not equivalent to any previous sequence are the canonical sequences. The 
canonical sequences represent the unique conditions of system usage, and 
analysis of the canonical sequences yields the state space for the system, given 
the level of abstraction of the black box. 
In canonical sequence analysis, variables are invented to encapsulate the 
conditions in each sequence of stimuli. These variables may be viewed as the 
state data for the system. The range of values for each variable is discovered as 
each canonical sequence is examined relative to each variable. The combination 
of variable values must be unique for each canonical sequence, such that the 
canonical sequences are disjoint when the analysis is complete. 
3.2.2 State Box Definition 
Each sequence in the black box specification may be thought of as a tuple (cur-
rent stimulus, previous stimuli). The previous stimuli in each sequence in the 
black box are, in fact, canonical sequences. Given this fact, the creation of the 
state box specification for the system is a matter of assembly. Each valid 
(sequence --7 response) mapping in the black box can be replaced with a (cur-
rent stimulus, state --7 response, state update) mapping in the state box. The 
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Current Stimulus: ___ _ _ _ 
Black Box Trace: 
Sequence Prior 
Current State Response State Update to Current Stimulus 
Figure 3.3 State box mapping table format 
state box can be generated automatically from the black box, and need not be 
verified if generated by a certified tool. 
The final form of the state box is a set of mapping tables, one per stimulus. 
Each mapping table is of the form shown in Figure 3.3. 
The state box specification is the final specification work product. The 
Cleanroom box structure specification and design method continues with 
refinement of the state box to the clear box, in terms of full procedural design, 
as described in Chapter 4. 
3.3 Example: Specification 
of a Security Alarm 
A simple software-controlled security alarm depicted in Figure 3.4 is to be cre-
ated for use on doors, windows, boxes, and so forth, to detect unauthorized 
entry. The security alarm has a detector that sends a trip signal when motion is 
detected. The security alarm is activated by pressing the Set button. A light in 
the Set button is illuminated when the security alarm is on. If a trip signal occurs 
Figure 3.4 Security alarm 
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while the device is set, a high-pitched tone (alarm) is emitted. A three-digit code 
must be entered to turn off the alarm. Correct entry of the code deactivates the 
security alarm. If a mistake is made when entering the code, the user must press 
the Clear button before the code can be reentered. The security alarm will not be 
programmable; each unit will have a hard-coded deactivation code. 
A sequence-based specification will be created for the security alarm using 
the stepwise process described in the preceding subsection. 
3.3.1 Black Box Definition 
Tagged Requirements. Tagging of requirements is the first step in creating a 
traceable specification, as shown in Table 3.3. Subsequent elements of the spec-
ification will be traced to their origin in the requirements through these tags. 
As each step in the specification is traced to the relevant requirement, 
ambiguities and omissions in the requirements will be discovered. When there 
is no requirement to cite in a trace, a "derived" requirement will be stated and 
tagged as D 1, D2, and so on. 
System Boundary Definition. There are two possible sources of stimuli to the 
ecurity alarm: the detector and the human user. The detector sends a trip stimu-
lus and all other stimuli originate with the human user, as shown in Table 3.4. 
The stimuli Trip, Set, and Clear are all atomic stimuli (i.e., discrete, low-
level stimuli). The stimuli GoodDigit and BadDigit are both abstractions, repre-
senting correct and incorrect entry of digits in the three-digit code. GoodDigit 
represents each digit in the sequence of three digit entries that deactivate the 
device. BadDigit represents a digit in any other sequence of digit entries. 
Table 3.3 Tagged requirements for the security alarm 
Tag 
No. Requirement 
The security alarm has a detector that sends a trip signal 
when motion is detected. 
2 The security alarm is activated by pressing the Set button. 
3 The Set button is illuminated when the security alarm is set. 
4 If a trip signal occurs while the security alarm is set, a high-
pitched tone (alarm) is emitted. 
5 A three-digit code must be entered to turn off the alarm tone. 
6 Correct entry of the code deactivates the security alarm. 
7 If a mistake is made when entering the code, the user must 
press the Clear button before the code can be reentered. 
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Table 3.4 Security alarm stimuli 
Requirement 
Stimulus Description Trace No. 
Set Device activator 2 
Trip Signal from detector 
Bad Digit Incorrect entry of a digit in the code 7 
Clear Clear entry 7 
Good Digit A digit that is part of the correct entry 
of the three-digit code that deactivates 
the alarm and device 5,6 
Table 3.5 Security alarm responses 
Requirement 
Response Description Trace No. 
Light on Set button illuminated 3 
Light off Set button not illuminated 6 
Alarm on High-pitched sound activated 4 
Alarm off High-pitched sound deactivated 5 
Abstraction in this instance serves the purpose of hiding well-understood 
atomic-level details (i.e., whether a particular digit is "good" or "bad" in the 
context of its entry). 
Two external responses are mentioned in the requirements: a light (the Set 
button) and an alarm. The system must start and stop each of these, as summa-
rized in Table 3.5. 
In addition to responses that are explicitly defined in the requirements, two 
other values are often used in sequence-based specification: the null response 
and illegal. The null response occurs when there is no external system response, 
such as when a system is ignoring or perhaps accumulating stimuli. Illegal is 
used when a sequence is impossible, such as when stimuli are presented before 
invocation. 
Sequence Enumeration. Sequence enumeration involves consideration of 
all possible scenarios of use: sequences of length zero (the empty sequence), 
length one (single stimulus), length two (single-stimulus extensions of the 
sequences of length one), and so on. Enumeration ends when all sequences of a 
given length are either illegal or equivalent to a previous sequence. Again, an 
illegal sequence is one that is "impossible," such as SBG in Table 3.6 (pressing 
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the Set button, and then a BadDigit results in there being no such thing as 
GoodDigit, given the definition of that abstraction). Also, one sequence is 
equivalent to another if the two sequences have identical future behavior. The 
sequence 55 (pressing the Set button twice), for example, is marked as equiva-
lent to the sequence 5 (pressing the Set button only once), because all future 
responses are the same. Note that in Table 3.6 the current responses are differ-
ent. The response to 5 is to turn on the light, whereas the response to 55 is null 
(because the light is already on). After the current response, however, the 
responses to future stimuli will be the same whether they are preceded by 5 or 
SS. Therefore, SS is marked as equivalent to S in the enumeration and need not 
be extended. · 
Questions about requirements invariably arise as sequence scenarios are 
considered systematically. All questions, assumptions, and so forth, are docu-
mented so that outstanding issues can be addressed and resolved. 
The following symbols will be used to represent the stimuli in the enumer-






In the Equivalence column, the equivalence is to a previously considered 
equence. In the Requirements Trace column, a number denotes an original 
requirement from Table 3.3 ; a number prefixed with the letter D denotes a 
derived requirement. 
Table 3.6 Security alarm sequence enumeration 
Sequence Response Equivalence Requirements Trace No. 
Length Zero 
Empty Null 01 
The security alarm is initially deactivated. 
Length One 
s Light on 2,3 
I Illegal 01 
B Illegal 01 
c Illegal 01 
G Illegal 01 
continued 
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Table 3.6 continued 
Sequence Response Equivalence Requirements Trace No. 
Length Two 
ss Null s 02 
After the device has been set, the Set 
button has no further effect until the 
device has been deactivated . 
ST Alarm on 4 
SB Null 03 
The device produces no external 
response to an erroneous entry. 
sc Null s 04 
The device produces no external 
response to a Clear entry. 
SG Null 05 
The device produces no external response 
to correct entry of the code until all three 
digits of the code have been entered. 
Length Three 
STS Null ST 02 
STT Null ST 06 
After the trip signal has set off the alarm, 
the trip signal has no further effect unti l 
the device has been deactivated. 
STB Null 03 
STC Null ST 04 
STG Null 05 
SBS Null SB 02 
SBT Alarm on STB 4 
SBB Null SB 03 
SBC Null s 04,7 
SBG Illegal 7 
SGS Null SG 02 
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Sequence Response Equivalence Requirements Trace No. 
SGT Alarm on STB 4 
07 
Incomplete entry of the code prior to a trip 
signal will be regarded as an erroneous 
entry that requires a Clear and a reentry 
of the correct code to deactivate 
the alarm. 
S GB Null SB 03 
S GC Null s 04 
S GG Null 05 
Length Four 
STBS Null STB 02 
STET Null STB 06 
ST BB Null STB 03 
ST BC Null ST 04,7 
S T BG Illegal 7 
ST GS Null STG 02 
ST GT Null STG 06 
ST GB Null STB 03 
ST GC Null ST 04 
S TGG Null 05 
SGGS Null SGG 02 
GGT Alarm on STB 4, 07 
-G GB Null SB 03 
GGC Null s 04 
-e GG Light off Empty 6 
_ength Five 
Null STGG 02 
Null STGG 06 
Null STB . 03 
Null ST 04 
~T G GG Alarm off, Empty 3, 5,6 
light off 
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The black box function specification for the security alarm is now mathe-
matically complete and consistent, and subject to correctness verification. 
Every scenario has been mapped to a response, so the specification is 
complete. 
Every scenario has been mapped to only one response (or response set), 
so the specification is consistent. 
Requirements engineers can now confirm that assumptions documented 
as derived requirements are correct, and that the specification correctly 
implements both the original and the derived requirements. 
In practice, the dialog between requirements engineers and specification 
engineers is ongoing, and issues are clarified as they arise. 
Canonical Sequence Analysis. State data encapsulates and retains the com-
ponents of stimulus history that must be preserved for the system to produce 
correct responses. The essential components of stimulus history are identified 
by examining the canonical sequences in the enumeration (i.e., sequences that 
are not equivalent to any previous sequence). Each canonical sequence is exam-
ined to identify the unique conditions in the sequence, and state variables are 
invented to represent the conditions. 
For example, the canonical sequence Sin Table 3.7 is different from the 
Empty sequence in that the security alarm has gone from power-off to power-
on. The state variable Device, with values OFF and ON, was therefore invented 
to encapsulate that condition. Similarly, when the sequence ST was examined, it 
was discovered to contain a condition that was not present in either the Empty 
or S sequences: The alarm has been tripped. The state variable Alarm was in-
vented to represent the new condition, with associated values OFF and ON. 
Table 3.7 contains the canonical sequences, the state variables that are 
required to represent the conditions in the canonical sequences, and the values 
of the state variables before and after the current stimulus in the sequences. 
3.3.2 State Box Definition 
All state variables and their possible values have now been defined. No further 
invention will be needed to produce the state-based specification. Table 3.8 lists 
the names, ranges, and initial values of the state data. 
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Table 3.7 Canonical sequence analysis 
Value before Value after 
Canonical State Current Current 
Sequence Variables Stimulus Stimulus 
Empty 
s Device OFF ON 
The user has pressed the Set button to 
activate the device. 
ST Device ON ON 
The device has been set and the trip Alarm OFF ON 
signal has occurred, setting off the alarm. 
SB Device ON ON 
The device has been set and the user Code NONE ERROR 
has entered an invalid digit. 
SG Device ON ON 
The device has been set and the user Code NONE 1_0K 
has entered the first digit in the code. 
STB Device ON ON 
The device has been set, the trip Alarm ON ON 
signal has set off the alarm, and the Code NONE ERROR 
user has entered an invalid digit. 
The Clear button must be pressed before 
the code can be entered to turn off the 
alarm. 
STG Device ON ON 
The device has been set, the trip Alarm ON ON 
signal has set off the alarm, and the Code NONE 1_0K 
user has entered the first digit in the 
code. 
SGG Device ON ON 
The device has been set and the user Code 1_0K 2_0K 
has entered the first two digits in the 
code. 
S TGG Device ON ON 
The device has been set, the trip Alarm ON ON 
signal has set off the alarm, and the Code 1_0K 2_0K 
user has entered the first two digits in 
the code. 
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Table 3.8 State variables 
State 
Variable Range Initial Value 
Device {OFF, ON} OFF 
Alarm {OFF, ON} OFF 
Code {NONE, 1_0K, 2_0K, ERROR} NONE 
The completed sequence-based specification can now be recast as a state-
1{,<!_~~<! ~~~i_f;i_cation. Whereas the black box view is expressed in terms of 
sequences of user inputs and system responses, the state box view is expressed 
in terms of (current stimulus, state) and (system response, state update). All 
sequences in the enumeration that end in a given stimulus will be grouped, and 
. mapping rules of the following form will be stated: 
When the system receives the stimulus _ and the state data values 
are _ , the system response is _ and the state update is _ . This 
use can be traced to black box sequence _ . 
These mapping rules are summarized by Tables 3.10 through 3 .14, one table 
per stimulus. As an example, the sequences needed to construct the state-based 
specification for stimulus Tare given in Table 3.9. This excerpt from the enu-
meration contains only the sequences ending in T (Trip) and their responses. 
Table 3.9 Excerpt from enumeration: 
sequences ending in T 
Sequence Response 
T Illegal 
ST Alarm on 
STT Null 
SET Alarm on 
SGT Alarm on 
STET Null 
STGT Null 
SGGT Alarm on 
STGGT Null 
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Table 3.10 Current stimulus: Trip (T) 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to T 
Device=ON Alarm on Alarm= ON s 
Alarm =OFF 
Code= NONE 
2 Device= ON Null ST 
Alarm=ON 
Code= NONE 
3 Device= ON Alarm on Alarm=ON SB 
Alarm= OFF 
Code= ERROR 
4 Device= ON Alarm on Alarm=ON SG 
Alarm =OFF Code= ERROR 
Code= 1_0K 
5 Device= ON Null STB 
Alarm= ON 
Code= ERROR 
6 Device =ON Null STG 
Alarm =ON 
Code= 1_0K 
7 Device= ON Alarm on Alarm= ON SGG 
Alarm= OFF Code= ERROR 
Code =2_0K 
8 Device=ON Null STGG 
Alarm =ON 
Code= 2_0K 
The black box mapping rules of Table 3.9 are recast as a state-based speci-
fication in Table 3 .l 0 for system behavior when the current stimulus is T. 
Note that the sequences in the rightmost column of the table (the sequences 
prior to T) are all canonical. This is no accident. Because only the canonical 
sequences are extended during black box sequence enumeration, it stands to 
reason that any sequence prior to T is canonical. It is not necessarily the case 
that all canonical sequences will appear in the rightmost column, however. The 
canonical sequence Empty followed by Twas marked as illegal in the black box 
enumeration, for example, so it is not included in the state box. Once a sequence 
has been identified as illegal (i.e., impossible), it is not carried forward in the 
specification. 
The Current State column in Table 3.10 is populated with the state data 
derived during canonical sequence analysis. Because the sequences prior to T 
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(the rightmost column) are all canonical, the current state for each row is given 
by the state data associated with the canonical sequence. 
An inspection of the details of the state-based specification for current 
stimulus T makes it apparent that there are only a few scenarios for which the 
system actually needs to do something. This insight will be used in the eventual 
implementation. The following tables are the mapping tables for the remaining 
stimuli. Each mapping table was derived in the manner just shown for current 
stimulus T. 
Table 3.11 Current stimulus: Set (5) 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to 5 
9 Device= OFF Light on Device= ON None 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= NONE 
10 Device= ON Null - 5 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= NONE 
11 Device= ON Null - 5T 
Alarm =ON 
Code= NONE 
12 Device= ON Null - 5B 
Alarm= OFF 
Code= ERROR 
13 Device =ON Null 5G 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= 1_0K 
14 Device= ON Null - 5TB 
Alarm=ON 
Code= ERROR 
15 Device= ON Null 5TG 
Alarm =ON 
Code= 1_0K 
16 Device =ON Null - 5GG 
Alarm=OFF 
Code =2_0K 
17 Device= ON Null - 5TGG 
Alarm=ON 
Code= 2_0K 
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Table 3.12 Current stimulus: BadDigit (B) 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to B 
18 Device= ON Null Code= ERROR s 
Alarm= OFF 
Code= NONE 
19 Device= ON Null Code= ERROR ST 
Alarm= ON 
Code= NONE 
20 Device= ON Null SB 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= ERROR 
21 Device= ON Null Code= ERROR SG 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= 1 OK -
22 Device= ON Null STB 
Alarm=ON 
Code= ERROR 
23 Device= ON Null Code= ERROR STG 
Alarm=ON 
Code= 1_0K 
24 Device= ON Null Code= ERROR SGG 
Alarm= OFF 
Code= 2_0K 
25 Device =ON Null Code= ERROR ST GG 
Alarm= ON 
Code= 2_0K 
Table 3.13 Cu rrent stimulus: Clear (C) 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to C 
26 Device= ON Null s 
Alarm=OFF 
Code= NONE 
27 Device= ON Null ST 
Alarm=ON 
Code= NONE 
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Table 3.13 continued 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to C 
29 Device =ON Null Code= NONE SG 
Alarm =OFF 
Code= 1_0K 
30 Device= ON Null Code= NONE STB 
Alarm =ON 
Code= ERROR 
31 Device= ON Null Code= NONE STG 
Alarm=ON 
Code= 1_0K 
32 Device= ON Null Code= NONE SGG 
Alarm =OFF 
Code =2_0K 
33 Device= ON Null Code= NONE STGG 
Alarm=ON 
Code =2_0K 
Table 3.14 Current stimulus: GoodDigit (G) 
Tag Current Black Box Trace: 
No. State Response State Update Sequence Prior to G 
34 Device=ON Null Code= 1_0K s 
Alarm =OFF 
Code= NONE 
35 Device= ON Null Code= 1_0K ST 
Alarm= ON 
Code= NONE 
36 Device= ON Null Code= 2_0K SG 
Alarm= OFF 
Code= 1_0K 
37 Device= ON Null Code =2_0K STG 
Alarm =ON 
Code= 1_0K 
38 Device= ON Light off Device= OFF SGG 
Alarm =OFF Code= NONE 
Code =2_0K 
39 Device= ON Alarm off Device= OFF STGG 
Alarm=ON Light off Alarm=OFF 
Code= 2 OK Code= NONE 
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The state box specification for the security alarm is now complete, consis-
tent, traceable, and verifiably correct. 
• The state data values, system response, and state update requirements 
for every scenario have been defined, so the specification is complete. 
The state data values, system response, and state update requirements 
for every scenario have been unambiguously defined, so the specifica-
tion is consistent. 
Each element of the state-based specification can be compared to the 
corresponding element of the previously verified sequence-based spec-
ification to confirm that correctness has been preserved. 
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4.1 Box Structure Development 
The previous chapter described two functional views of a system or program, 
the first based on external behavior alone (black box) and the second based on a 
state machine (state box). This chapter describes a third view- the procedure or 
algorithm (clear box) to implement the state box and exhibit the specified exter-
nal behavior. 
The top-down iterative process by which the highest level specification of a 
complex system becomes a body of code that executes on a computer must 
address many design decisions. The box structure method does not make design 
decisions; however, it does encourage designers to consider the entire solution 
space. The solution space consists of all possible implementations-the good, 
the bad, and the ugly. There are solutions with fast execution times and solu-
tions that are slow, solutions that require a lot of memory and solutions that are 
memory misers, solutions that will be easy to revise and maintain, as well as 
olutions that will be very difficult to maintain. A solution that is acceptable in 
one circumstance may be unacceptable in another, so the design decisions must 
take into account many, often conflicting, considerations. 
The top-level black box description of behavior should be unique given the 
requirements. There is a one-to-many relationship between the black box and 
the possible state boxes that will mirror the required behavior. There is both 
control state information and data state information, and often a trade-off 
between the two. Minimal control state information might imply unacceptable 
performance, leading to a design decision with richer control information. 
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Likewise, there is often a trade-off between storing data in tables and recom-
puting values when needed. Figure 4.1 shows the general solution space with 
the unique black box leading to several possible state boxes, all of which will 
mirror the black box behavior. Box structures highlight this relationship 
and remind the designer to think about alternative state boxes relative to all 
aspects of the design. The selection of a specific state box forecloses (tempo-
rarily) many solutions and constrains, but does not fully determine, the clear 
box options. 
There is a one-to-many relationship between a given state box and the 
many clear boxes or algorithms that would implement the state box. Again, the 
choice of clear box will constrain but not fully determine the final solution. As 
described in this chapter, the clear box is always defined as a structured pro-
gram that may contain and connect lower level\black boxes. Each of these black 
boxes is in turn unique, given the specifications it must meet to be referentially 
transparent to the clear box of which it is a part. This process of stepwise refine-
ment results in a hierarchy of box structures, as was illustrated in Figure 3 .2. 
It is important always to consider a design in progress to be open to revi-
sion and reconsideration. One should never lose sight of the fact that there is an 
entire solution space to be considered, and a path to be chosen from the top-
level black box to the final working system. It is the rule rather than the excep-
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Figure 4.1 Box structure solution space. BB == black box; SB == state box; 
CB == clear box. 
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rarely the best idea. It is better to let go of a design that is working out badly, to 
revisit earlier design decisions and to take a better path, than to drive a bad 
design doggedly to conclusion. The design process should be viewed as a mat-
ter of analysis and selection-a series of choices to be made, evaluated, and 
possibly reconsidered. 
Architecture is a powerful force in constraining the choices. If a product 
line architecture exists, then it is likely that certain functionality, state, and algo-
rithms will be imposed on the solution. The designer will be required to make 
decisions that lead to reuse rather than new development. The box structure 
method does not in itself produce an architecture and does not make design 
decisions; these tasks are up to the designer. However, by creating an awareness 
of the entire solution space, box structures clarify architectural qualities and 
alternatives for analysis and informed decision making. 
4.2 Clear Box Development 
4.2.1 Clear Box Structures 
A clear box defines the procedures required to implement the transition func-
tion of a state box. The stimulus and response sets, external behavior, and state 
of a clear box are identical to those of the corresponding state box. Clear box 
designs may reuse existing black boxes and introduce new black boxes, and 
may also define local data with no persistence. The procedures of a clear box 
are often organized around external services that its users (people, hardware, or 
other clear boxes) can invoke. For example, a data management clear box might 
provide services for adding, deleting, and retrieving data. 
The focus of clear box design is on algorithm development. State box spec-
ifications that require little algorithmic elaboration can often be implemented 
directly in clear box procedures composed of case statements. The statements 
test the current stimulus and old state to determine the proper response and new 
state. In essence, such procedures amount to state box table look-ups that deter-
mine the appropriate transition, and verification can often be achieved by com-
paring individual state box transitions for equivalence with their localized 
implementations in the clear box statements. 
However, state box specifications of algorithm-intensive systems will 
require extensive clear box analysis, design, and correctness verification. Such 
systems may exhibit simple state box specifications that nevertheless require 
ubstantial effort to implement in clear box form. These clear boxes can often 
result in large procedure designs, and may require definition of many new, and 
reuse of many existing, black boxes in their elaboration. 
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Clear boxes are composed of sequence, alternation, and iteration control 
structures, examples of which are depicted in Table 4.1 in graphic and design 
language form (Mills, Linger, and Hevner 1986). Concurrent control structures 
can also be introduced. The control structures are themselves composed of func-
tion nodes, represented in the table by g and h, and predicate nodes, represented 
by p. (Collector nodes represented by circles join the flow of control.) A func-
tion node can represent any operation, from a single assignment to an extensive 
computation. Any function node may itself be a new or reused black box. Every 
function node in a clear box may access the current state as input and may pro-
duce an updated state as output. Every predicate node may access the current 
state as input, but can make no changes to it. Sequence control structures can be 
generalized to any number of function nodes (a two-part sequence is shown in 
Table 4.1), or to indexed sequences that repeat execution of a function node 
under control of an index variable, as in a fordo structure. Ifthenelse struc-
tures can be generalized to case structures with multiple branches. 
For ease of reference, the parts of these control structures can be given 
names. For example, for the sequence, g and hare referred to as fi rstpart and 
secondpart respectively. For the i f thenel se, p, g, and hare referred to as the 
iftes t , thenpart, and elsepart. And for the whi ledo, p and g are referred to 
as the whiletest and dopart . 
Every clear box control structure exhibits a single entry line and a single 
exit line, with no side effects in control flow. From its entry line to its exit line, a 
control structure simply carries out a transformation on data. Because of this 
single-entry/single-exit property, these control structures correspond to mathe-
matical functions. To illustrate, the following three-part sequence of assign-
ments on integers t, x, and y (: ~ represents the assignment operation) 
do 
t : ~ X 
X : ~ y 
y :~ t 
enddo 
can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 4.2. At point 1 in Figure 4.2, an initial 
domain of t , x , and y is defined (o's represent initial values; for example, to is 
the initial value of t ). The first assignment t : ~ x changes the value of t to the 
initial value of x to produce the range at point 2, which in tum becomes the 
domain for the second assignment x : = y, which produces the range at point 3, 
continuing in this manner until the final range at point 4 is reached. The overall 
effect of the sequence, from the domain at point 1 to the range at point 4 can 
thus be defined in natural language as 
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Set t to the initial value of x and exchange the initial values of x and y 
or equivalently in terms of a concurrent assignment as 
t , X, y := X , y, X 
In a concurrent assignment, all variables or expressions on the right are 
assigned simultaneously to the position-respective variables on the left. That is, 
simultaneous assignments are made of x tot, y to x, and x toy. In set notation, 
{ ( <t , x, y> , <x, y, x>)} is the sequence-free function definition for the three-part 
sequence. The definition is independent of context. Even if the sequence was 
embedded in a large clear box, the function definition would be identical. All 
clear box control structures implement domain-to-range mappings as illustrated 
in the sequence example in Figure 4.2. 
4.2.2 Clear Box Abstraction and Documentation 
Control structures can be read and understood in terms of their net effect on data 
from entry to exit and documented as function definitions. These definitions, 
called program functions, express the final values of variables as functions of 
initial values, and are determined by function abstraction. They can be expressed 
in a variety of forms, from natural language to mathematics. Program functions 
are function equivalent to their corresponding control structures. 
The systematic process of reading and abstracting programs can be used to 
recover missing or incomplete documentation. In particular, legacy systems and 
reused components that are expressed in structured form can be read and ab-
stracted to document their designs and to help recover embedded business rules 
for improved maintenance and evolution. 
To illustrate, the control structures in Table 4.2 (w, x, y, and z are positive 
integers) can be read and analyzed to abstract their program functions as shown. 
The program function of sequence can be determined by mental composition of 
its individual operations. In this case, the value of w computed by the first oper-
ation can be substituted into the occurrence of w in the second operation. 
An ifthenelse program function can be determined by summarizing its true 
and false operations into a single expression. In this case, the true and false 
operations are seen to carry out a common mathematical operation. Deterrnina-
Point 1 Point 2 Point 3 Point 4 
Figure 4.2 Domain-to-range mappings for the three-part sequence 
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tion of program functions for whi 1 e do and other iteration control structures may 
require more analysis, but can often be derived by summarizing the results of 
mental execution of several iterations in a single expression. In this case, if x is 
initially odd, its value is reduced by two each iteration until it reaches one and 
the loop terminates. If x is initially even, its value is reduced by two each itera-
tion until it reaches zero, and the loop likewise terminates. This program function 
is conveniently expressed in the table as a two-part conditional rule of the form 
(condition 1 ~rule 11 
condition 2 ~rule 2) 
where each condition is a predicate that defines the circumstances under which 
the corresponding rule (assignment) is to be executed, and the vertical bar ( I ) 
represents "or." In this case, if x is initially odd, its final value is set to one; oth-
erwise, if x is initially even, its final value is set to zero. (In general, conditional 
rules can have any number of parts.) 
When all conditions of a conditional rule are pairwise disjoint for all pairs, 
the rule is called a disjoint rule, and the order of evaluation of the conditions 
does not affect the outcome. Disjoint rules are very useful in expressing program 
functions. Note also that a state box defines a possibly large disjoint rule with 
conditions that evaluate the stimulus and old state to determine the response and 
new state. 
The program functions of the sequence, i ft h e nelse, and whi ledo struc-
tures in Table 4.2 are sequence free, alternation free, and iteration free respec-
tively. That is, the program functions of these structures abstract control flow to 
define their net effect on data in a single step from entry to exit. 
Table 4.2 Program function examples 
Control Structure 
do 
w . - abs (x) 




Z := X 
~::.se 
z : = y 
E__"'!dif 
X .- X - 2 
e::1ddo 
Program Function 
w, z : = abs(x}, max(abs(x}, y) 
z : = min(x, y} 
(initial x odd__... x : = 1 1 
initial x even__... x : = o) 
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The single-entry/single-exit property of control structures and their func-
tion nodes is critical to scalability in clear box abstraction, design, and verifica-
tion. For this reason, clear box designs should avoid language features that can 
interfere with this property (e.g., goto statements that permit arbitrary branch-
ing logic). Single-entry/single-exit control structures enable a natural scalabil-
ity for creating large designs while retaining intellectual control over their 
structure and function . Specifically, control structures can be nested and 
sequenced again and again in clear box designs as necessary to implement a 
state box transition function. 
To illustrate, consider the clear box procedure design in Figure 4.3. At the 
lowest level of design, the net effect from entry to exit of while q do i enddo 
can be abstracted to a loop-free program function named A, and the net effect 
of do g; h enddo can be abstracted to a sequence-free program function named 
B. Now the i fthene lse can be treated at a higher but function-equivalent level 
of abstraction as if p then A e lse B endi f, with no details of its constituent 
sequence and whiledo required, and in tum can be abstracted to a program 
function named C. Now do C; k enddo can be treated at a higher but again 
function-equivalent level of abstraction with no details of the constituent 
i f thenelse required. The net effect of this sequence can be abstracted to pro-
gram function D to define the overall program function of the entire clear box. 




_v_- J -- J J 
I ~---=====---====-------: ~-----=====--------L-----
Program Function Defines Effect of 
A whiledo: while q do i enddo 
B sequence: do g; h enddo 
c ifthenelse: if p then A else B endif 
D sequence : do C; k enddo 
Figure 4.3 Abstraction hierarchy of a clear box 
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full functional effect of abstracted operations at each level, with no reference to 
their procedural details required, but no behavior unaccounted for in the abstrac-
tions. This hierarchy of abstractions exists within an algebra of functions , where 
replacement of a control structure by its program function is the sole operation, 
and keywords d o, if , and so forth, act as function operators. Function abstrac-
tion is a complete and systematic method for recovering program documenta-
tion for understanding and maintenance. 
4.2.3 Clear Box Design with Intended Functions 
The process of reading and abstracting control structures to recover the previ-
ously described program functions is reversed for procedure design. In this 
case, the functions are called intended functions. Clear box designs are elabo-
rated through stepwise refinement of intended functions, which define the 
required net effect on data of their subsequent control structure refinements. 
The initial intended function for a clear box refinement is a state .box specifica-
tion. Intended functions internal to clear box refinements may be embedded in 
their design text according to the design language syntax depicted in Table 4.3. 
quare brackets ( [ ] ) are used in Table 4.3 to delimit the intended functions . 
Comment delimiters can be employed for this purpose in implementation lan-
guages. The overall intended function of each control structure, denoted by [f), 
· attached to its entry point. Intended functions internal to control structures are 
attached to their keywords. For example, in the if thene 1 s e structure, intended 
functions [ g] and [ h] are attached to keywords t h e n and else respectively to 
document the net effect of operations g and h respectively. 
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Table 4.3 continued 
Control Intended Function 
Structure Placement 
Ifthenelse [ f l 
if 
p 
then [ g ] 
g 




Whil edo [ f l 
whil e 
p 
do [ g ] 
g 
enddo --
Dount il [ f l 






Dowhi ledo [ f l 




do [ h l 
h 
enddo 
Figure 4.4 depicts the refinement process for an intended function on the 
left operating on integer variables, itself embedded in a larger design not shown. 
This function is refined in the first step into a sequenc e of two operations in the 
center of the figure, themselves expressed as intended functions for further 
refinement. (Variable b is local to the design and not referenced outside it, and 
thus is not mentioned in the original intended function.) Note that the original 
intended function propagates to this s equence refinement to document its net 
effect on data. The two new intended functions are next refined in the second 
step into, in this case, i f t hene 1 s e control structures on the right of the figure, 
and are likewise propagated to these refinements to document their designs. 
First Refinement Step 
[set d to minimum 
· of c and absolute 
value of a ] 
[set d to minimum 
of c and absolute 
value of a] 
do 
[set b to absolute 
value of a ] 
[set d to minimum 
of c and bl 
enddo 
Second Abstraction Step 
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Second Refinement Step 
[set d to minimum 
of c and absolute 
value of a ] 
do 
[set b to absolute 
value of a] 
if a < 0 
t hen 
b : ~ -a 
el s e 
b :~ a 
endif 
[set d to minimum 
of c and b ] 
if b < c 
then 
d : ~ b 
else 
d : ~ c 
e nd if 
end do 
First Abstraction Step 
Figure 4.4 Stepwise refinement with intended functions 
Figure 4.4 also depicts two abstraction steps that correspond to reading the 
control structures to derive their program functions . The abstracted program 
functions and the intended functions should be equal. Although this simple 
example can be readily understood by direct reading of its control structures, in 
larger designs intended functions play a critical role in preserving design inten-
tion for verification and maintenance. It is easy for the eye and mind to summa-
rize five or 10 lines of design mentally, but not so easy to summarize 50 or 100 
lines. It is clear that a correctness relationship exists between intended functions 
and their control structure refinements, as discussed next. 
It is also important to note that clear box refinement is not a lockstep 
process. The top-level structure of a design cannot be created without a good 
understanding of how it will be refined into lower level structures. Design is an 
iterative, creative process; as understanding improves, better ideas emerge. 
Insights at lower levels may lead to revisions at higher levels. The critical point 
is that the last intellectual pass through a design should be top down to validate 
and verify its intended function definitions and refinement steps. 
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4.3 Clear Box Verification 
4.3.1 The Correctness Questions 
Clear box correctness verification is a mathematics-based method for demon-
strating that a procedure meets its specification. Just as the correctness of a 
long-division computation is not demonstrated by rechecking the division, but 
rather by multiplication, so too the correctness of a procedure is not demon-
strated by rechecking its refinement, but rather by other means. The clear box 
verification method widely used in Cleanroom development is called function-
theoretic correctness verification. Using the function-theoretic approach, every 
control structure in a procedure is verified to do what its intended function spec-
ifies. An entire procedure has been verified when all its constituent control 
structures have been verified. Verifications are typically carried out in team 
reviews. 
The Correctness Theorem (Linger, Mills, and Witt 1979) defines correct-
ness questions for every clear box control structure, as depicted in Table 4.4. 
The number of questions to be asked and answered for each control structure is 
one for sequence structures, two for alternation structures, and three for itera-
tion structures . Because procedures of any size contain a virtually infinite num-
ber of execution paths, verification by tracing paths is impossible. However, 
despite the number of paths they define, procedures are composed of a finite 
number of control structures. By verifying every control structure in a few steps 
(three or fewer for the structures in Table 4.4), procedure verification is reduced 
to a systematic process with a practical total number of steps. The correctness 
questions can be applied at varying levels of rigor, ranging from verbal proofs in 
team reviews to detailed written proofs. The level of rigor employed is a busi-
ness decision based on risks and rewards. Experience has shown that verbal 
proofs in team reviews are very effective in developing high-quality software. 
The correctness questions in the table follow directly from analysis of exe-
cution paths in the corresponding control structures. For the sequence, the only 
path that exists is g followed by h; so for correctness, the composition of these 
function nodes must do f , the intended function of the sequence. 
For the i fthen, when pis true, the only path is through g; so for correctness, 
g must do fin this case. When p is false, the only path is through nothing (the 
identity function), so for correctness doing nothing must do fin this case; that 
is, f must already have been done when p is false. Analysis of the i f t h e nelse 
is similar, except when p is false, the only path is through h, so for correctness h 
must do fin this case. 
The correctness of iteration structures can often be difficult to prove 
directly. Fortunately, the correctness of an iteration that terminates can be deter-
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(for all possible inputs to/) 
(1) Composition question: 
Does g followed by h do j? 
(1) If tes t true question: 
When p is true, does g do f? 
(2) If test false question: 
When p is false, does doing nothing do j? 
(1) Iftest true question: 
When p is true, does g do j? 
(2) If test false question: 
When,p is false, does h dof? 
(1) Temiination question: 
Is termination guaranteed? 
(2) Whi letest true question: 
When p is true, does g followed by f do j? 
(3) Whiletest false question: 
When p is false, does doing nothing do j? 
(1) Termination question: 
Is termination guaranteed? 
(2) Whiletest true question: 
When p after g is false, does g followed by f do j? 
(3) Whiletest false question: 
When p after g is true, does g do j? 
(1) Termination question: 
Is termination guaranteed? 
(2) Whiletest true question: 
When p after g is true, does g followed by h followed 
byjdoj? 
(3) whiletest false question: 
When p after g is false, does g do j? 




Figure 4.5 Deriving the whiledo correctness question 
mined by verifying a simpler but equivalent ifthene lse structure derived 
through transformations on execution paths of the iteration. For example, con-
sider the whiledo control structure shown in graphic form in the top display of 
Figure 4.5. In the middle display, an equivalent ifthenelse has been con-
structed with the whiletest (p) as its predicate. For the true branch of the 
ifthenelse, one step (g) of the iteration is executed, followed by reentry to the 
whiledo itself, just as in execution of the original whiledo. For the false branch, 
nothing is done, likewise just as in execution of the original whiledo. This new 
if thene lse is thus execution equivalent to the whiledo in the top display. But 
the whiledo on the true branch of the new ifth e nel s e is postulated to be equiv-
alent to f; so in the lower display, it is replaced by f Thus, the correctness of a 
whil e do is reduced to the correctness of an ifthenelse and a seque nce . The 
correctness questions for the whiledo can now be derived by analysis of the 
execution paths of the ifthenelse. The true path requires that g followed by f 
must do f, and the false path requires that doing nothing must do f 
In illustration of the true-case correctness question, consider the following 
whiledo: 
[read remaining records from file, if any l 
while 
[records remain ] 
do 
[read next record ] 
e nddo 
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The correctness question is: When the whilet es t is true, does g followed by f 
do f? It is expressed as 
When [records remain] is true, 
does [read next record] followed by [read remaining records from file, if any] 
do [read remaining recordsfromfile, if any] 
The answer is yes, because given an initial nonempty state of the file (guaran-
teed by the predicate evaluation of true), [read next record ] (representing g) 
will result in one fewer record left to be read, resulting in either an empty or 
nonempty file, and [read remaining records from file, if any ] (representing f) 
will either complete the reading of a nonempty file or do nothing if the file is 
already empty. Thus the s equen ce (g followed by f) has the same effect as the 
intended function r read remaining records from file, if any l (f), given the same 
initial state of the file. 
Note that in addition to the true and false questions for the whi l edo , a third 
question is required to show that the iteration terminates. Termination argu-
ments are often based on some monotonic property of the iteration that eventu-
ally results in failure of the test. For example, the iteration here that reads 
consecutive records from a file is guaranteed to terminate when the file is 
exhausted. Analysis for the daunt il and dowh i l edo structures is similar. 
4.3.2 A Correctness Verification Example 
Consider the following clear box procedure and how to verify it. Such a proce-
dure could be a low-level subroutine in a large clear box design. As such, its 
overall intended function (lines 1-2) would be involved in verification of the 
higher level procedures that invoke it. The procedure accepts as arguments an 
integer array named emp (for employee number) of n elements, an integer 
named id (for identification), and an integer named i. (Array emp is guaranteed 
to be in ascending sorted order.) The intended function of the procedure 
requires that i be set to the location in emp that matches i d, if any; otherwise, i 
is to be set to o. The procedure implements a binary search for the value of id in 
e:np . The intended functions of th.e procedure, delimited by square brackets, are 
expressed in an informal yet concise style. Because some operations are self-
evident, not every control structure carries an intended function. 
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1 [if possible , set i s uch that emp(i) = id and 1 <= i <= n , 
otherwise set i to 0 ] 
2 procedure search(id , i: int eger ; emp(l .. n): array o f integer) 
3 bot, top , mid : integer 
4 i : = 0 
5 bot : = 1 
6 top : = n 
7 
8 
[if possible , set i so that emp(i) 
otherwise leave i unchanged] 
9 while 
10 bot <= top & i = 0 
id and bot <= i <= top , 
11 [if id = emp( (bot+ top)/2), set ito (bot+ top)/2, 
otherwise 
12 if id > emp((bot + top)/2), set bot to (bot+ top)/2 + 1, 
otherwise 
13 if id < emp((bot + top)/2), set top to (bot+ top)/2 - 1] 
14 do 
15 mid : = (bot + top)/2 
16 if 
17 emp(mid) = id 
18 then 
19 i := mi d 
20 else [if id > emp (mid) , set bot to mid + l, otherwise 








emp(mid) < id 
then 
bot := mid + 1 
else 





The verification will be carried out by asking and answering the correct-
ness questions, just as is done in a team review. The control structures can be 
verified in any order (e.g., top down, bottom up, or in some combination). After 
all the control structures have been verified, no matter the order, the entire pro-
cedure is verified. The following verification is carried out in top-down order. 
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The sequence at lines 4 through 8. Consider the sequence of three assign-
ments at lines 4 through 6, followed by the intended function at lines 7 and 8: 
4 i : = 0 
5 bot . - 1 
6 top . - n 
7 [if possible, set i so tha t emp(i) 
8 otherwise leave i unchanged] 
id and bot <= i <= top, 
The sequence correctness question requires that the composition of opera-
tions in this four-part sequence satisfy the intended function given at line 1: 
1 [if possible, set i such that emp(i) = id and 1 <= i <= n, 
otherwise set i to 0] 
Proof reasoning: At line 7, bot and top can be replaced by their prior val-
ues from lines 5 and 6; namely, 1 and n respectively. Then the intended function 
at lines 7 and 8 becomes 
7 [ if possible, set i such that emp(i) id and 1 <= i <= n, 
8 otherwise leave i unchanged] 
as is required by the intended function at line 1. Also, i is set to o at line 4 and is 
left unchanged by the intended function at lines 7 and 8 unless i d is found in 
e mp, also as required. Thus, the sequence appears to be correct. 
The whiledo at lines 9 through 13, 30. The intended function for the 
-wh i ledo is given at lines 7 and 8, and for its dopart at lines 11 through 13. Note 
that the dopart intended function defines the net effect of all the operations in 
its refinement at lines 14 through 29, and thus participates in the verification in 
place of these operations. The structure to be verified is thus 
9 while 
: o bot <= top & i = 0 
(do) 
:1 [if id = emp( (bot+ top)/2), set ito (bot + top)/2, 
otherwise 
:2 if id > emp( (bot + top) /2), set bot to (bot + top) /2 + 1, 
otherwise 
-:_3 if id < emp((bot + top)/2), set top to (bot+ top)/2- 1] 
30 enddo 
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The whiledo correctness question is composed of three parts that must be 
proved to show that the whiledo satisfies its intended function at lines 7-8: 
7 [if possible , set i so that emp(i) = id and bot <= i <= top , 
8 otherwise leave i unchanged] 
Proof reasoning: First, termination (while tes t evaluates false) is guaran-
teed because on each iteration, either id is found in emp and i is set to a nonzero 
value, or either bot is increased or top is decreased, so that eventually the 
whil etest will fail and the loop will terminate. Second, for the whil etest true 
case, the two-part sequence of operations defined by the dopart intended func-
tion (g) followed by the whiledo intended functionf(recall the definitions off 
and g from Table 4.4) 
11 [if id = emp( (bot + top) /2) , set i to (bot+ top)/2, 
otherwis e 
12 if id > emp ((bot + top)/ 2 ), se t bo t to (bot+ t op)/2 + 1 , 
otherwise 
13 if id < emp( (bot + top) /2) , set top to (bot+ top)/2 - 1] 
7 [if poss ible, set i s o that emp(i) = i d and bot <= i <= top , 
8 otherwise leave i unchanged] 
must satisfy the whiledo intended function (f): 
7 [if possible , set i so that emp(i) id and bot <= i <= top, 
8 otherwise leave i unchanged] 
To see this, note that performing the first part of the sequence (the dopart 
intended function at lines 11- 13) will either find i in e mp (line 11) or will 
exclude a portion of emp from further search (where i is guaranteed not to be 
found) by adjusting the value of top or bot as required (lines 12 and 13). Thus, 
the dopart function may find i , but if not it will not prevent finding i if possible 
in performing the second part of the sequence (the whiledo intended function at 
lines 7- 8), which now searches that part of emp where i may still be found. 
Also, the dopart intended function (lines 11- 13) and the whiledo intended 
function (lines 7 and 8) do not change the value of i unless it is found in emp. 
Thus, the two-part sequence appears to be equivalent to the whi l edo intended 
function, as is required. 
Third, for the whiletes t false case, doing nothing must do the intended 
function. When the whil etest is false, either i has already been set to the 
appropriate value (line 11) or the entire array has been searched (each iteration, 
lines 11 and 12 exclude successive portions of the sorted array where id is guar-
anteed not to be found, until finally no portions remain to be excluded- the 
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entire array has been searched) and id has not been found. In either case, doing 
nothing is the appropriate action to satisfy the intended function. 
The depart at lines 11 through 21, 30. The intended function for the dopart 
is given at lines 11 through 13, and the intended function for the nested 
i fthenelse is given at lines 20 and 21. Note that a sequence with firstpart 
an assignment to mid and secondpart an i fthenel·se is verified here. Such 
combined analysis of control structures in verification is useful when proof 
arguments are simplified as a result: 
:1 [if id = emp( (bot+ top)/2), set ito (bot+ top)/2 , 
otherwise 
: 2 if id > emp( (bot + top)/2), set bot to (bot+ top)/2 + 1, 
otherwise 
:3 i f id < emp((bot + top)/2), set top to (bot+ top)/2 - 1] 
:4 do 
:s mid := (bot+ top)/2 
: 6 if 
emp(mid) id 
: s then 
: 9 i := mid 
0 else [if id > emp(mid), set bot to mid+ 1 , otherwise 
2 : if id < emp(mid), set top to mid - 1] 
29 endif 
30 enddo 
Proof reasoning: Given the assignment at line 15, the ifthenelse can be 
rewritten as 
emp(bot + top)/2 = id 
: 8 t hen 
:_g i :=((bot+ top)/2) 
: o else [if id > emp((bot + top)/2), set bot to ((bot+ top)/2) + l , 
otherwise 
if id < emp( (bot + top) /2), set top to ((bot + top) /2) - 1] 
::'9 endif 
Thus, the iftest at line 17 and assignment at line 19 perform the first part of 
dle intended function at line 11, and the embedded intended function at lines 20 
and 21 performs the remaining two parts ofthe intended function at lines 12 and 
13, as required. 
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The ifthenelse at lines 20 through 28. This control structure is correct by 
direct inspection of the true and false correctness questions. 
20 e lse [ if id > emp (mid ) , se t bot to mi d + 1 , othe rwise 
21 if i d < emp(mid ), s e t top to mid - 1] 
22 if 
23 emp (mi d) < i d 
24 then 
2 5 bo t : = mid + 1 
26 el se 
27 t op : = mid - 1 
28 endif 
Having completed the proof arguments for all the control structures in the 
search procedure, the correctness of the entire procedure can now be asserted. 
The level of proof reasoning illustrated here is typically carried out verbally in 
team reviews, stepping through each correctness question in turn, with group 
agreement required for correctness. This process of acquiring team consensus is 
extremely effective in producing high-quality software because team fallibility 
is far less than individual fallibility. Additional rigor is always available for ver-
ifying life-, mission-, and enterprise-critical software through mathematics-
based intended functions and written proofs of the correctness questions. 
4.3.3 Verification in Practice 
To make verification as practical as possible (fast and effective), several aspects 
of formal verification described earlier must be adapted to each situation. For 
example, one would need a correctness condition for every language construct 
used to have a formal basis for doing function abstraction correctly in terms of 
transformations on the data space visible to the structure. It is often beneficial 
for a team to agree to use a limited subset of the programming language and to 
write constructs uniformly. As a practical matter, it would be wise to have a 
style guide for team coding practices that is as simple and as limited as the situ-
ation allows. 
The methods described earlier for verification are the very same methods 
used to reverse-engineer code. However, there is a vast difference in level of 
effort between verification of code that has been designed in full knowledge 
that its authors must verify the code, and verification of code written by others 
with no verification anticipated (reverse engineering). The sequence enumera-
tion leads to black box and state box specifications that can serve as the 
intended functions to be coded. Further design decisions made at the clear box 
level may change these intended functions somewhat; however, in general, 
intended functions can be represented in the code by reference to the state box 
specifications. 
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Finally, the verification process will be conducted by a team reading the 
code, mentally posing and answering correctness questions, abstracting the pro-
gram function of various constructs, and comparing that program function with 
the intended function. Function abstraction and comparison with the intended 
function is the essence of verification. Given straightforward and uniform cod-
ing practices, teams become very effective at the cognitive pattern matching of 
mental and verbal verification, which is also known as proof by direct assertion. 
In practice, a team would only "go to the board" when there is controversy regard-
ing the actual transformation on data or the comparison with the specification. 
Successful verification does not mean that the code will not change. 
Verification sessions often lead to insights for better designs, and sometimes the 
better idea justifies redesign of the code, which should be reverified. Errors 
found, of course, lead to code changes and repeated verification. The verifica-
tion process can consume substantial resources; however, this resource alloca-
tion is very cost-effective because of the nearly total elimination of rework after 
the code goes into testing. 
Stavely (1999) gives an intuitive and thorough treatment of design and ver-
ification using intended functions. 
4.4 Example: The Security Alarm 
Clear Box 
The state-based specification for the security alarm will now be used for clear 
box design. The security alarm illustrates a clear box that can be developed 
from the state box with little algorithmic elaboration required. However, as the 
example illustrates, substantial thought should be applied to the architecture of 
clear boxes to provide flexibility for future business needs. 
4.4.1 Design Strategies 
An obvious design strategy, though not necessarily the best one, is simply to use 
a high-level switch structure to send each stimulus to a lower level component. 
Four lower level components would be needed: one each for Trip, Set, Digit, 
and Clear. The lower level components would perform the actions specified in 
the tables presented earlier. Another obvious design strategy, again not neces-
arily the best one, is to use a high-level switch structure based on the current 
values of state data. There is no compelling reason for this choice, but it would 
be easy to produce. 
These two options are so straightforward that the code could be generated 
directly from the tables, with no design decisions required. As modifications 
and enhancements are made in the future, only the specification needs to be 
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maintained. Code could always be generated at the level of abstraction of the 
specification. If, on the other hand, the product is to be part of a product line, 
with related products containing similar components, then separation of con-
cerns may be a design priority to facilitate reuse across the product line. A mod-
ular, extensible architecture based on device objects may be desired. 
4.4.2 Flexible Architecture for Product Evolution 
The simple security alarm might be the base product in a prospective line of 
consumer security devices. The following features might be included in the plan 
for derivative products: 
User-programmable codes 
A device status window 
Event data storage 
Devices with multiple trip mechanisms 
Alarms with various characteristics (e.g. , time-out, signal type, volume 
level) 
Connectivity to other devices 
This list could be elaborated to all conceivable features of derivative prod-
ucts. A software architecture that isolates each aspect of the device will accom-
modate product evolution by allowing changes to parts while preserving the 
integrity of the whole. The important aspects of the security alarm might be 
described as the device display, the code, and the alarm. Three principal com-
ponents will be defined for the security alarm clear box architecture: a 
DisplayManage r, a Cod eMana ger, and an AlarmManager . 
4.4.3 Security Alarm Clear Box Design 
The clear box for the security alarm is a set of components that collectively 
implements the state box specification developed in Chapter 3 and summarized 
in Tables 3.10 to 3.14. The clear box is expressed in an object-oriented pseudo 
code. The pound symbol (#) precedes each comment in the clear box. Some 
comments include numbers that are preceded by SB (for state box), followed by 
tag numbers as defined in Tables 3.10 through 3.14. These comments are traces 
to the intended functions. 
The security alarm state box can be considered as a disjoint conditional 
rule that defines 39 transitions. Examination shows that transition 9 defines ini-
tialization whereas transitions 38 and 39 define finalization. After initialization, 
a loop will monitor events and produce responses as indicated in all other transi-
tions of the state box. 
A clear box implementation of state variables invented during state box 
development often involves some variation on their state box form. In this 
example, the state variables are implemented as follows. 
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1. The Set stimulus activates the device. All device behavior occurs when 
the device is active, as seen in the state box tables by the fact that the 
Device state variable is always ON and corresponds to LightStatus. 
2. The state variable Alarm is implemented as the variable AlarmStatus 
in the AlarmManager component. 
3. The state variable Code is implemented as the variable EntryStatus 






CLEAR constant 0; 
STOP constant -1; 
TRIPSIGNAL constant -99; 
SET constant -100; 
# Variables 
# no error or alarm 
# stops main loop on correct code 
# hardware trip wire signal 
# Set button on keypad pressed 
Event integer init (CLEAR); #any keypad entry or hardware signal 
SecurityStatus boolean init (CLEAR); #alarm on or off 
#----------------------------------------------------------------
# Main Program 
#----------------------------------------------------------------
# start the device; SB 9 
DisplayManager (Start); 
while (Event != STOP) 
do 
# get next user input or hardware signal 
get (Event); 
switch (Event) ; 
# SB 10-17 
case (SET); 
# do nothing 
# SB 1-8 
case (TRIPSIGNAL) 
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# SB 1,3,4,7 
A1armManager (Start); 
# SB 4,7 
CodeManager (Alert, Event); 
# else do nothing; SB 2,5,6,8 
endif 
# SB 18-37 
default 
CodeManager (Evaluate, Event); 




# SB 38,39 
AlarmManager (Stop); 
DisplayManager (Stop); 
# end of Security Alarm main program 
# OBJECT TEMPLATES 
# DisplayManager (Service) 
# AlarmManager (Service, Data) 






ON constant 1; 
OFF constant 0; 
# State data 
# light is on 
# light is off 




# SB 9 
Start; 
LightStatus :~ ON; 
# SB 38-39 
Stop; 
LightStatus .- OFF; 
# end DisplayManager 
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ON constant l; 
OFF constant 0; 
# State data 
# alarm is on 
# alarm is off 




# SB 1,3,4,7 
Start; 
AlarmStatus .- ON; 
Query; 
Status 
# SB 39 
Stop; 
AlarmStatus; 
AlarmStatus .- OFF; 
# end AlarmManager 





NONE constant 0; 
1_0K constant 1; 
2_0K constant 2; 
CLEAR constant 0; 
COMPLETE constant -1; 
ERROR constant -2; 
# no keypad entry 
# first correct digit in code entered 
# second correct digit in code entered 
# Clear button on keypad pressed 
# correct code entered 
# error in code entry 
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# State data 
CodeCombination array static init([1] :=7; [2] :=5; [3] :=7]) #code is 757 




# SB 4,7 
Alert; 
if ((EntryStatus = 1_0K) 
then EntryStatus := ERROR; 
endif 






# clear button has been pressed; SB 26-33 
EntryStatus := NONE; 
else 
# digit has been pressed 
switch (EntryStatus); 
case (NONE) 
# SB 34,35 
if (Event= CodeCombination[1]) 
then EntryStatus := 1_0K; 
# SB 18,19 
else EntryStatus := ERROR; 
endif 
case (1_0K) 
# SB 36,37 
if (Event = CodeCombination[2]) 
then EntryStatus := 2_0K; 
# SB 21,23 
else EntryStatus := ERROR; 
endif 
case (2_0K) 
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EntryS t atus := NONE; 
Event : = COMPLETE; 
# SB 24 , 25 
else EntryStatus = ERROR; 
endi f 
de fau l t; 
# if EntryStatus ERROR, do no thing ; SB 20 , 22 
endswit ch 
endif 
# e nd CodeManager 
4.4.4 Correctness Verification of Clear Box 
Verification of the security alarm clear box is done by abstracting the program 
function and then comparing the results with the state box specification, fol-
lowed by analyzing the correctness conditions. At the risk of belaboring the 
issue, many details are written out here that in practice would be dispatched 
quickly in team review. Increasingly, however, full documentation of correct-
ness verification is being required in safety-critical and high-business-risk 
applications. 
The verification fundamentals described earlier are used, with effects on 
data presented in <before, after> and tabular forms. The column titles in Tables 
4.5 through 4.7 give the names of all the variables mentioned in the code of the 
object. Each row of the table represents the status of all variables on exit. The 
rightmost column contains a trace to the state box row being implemented, and 
an asterisk is used to flag partial or distributed implementation. Thus the effects 
on data are fully summarized and the effect of any use of the object is easily 
seen. The program function of each of the three objects is abstracted before that 
of the main program. Logic symbols are & for logical and, I for or, and - for not. 
Dashes indicate no change and x represents don't know or don't care. All tables 
are written out here; in practice, perhaps only that of the codeManager would be 
written. 
The program function of CodeManager is a bit more complex than the oth-
ers . Each numbered row has two rows within it; the upper represents the data 
space before execution and the lower represents the data space after execution. 
codeManager makes essentially 10 transformations in monitoring user 
attempts to enter a correct three-digit code to tum off the device. Row 8 changes 
=:vent to -1 to indicate success. Row 1 shows that an alarm signal will disrupt a 
disarm code in progress, whereas row 2 shows that no code in progress results 
in no change to the data space. Row 3 shows that SET initializes and CLEAR resets 
progress status, and a newly entered, correct three-digit code is required. Row 4 
~~================-----------
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Table 4.6 Program function of AlarmManager 
Alarm State Box Trace 
Service Status AlarmStatus Row No. 
Start 1 1, 3, 4*,7* 
Query 'i)',., 
Stop 0 39* 
shows that a good first digit (meaning the correct digit at the right time) records 
progress, otherwise it results in an error (row 5). Row 6 shows that a good sec-
ond digit records progress, otherwise it results in an error (row 7). As noted ear-
lier, a good third digit results in Event being set to -1; otherwise, it results in an 
error (row 9). All other inputs result in no change to the data space, as indicated 
in row 10. 
The visible data space of the device is a pair <Li ght Status, AlarmSt atus >. 
The overall structure of the top-level procedure is a four-part sequence with 
correct behavior: 
< OFF, OFF> 
Di sp layMa n a g er 
<ON, OFF > 
While-do-loop 
< ON, x> 
Al armMa nag e r 
<ON, OFF > 
DisplayManager 
<OFF, OFF > 
When the device is turned on, DisplayManager turns on the light <OFF, 
OFF> to <ON, OFF> . Event is defaulted to CLEAR, and so the loop is always 
entered. 
Within the loop, (1) further instances of SET have no effect; (2) TRIPSIGNAL 
will tum on the alarm and tell the CodeManager (so that if disarming is in 
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Table 4.7 Program function of CodeManager 
() () () 
0 0 0 
p, p, p, 
(0 (0 (0 
() () () 
0 0 0 !a trl fr 8 8 t1 t1 I» ::; f-' · f-' · f-'· it " ::; ::; ::; 11 PJ PJ PJ OJ :c '< rr rr " 0 0 (/) r.n f-' · f-' · f-'· >< 
:t! 
(1) trl rr 0 0 0 ~ < < PJ ::; ::; ::; z c;· (0 rr ~ ~ ~ I» p ::; c f-' tv w 0 (1) rr w ~ ~ ~ (1) 
1 Alert X 112 7 5 7 4*, 7* 
- -2 - - -
2 Alert X -(112) 7 5 7 1*, 3* 
- - - - -
3 Evaluate & 0 X 7 5 7 26-33 
- 0 - - -
4 Evaluate & 7 & 0 7 5 7 34,35 
- 1 - - -
5 Evaluate & -7 & 0 7 5 7 18, 19 
- -2 - - -
6 Evaluat e & 5 & 1 7 5 7 36,37 
- 2 - - -
7 Evaluate & -5 & 1 7 5 7 21,23 
- -2 - -
8 Evaluate & 7 & 2 7 5 7 38,39 
-1 0 - - -
9 Evaluate & -7 & 2 7 5 7 24,25 
- -2 - - -
10 Eva l uat e & other & other 7 5 7 20,22 
- - - - -
progress it will be interrupted, if the alarm is off; if the alarm is on, then it will 
have no effect); (3) all other values of Events will be given directly to the 
codeManager to evaluate. It is possible for the loop to terminate. This happens 
when and only when CodeManager sets Event to -1 , whereupon the loop termi-
nates immediately and the device behavior is <oN, x>. 
On exiting the loop, AlarmManager is called and the device goes from 
< ON, x > to < ON, OFF>. Di splayManager is called and the device goes from < ON, 
OFF> to < OFF, OFF>. This analysis is easily restated directly in terms of correct-
ness questions in a further illustration of verification methods. 
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The overall structure of the top-level procedure is a four-part sequence, 
with firstpart , thirdpart , and fourthpart object service invocations and 
with s econdpart a whil e do. The sequence correctness question requires that 
the composition of these four parts must carry out the intended function; in this 
case, successive transitions of the state box itself. Inspection shows that f irst -
part correctly implements transition 9, start-up. Likewise thirdpart and 
fourthpart correctly implement transitions 38 and 39, with the assumption 
that whi ledo terminates. For correctness, secondpart whi ledo must carry out 
all state box transitions other than 9, 38, and 39, and must also terminate on 
completion of a correct code only. These assumptions define the required, 
intended function of the wh i ledo . 
The dopart of whiledo is a two-part sequence, with firstpart a get 
statement that obtains the current stimulus, and secondpart a swit ch statement 
that processes it. This sequence is correct by inspection with the provision that 
secondpart processing is correct. 
secondpart is comprised of three cases that are based on the current stim-
uli. The first case deals with the Set stimulus, and inspection shows that this 
case correctly implements transitions 10 through 17. 
The second case, TRIPSIGNAL, is composed of a sequence of AlarmManager 
and an ifthenelse. The if test composes the AlarmManager with either the 
thenpart or the el separt. If the alarm is off, it is turned on no matter what 
the current state, as required by transitions 1, 3, 4, and 7, and codeManager is 
invoked to set Entrystatus to -2 if a code entry was in progress, as required by 
transitions 4 and 7. If the alarm is on, there is no response or state change as 
required by transitions 2, 5, 6 and 8. Thus, the second case correctly handles 
transitions 1 through 8. 
The third case deals with all other stimuli and is composed of CodeManager, 
which directly implements transitions 18 through 37. Thus, dopart correctly 
implements transitions 1 through 8 and 10 through 37, and sets the loop exit 
conditions. Given this analysis, the three whiledo correctness conditions-ter-
mination, whiletest true, and while t est false-can be addressed. The clear 
box appears to be a correct implementation of the state box. 
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A statistical approach to software testing was developed both by Harlan Mills 
(Mills, Dyer, and Linger 1987) and colleagues at IBM, and by John Musa 
(1993) and colleagues at AT&T. The terminology used by Mills and Musa dif-
fered slightly, but their ideas were similarly drawn from scientific approaches to 
product testing and certification in mature engineering disciplines. In other in-
dustries, products are typically certified under protocols in which random sam-
ples of the product are drawn, tests characteristic of operational use are applied, 
analytical or statistical inferences are made, and products meeting a standard 
are "certified" as fit for use. 
The Cleanroom approach to software testing and certification-statistical 
resting based on a usage model-is the application of such a protocol to soft-
ware (Poore and Trammell 1998). In statistical testing, an operational usage 
model of the software is developed, test cases are generated randomly from the 
usage model, and test results are interpreted according to mathematical and sta-
tistical models to yield measures of software quality and test sufficiency. 
Traditional forms of structural testing are complementary with Cleanroom sta-
. tical usage testing, and need not be abandoned. However, many organizations 
have found that usage testing is a more economical and efficient approach to 
c!evelopmental testing, and it results in higher reliability of fielded software. 
5.1 Benefits of Statistical Testing 
Based on a Usage Model 
ratistical usage testing of a software system produces measures of product 
d process quality for management decision making throughout the life cycle. 
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Because a usage model is based on specifications rather than code, the insights 
that result from model building can be used to make informed management 
decisions in the early stages of a project when the opportunity to prevent prob-
lems is greatest. The following are key benefits of usage modeling and statisti-
cal testing. 
Validation of Requirements. A usage model is an external view of the sys-
tem specification that is readily understandable by system engineers, develop-
ers, customers, and end users. Interfaces and requirements are often simplified 
or clarified when the usage model (including possible inputs, possible sequenc-
ing of inputs, and expected outputs) is reviewed systematically in the context of 
operational use. 
Resource and Schedule Estimation. Standard calculations on a usage 
model provide data for effort, schedule, and cost projections, such as the mini-
mum number of tests required to cover all states and transitions in the model. 
"What-if" analyses can be conducted to bound the best and worst case out-
comes of testing based on failure data. 
Crafted, Nonrandom Test Cases. Special test cases, perhaps required by 
contract or regulation, can be determined by examining the model to be sure 
that certain sequences are tested. Existing test cases can be mapped to the 
model to assess omissions or redundancy. The usage model becomes a refer-
ence model for all testing required or desired. 
Automated Test Case Generation. A minimal coverage test script (the 
minimal number of test events for complete coverage of the usage model) and 
random test cases (based on the usage probability distribution) can be generated 
automatically from a usage model. Model coverage testing ensures a minimal 
level of function before random testing begins, and random testing provides a 
basis for estimating operational reliability. 
Effective, Efficient Testing. Faults are not equally likely to cause failures. 
Faults that are on frequently traversed paths have a higher probability of causing 
failures than faults that are on infrequently traversed paths. This simple fact is the 
primary motivation for random testing: Faults are discovered in roughly the order 
in which they would cause failures in the field. The test budget is spent in a way 
that maximizes the increase in operational reliability resulting from testing. 
Focused Testing (Biased Sampling). Usage models support biased sam-
pling of sequences of special interest, such as infrequently used but critical 
functions. Separate models can be developed for these functions, or the origi-
nal model may be transformed, sampled, and the results corrected to remove 
the bias. 
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Quantitative Test Management. Statistical testing based on a usage model 
provides quantitative criteria for management decisions about completion of 
testing and system release. The sufficiency of testing can be measured as the 
statistical difference between expected usage (as represented in the usage model) 
and tested usage (as recorded in testing) . 
Estimate of Rel iabil ity. Using a statistical testing protocol, a valid estimate of 
expected operational performance can be derived from the performance of the 
software during testing. The actual test results (i.e., correct and incorrect perfor-
mance on each input) are recorded as weights on the usage model, and calcula-
tions on the model provide estimates of reliability in operational use. 
5.2 Theoretical Foundations 
of Statistical Testing 
5.2.1 Populations and Samples 
In statistical testing, software testing is viewed as a problem to be solved by 
statistical methods. A subset of all possible uses of the software is generated, 
and performance on the subset is used as a basis for conclusions about general 
operational performance. In other words, a "sample" is used to draw conclu-
sions about a "population." 
The premise that must be accepted as a starting point in this analogy is that 
it is not possible to test all ways in which software may be used. This is appar-
ently not a premise that can be assumed as obvious. In discussing software test-
ing strategies with testing practitioners, it is not uncommon to hear someone 
ay, "We have to test every possible use of the software; the kind of software we 
develop could have catastrophic consequences if it is not tested completely." 
The following simple examples are intended to demonstrate the impossibility of 
testing all possible scenarios of use. 
Software with a bounded but large input sequence length has a finite but 
astronomical number of possible usage scenarios. The combinatorial growth in 
possible input sequences yields a testing problem of surprising magnitude for 
even a small application, as shown in the example in Table 5.1 from Wiener 
(1 994). The example assumes a system in which (1) a usage scenario has at 
least one input and at most 10 inputs, (2) 20 different inputs are possible, and 
(3) inputs may be repeated. Such a system would be small indeed by today's 
standards. 
If each scenario in this example could be tested in one second, the system 
would require more than 300,000 years to test. If 100 scenarios could be tested 
per second, the testing time is reduced to 3,000+ years. If 100 scenarios could 
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Table 5.1 Scenarios 
Length of 
Input 
Sequence No. of Possible Usage Scenarios 
20 = 20 
2 20x20 =400 
3 20 X 20 X 20 = 8,000 
4 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 160,000 
5 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 3,200,000 
6 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 64,000,000 
7 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 1 ,280,000,000 
8 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 25,600,000,000 
9 ~x~x~x~ x~x~x~x~x~ = 512,000,000,000 
10 ~x~x~x~x~x~ x ~x~x~x~ = 10,240,000,000,000 
Total usage 10,778,947,368,420 
scenarios 
be tested per second on each of I 00 copies of the software, testing time is 
reduced to 30+ years. Exhaustive testing is simply an impossible task, even 
when the number of usage scenarios is finite. 
Software with an unbounded input sequence length has a theoretically infi-
nite number of possible usage scenarios. For software with only two user 
inputs, A and B, the possible scenarios of use (i.e. , scenarios that begin with 
invocation and end with termination) are A, B, AA, AB, BB, BA, AAA, AAB, 
ABA, BAA, BBB, and so on. 
There is really no question about whether all possible scenarios of use will 
be tested. They will not. The only questions are how the population of uses will 
be characterized and how a subset of test cases will be drawn. A random sample 
of test cases from a properly characterized population, if applied to the software 
with proper experimental control, will allow valid generalization of conclusions 
from testing to operational use. Any other set of test cases, no matter how 
thoughtfully constructed, will not. 
5.2.2 Stochastic Nature of Software Use 
Software use can be viewed as a stochastic process (i.e., a series of events that 
unfold over time in a probabilistic way). A Markov process is a stochastic 
process that obeys the Markov property, in which the next event in a series can 
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be determined based on the present, without reference to the past. Markov the-
ory has been applied to developing and analyzing software usage models 
(Whittaker and Poore 1993, Whittaker and Thomason 1994), and mathematical 
programming has been applied to model optimization (Walton, Poore, and 
Trammell 1993). Software use can be modeled as a finite state, discrete-para-
meter Markov chain, and the standard analytical results for Markov chains can 
be interpreted to yield insights about long-term operational use. Given a usage 
model as a system of constraints (Walton 1995), mathematical programming 
can then be used to generate the optimal model for an objective function (for 
example, the model that "covers" all usage states and state transitions with the 
fewest test cases). The formalisms used in Cleanroom software certification 
provide a sound theoretical foundation for current practice and ongoing 
advances in technology. 
5.3 Statistical Usage Testing 
in Practice 
A software usage model characterizes operational use of a software system (i.e., 
the population from which a statistically correct sample of test cases can be 
drawn). Statistical testing is ordinarily discussed within the context of normal 
usage conditions, but other usage contexts (e.g., stress conditions, hazardous 
conditions, maintenance conditions) may be specified as well. 
5.3.1 Usage Specification 
The first step in usage model development is to characterize general operational 
conditions and perhaps stratify classes of usage. Software is "used" by a "user" 
in some "environment." The definitions of user, use, and environment define the 
operational environment to which inferences about the software apply. If multi-
ple usage contexts are important, separate models that are tailored for each con-
text may be used. Stratification of usage is a technique for characterizing usage 
in as granular a fashion as necessary to describe the variation in operational 
conditions. 
A user of the software may be a person, a hardware device, or other soft-
ware, and each user type may be further stratified if necessary. Human users, 
for example, might be classified by job type, access privileges, or experience in 
the domain. 
A use of the software may be a work session, a transaction, a telephone 
call, or any other unit of service. A use may be bounded by power-on/power-off, 
invocation/termination, switcQ.hook-up/switchhook-down, or any other appro-
priate start/finish events defining an instance of usage. 
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A usage environment can be characterized by platform, single user versus 
multiuser, concurrent applications, system load, integrity of externally provided 
data, and other factors. 
5.3.2 Usage Model Development 
The initial structure of a usage model follows directly from the software speci-
fication. The Cleanroom approach to specification provides a common point 
of departure for both the development work described in the previous chapter 
and the certification work described in this chapter. In particular, the canonical 
sequences identified during specification define the initial state space for the 
usage model. 
A usage model may be represented as a graph in which the nodes represent 
usage states and the arcs represent stimuli that cause transitions between usage 
states. Note that it is states of use (e.g., "signed on," "transaction initiated," etc.) 
that are referred to here, and not internal states of the software. Graphical usage 
models are easily understood by developers and potential users, who often 
participate in usage model review. Graphical representation aids in system 
understanding but is generally only used for small systems or for high-level rep-
resentation of large systems. Usage models for large systems are often defined 
abstractly at first, with automated support for model expansion through sub-
models and transformation of abstract stimuli to associated atomic stimuli. 
Usage models may also be represented as tables or matrices, with rows and 
columns representing states, and each cell representing the probability of the 
row state being followed by the column state. 
The structure of a usage model represents possible use of the software. A 
probability distribution is next imposed on the structure to represent expected 
use of the software under specified conditions. Transition probabilities between 
states in the usage model may be based on field data if available, on estimates 
from customer interviews, or on instrumentation of prior system versions. The 
probabilities associated with states and state transitions in a usage model may 
be set to reflect either routine or nonroutine conditions. 
5.3.3 Usage Model Analysis and Test Planning 
As mentioned, state transition graphs or matrices are common forms for repre-
senting usage models. Such structures are also common forms for representing 
Markov chains. Although usage models may be represented in other forms, 
Markov chain usage models are prominent in Cleanroom practice due to the 
insights that may be gained from calculations on a Markov chain. Standard cal-
culations on a Markov chain provide expected values for measures that are 
highly useful in test planning, such as 
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Average number of events in a use (test case) 
Longcrun state occupancy (i.e., percentage of total usage time) 
Average number of uses (test cases) before a given usage state occurs 
These results-available from the model alone (i.e., prior to software 
design and implementation)-have application throughout the software life 
cycle. They may be used to prune the specification, gauge complexity, focus 
verification efforts, identify frequencies of events, plan the test schedule, and 
determine the upper bound on inferences about reliability. 
5.3.4 Test Case Generation and Testing 
After the usage model has been developed, test cases can be generated automat-
ically by traversing the usage states of the model, guided by the transition prob-
abilities associated with the exit arcs from each state. Because each arc is 
associated with a particular stimulus to the system, the traversal results in an 
accumulation of successive stimuli that represents a particular test case. The test 
cases constitute a script for use in testing. They may be annotated during test 
planning to include instructions for conducting and evaluating tests, and they 
may be annotated during testing to record results and observations. Test cases 
may be applied by human testers or used as input to an automated test tool. 
Several assumptions underlie the validity of inferences from a statistical 
experiment. In general, proper control of the testing process may be safe-
guarded by the following four practices. 
1. Each version of the software is tested in a unique statistical experi-
ment. Data from a given version may be used to estimate the reliability 
of that version only. Data across versions are used to characterize the 
testing process. Data used in reliability models are used to estimate the 
reliability of the product; data used in reliability growth models are 
used to estimate the effectiveness of the process. 
2. The specification, environmental conditions, and the basis for evalua-
tion of performance are held constant for each version of the software 
that is tested. 
3. Test cases are run as generated. One does not "pick and choose" among 
test cases. 
4. Test staff members are trained to ensure a common understanding of 
all test materials and policies. Performance of human testers is moni-
tored throughout testing to prevent "drift." Regular communication 
among test team members is scheduled to review results and discuss 
matters that may affect test judgment. 
The actual behavior of the software under test is compared with the speci-
fied behavior by either human or automated means. The behavior of the soft-
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ware is checked on each transition, and failures are recorded by software ver-
sion, test case number, and transition number. All test data and test scripts are 
archived. 
5.3.5 Metrics for Test Sufficiency and Product Quality 
The usage model that generates test cases is called the usage chain. The ex-
pected long-run occupancy of each state is calculated from the usage chain dur-
ing model analysis. During the testing phase, a second chain (called the testing 
chain) is used to track actual state traversals during testing. The testing chain 
begins as a copy of the usage chain structure, with a counter on each arc that is 
initially zero (indicating that no use of the software has yet occurred). As test 
cases are applied, the counters associated with the arcs are incremented to 
record state transitions (if the software performs the transition to the usage state 
successfully) during testing. 
A comparison of the usage and testing chains is made on an ongoing basis 
during testing to gauge the difference between expected and actual usage. The 
difference is given as the value of a measure called the discriminant, which 
reflects the degree to which the testing experience has become representative of 
expected usage. The value for the discriminant generally tends toward zero (but 
not monotonically) as testing progresses without failures. The value will 
plateau at stages of testing, with the specific values dependent on the specific 
models and the amount of testing done. When, in the judgment of the test engi-
neers, the value is low enough to indicate that the testing experience is suffi-
ciently similar to expected field performance such that further testing is not 
worth its cost, testing should stop. 
As testing progresses and failures occur, the structure of the testing chain is 
augmented with failure states. The reliability of the software, which may be cal-
culated at any point in testing, is the probability of taking a random walk 
through the testing chain from invocation to termination without encountering a 
failure state. In other words, reliability is the probability that every event in a 
complete usage scenario will be processed successfully. Reliability is calcu-
lated from the testing chain. 
If no failures occur during testing, the reliability calculation yields 1.0, 
which must be interpreted as "no information" and not as a reliability estimate. 
When testing shows no failures, other reliability measures should be used, such 
as presented by Poore, Mills, and Mutchler (1993) or Miller (1992). 
Statistical testing based on a usage model is an appropriate protocol for 
software testing. It is grounded in sound scientific principles, has been reduced 
to reasonable engineering practice, and produces conclusions that are indepen-
dently confirmable. 
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5.4 Example: Security Alarm 
5.4.1 Usage Model 
The canonical sequences identified during security alarm specification define 
the state space for the usage model. The canonical sequences for the security 
alarm that were discovered in Chapter 3 are presented again in Table 5.2. Each 
canonical sequence is named to represent the usage state. 
The usage model may be drawn using the canonical sequences as states. 
The ordering of states can be determined by referring to the canonical 
sequences , and the full set of possible stimuli given in the sequence enumera-
tion in Chapter 3 can be used to define all possible transitions (arcs) among 
states. Figure 5.1 is a graphical depiction of the usage model for the security 
Table 5.2 Canonical sequences for the security alarm 
Canonical Usage 
Sequence Description State Name 
Empty Software Not 
Invoked 
s The user has pressed the Set button to activate Ready 
the device. 
ST The device has been set and the trip signal has Alarm 
occurred, setting off the alarm. 
SB The device has been set and the user has entered Entry Error 
an invalid digit. 
SG The device has been set and the user has entered 1_0K 
the first digit in the code. 
S TB The device has been set, the trip signal has set off Alarm and Entry 
the alarm, and the user has entered an invalid digit. Error 
The Clear button must be pressed before the code 
can be entered to turn off the alarm. 
STG The device has been set, the trip signal has set off Alarm and 
the alarm, and the user has entered the first digit 1 - OK 
in the code. 
S GG The device has been set and the user has entered 2_0K 
the first two digits in the code. 
STGG The device has been set, the trip signal has set off Alarm and 
the alarm, and the user has entered the first two 2_0K 
digits in the code. 
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other 
~ All states except Software Not Invoked and Software Terminated also "----.J · have self-loops, which represent application of all other legal inputs. 
Figure 5.1 Usage model for security alarm 
alarm. Stimuli that have no effect on the usage state are represented in a 
self-loop in each state. From the Alarm state, for example, the Set button may 
be pressed, but it has no effect (does not change state of use); the usage state is 
still Alarm. 
The next step in usage modeling is assignment of usage probability values 
for each arc in the model. In this case, all stimuli that can produce a state change 
will be regarded as equally likely except for the Trip stimulus, which will be 
assumed to be less likely than other stimuli. The Trip stimulus will be assigned 
a 0.05 probability from the Ready, Entry Error, l _OK, and 2_0K states. The 
Trip stimulus has no effect in other states because the alarm is already on. 
(Stimuli that do not produce state changes are the "other" stimuli associated 
with self-loops in Figure 5.1.) 
In the Ready state, for example, the Trip stimulus has a 0.05 probability of 
occurring, a GoodDigit and BadDigit in the security code each has a 0.45 prob-
ability of occurring, and all other stimuli (in this case, Set and Clear) have a 
(collective) 0.05 probability of occurring. Probabilities are assigned to all the 
outgoing arcs of each state. 
Given the usage model structure and the usage probabilities, an analysis of 
the usage model can be performed to produce data that can be used throughout 
the life cycle. Table 5.3 presents the analytical values for the model. Formulas 
for all analytical results presented in this chapter are found in Whittaker and 
Thomason (1994). 
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Test planning is one primary use of analytical data from the usage model. 
The average length of a test case, for example, may be used to establish upper 
and lower bounds on the testing schedule. The expected average test case length 
for the security alarm is 48. Each test case might be estimated to require 15 min-
utes to test. The target level of system reliability to be demonstrated in testing 
might be 0.95 reliability at the 99% confidence level. Using simple hypothesis 
testing, a total of 90 test cases must be performed to meet that requirement 
(Poore, Mills, and Mutchler 1993). Assuming there are no failures during test-
ing, a total of 22.5 hours will be needed to perform the 90 test cases. If an equiv-
alent amount of time is needed for pre- and post -test activity, then the minimum 
total test schedule may be estimated to be 45 hours. An upper limit may be esti-
mated as well by assuming longer elapsed time for test cases and/or a distribu-
tion of failures across test cases. 
The minimum amount of random testing required to visit all usage states is 
being driven by the 2_0K state. Fifty-eight usage events (transitions) are 
expected before its first occurrence-a greater number than for any other state. 
A reduction in time to achieve state coverage is possible if the probability of 
stimuli leading to the 2_0K state is increased. Further consideration of this 
probability assignment is warranted (and may or may not lead to a decision to 
alter the probability to achieve a shorter schedule for state coverage). 
Data from model analysis may also be used to focus development activity. 
For example, the expected long-run occupancy of the Alarm, and Alarm and 
Entry Error states represent half the usage probability mass (0.293 + 0.215 = 
Table 5.3 Analysis of the security alarm usage model 
Expected Transitions Probability of 
Long-run until State First Occurrence in 
State Occupancy Occurs a Single Use 
Software Not Invoked 0.020 48.860 1.000 
Ready 0.111 1.000 1.000 
Entry Error 0.074 9.763 0.835 
1_0K 0.053 13.820 0.832 
2_0K 0.017 58.330 0.527 
Alarm 0.293 18.363 0.756 
Alarm and 1 OK 0.147 21.521 0.756 -
Alarm and 2_0K 0.049 32.047 0.756 
Alarm and Entry Error 0.215 21.102 0.714 
Software Terminated 0.020 47.860 1.000 
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0.508). The development activity related to these usage states should receive 
particularly rigorous verification. Conversely, states with extremely low occu-
pancy rates may represent functions that might even be pruned from the specifi-
cation in some applications. 
5.4.2 Testing 
After the usage model and the analysis have been reviewed and determined to 
be a viable basis for testing, test cases are generated. The first test suite gener-
ated is usually the minimal arc coverage suite, which traverses the model in the 
fewest possible steps required to achieve model coverage. Model coverage test-
ing accomplishes several goals. The model is further confirmed to be accurate, 
the ability to evaluate all responses is confirmed, and the readiness of the soft-
ware for random testing is established. Random testing enables measurement 
of the reliability of the software. If the quality of the software is so poor that it 
cannot survive arc coverage testing in a reasonable period of time, then the soft-
ware is not ready for random testing. 
After the software has successfully passed the arc coverage test, random 
test cases are generated. Each test case is a random walk through the usage 
model. Each state in the model has a set of exit arcs, with each arc representing 
a stimulus. During a random walk through the model, a random number is gen-
erated at each state, and a stimulus is chosen based on the probabilities associ-
ated with the exit arcs from that state. 
Table 5.4 depicts a sample test case for the security alarm that was gener-
ated randomly from the usage model. The initial state is Software Not Invoked. 
The only stimulus that is possible in that state is Set, so regardless of the random 
number generated, Set will be the next stimulus. The Set stimulus leads to the 
Ready state, which has four exit arcs (i.e., four possible stimuli). As mentioned 
earlier, the probabilities associated with the exit arcs are T (Trip), 0.05; G 
(GoodDigit), 0.45; B (BadDigit), 0.45; and any other stimulus, 0.05. In the fol-
lowing test case, the random number generated at the Ready state resulted in the 
G stimulus being selected. Random selection of stimuli continues at each state 
until the Software Terminated state is reached, signaling the end of the test case. 
As testing proceeds, the performance of the software on each test case is 
recorded. If the software processes each test event correctly, the test case is 
recorded as a "pass." If there is a failure, the test case number and the transition 
number of the failure are recorded. Failure data and usage model analyses are 
used together to produce metrics for test sufficiency and product quality. 
5.4.3 Measures of Test Sufficiency 
The sufficiency of testing for the security alarm is quantified in two ways. The 
simplest measure of sufficiency is model coverage. Only two random test cases 
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Table 5.4 A randomly generated test case 
Stimulus No. Stimulus Next State 
s Ready 
2 G 1_0K 
3 G 2_0K 
4 c Ready 
5 B Entry Error 
6 c Ready 
7 B Entry Error 
8 c Ready 
9 G 1_0K 
10 G 2_0K 
11 G Software Terminated 
will be required to cover all states in the model on average. Fifteen test cases will 
be required to cover all arcs in the model. Again, a test case is a random walk 
through the usage model beginning with Software Not Invoked and ending with 
Software Terminated. 
The column headed D(U,T) in Table 5.5 is the discriminant described ear-
lier. The value is not defined until all arcs have been traversed; consequently, 
this column has no value for the first 14 scripts. When test cases are generated 
randomly from the model, they are of course generated in a manner that reflects 
the probabilities in the usage model. As the randomly generated test cases con-
tinue to accumulate usage events in proportion to usage probabilities, the use 
of the software in testing becomes more and more like the profile of usage that 
· expected to occur in the field. The discriminant- a measure of the similarity 
between expected and tested use-decreases during testing and eventually 
ops changing at some significant digit of interest. In the example in Table 5.5, 
lhe value of the discriminant is generally decreasing, but has not yet converged. 
The specific stopping criterion is a matter of experience in a particular domain, 
~ngineering judgment, and the testing budget and schedule. 
In Table 5.5 no failures were assumed to have occurred during testing. An 
alternative scenario will now be assumed, in which a failure in the software's 
recessing of the trip signal occurs . In this scenario, the software fails to set off 
e alarm when a trip signal occurs immediately after a bad digit has been 
entered. 
The same 30 randomly generated test cases will again be considered, with 
- · ures as recorded in Table 5.6. The failures are stop failures rather than continue 
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Table 5.5 Test sufficiency: no-failures case 
%States %Arcs 
Script No. Result D(U,T) Visited Traversed 
Pass 60.000 22.581 
2 Pass 100.000 58.065 
3 Pass - 100.000 67.742 
4 Pass - 100.000 67.742 
5 Pass 100.000 70.968 
6 Pass 100.000 77.419 
7 Pass 100.000 87 .097 
8 Pass 100.000 90.323 
9 Pass 100.000 93.548 
10 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
11 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
12 Pass 100.000 96.774 
13 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
14 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
15 Pass 0.0059 100.000 100.000 
16 Pass 0.0055 100.000 100.000 
17 Pass 0.0036 100.000 100.000 
18 Pass 0.0035 100.000 100.000 
19 Pass 0.0037 100.000 100.000 
20 Pass 0.0037 100.000 100.000 
21 Pass 0.0037 100.000 100.000 
22 Pass 0.0036 100.000 100.000 
23 Pass 0.0039 100.000 100.000 
24 Pass 0.0036 100.000 100.000 
25 Pass 0.0037 100.000 100.000 
26 Pass 0.0038 100.000 100.000 
27 Pass 0.0034 100.000 100.000 
28 Pass 0.0028 100.000 100.000 
29 Pass 0.0020 100.000 100.000 
30 Pass 0.0019 100.000 100.000 
5.4 Example: Security Alarm 1 OS 
fa ilures, meaning that a test case is discontinued on failure, and the remaining 
transitions in the test case are not executed. 
The failure data indicate that the software failed six times. In test cases 3, 7, 
12, 27, 28, and 29, a trip signal immediately followed a bad digit, and the soft-
ware did not set off the alarm. Given this scenario, the measures of test suffi-
ciency are different. As shown in Table 5.7, all arcs in the model have not been 
"covered after 30 test cases, and the value of the discriminant cannot be com-
puted. Clearly, the measures of test sufficiency do not support product release. 
As is apparent by the presentation of the no-failure and the one-failure sce-
narios, it is possible to pose what-if scenarios and determine bounds on the test-
ing schedule given assumptions about the performance of the software during 
Table 5.6 Failure data 
Test Case Transition Stop or 
No. No. Continue? 
3 5 Stop 
7 21 Stop 
12 27 Stop 
27 16 Stop 
28 9 Stop 
29 16 Stop 
Table 5.7 Test sufficiency: one-failure case 
%States %Arcs 
Script No. Result D(U,T) Visited Traversed 
Pass 60.000 22.581 
2 Pass 100.000 58.065 
3 Fail 100.000 58.065 
4 Pass 100.000 58.065 
5 Pass 100.000 61 .290 
6 Pass 100.000 70.968 
7 Fail 100.000 77.419 
8 Pass 100.000 83.871 
9 Pass 100.000 90.323 
continued 
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Table 5.7 continued 
%States %Arcs 
Script No. Result D(U,T) Visited Traversed 
10 Pass - 100.000 93.548 
11 Pass - 100.000 93.548 
12 Fail - 100.000 93.548 
13 Pass 100.000 93.548 
14 Pass - 100.000 93.548 
15 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
16 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
17 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
18 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
19 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
20 Pass 100.000 96.774 
21 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
22 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
23 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
24 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
25 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
26 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
27 Fail - 100.000 96.774 
28 Fail 100.000 96.774 
29 Fail - 100.000 96.774 
30 Pass - 100.000 96.774 
testing. Measures of test sufficiency may be used prior to testing, in test plan-
ning, and during testing for test management. 
5.4.4 Measures of Product Quality 
Continuing the scenario in which one failure occurs during testing, measures of 
product quality are generated and summarized in Table 5.8 for the same 30 ran-
dom test cases. As noted earlier, the reliability calculation will be 1.0 (no infor-
mation) until a failure is recorded. 
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Because no failures occurred in the first two test cases, there is no failure 
data to use in calculating the MTTF for those two test cases. Similarly, the reli-
ability of the software is reported as 1.0 as long as the software has exhibited no 
failures. 
The first failure occurs in test case 3, so the MTTF (the average number of 
test cases until a fai lure occurs) at that point is approximately three. By the fifth 
Table 5.8 Security alarm: one-failure case 
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Table 5.8 continued 
MeanTime 
Script No. Result to Failure Reliability 
24 Pass 8.000 0.875 
25 Pass 8.333 0.880 
26 Pass 8.667 0.885 
27 Fail 6.750 0.852 
28 Fail 5.600 0.821 
29 Fail 4.833 0.793 
30 Pass 5.000 0.800 
test case, the MTTF has risen to five, because only one failure has been seen in 
five test cases. When the second failure occurs in test case 7, the MTTF de-
creases sharply because two failures have now been seen in seven test cases, for 
a MTTF of 3.5. 
Because statistical testing is based on a model of the specification, these 
measures of product quality, like measures of test sufficiency, may be generated 
for various scenarios of software performance long before the software actually 
exists. Product quality projections (based on what-if scenarios) provide data for 
reliability planning early in the software life cycle, and product quality esti-
mates (based on performance during testing) provide additional stopping crite-
ria for testing. 
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6.1 An Introduction to the CRM 
The Cleanroom Software Engineering Reference Model (Linger and Trammell 
1996), or CRM, was developed at the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 
~lellon University, as part of a study to map Cleanroom into the Capability 
~1aturity Model for Software, or CMM (Linger, Paulk, and Trammell 1996). 
The CRM is expressed in terms of a set of 14 Cleanroom processes and 20 asso-
iated work products. It embodies the principal technologies and processes of 
O eanroom, and is intended as a guide for Cleanroom project management and 
performance, process assessment and improvement, and technology transfer 
and adoption, as well as a baseline for continued evolution of Cleanroom 
practice. It is a comprehensive road map to Cleanroom project performance for 
software teams trained in Cleanroom methods. The CRM is organized into 
processes for software project management, specification, development, and 
ting. Other processes essential to product success, such as marketing, distri-
bution, installation, and customer support are beyond the scope of the project 
management and technology focus of the CRM. The 14 processes are as follows: 
Cleanroom Management Processes 
Project Planning Process 
Project Management Process 
Performance Improvement Process 
Engineering Change Process 
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Cleanroom Specification Processes 
Requirements Analysis Process 
Function Specification Process 
• Usage Specification Process 
• Architecture Specification Process 
• Increment Planning Process 
Cleanroom Development Processes 
Software Reengineering Process 
Increment Design Process 
Correctness Verification Process 
Cleanroom Certification Processes 
• Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process 
• Statistical Testing and Certification Process 
The CRM is a high-level process template that is intended to be tailored and 
adapted for specific organizational environments and project requirements. 
Existing organizational and project policies and standards should be taken into 
account in defining the tailored processes. For example, if a requirement exists 
to program in a specific language, the relationship of that language to box struc-
ture specification and design semantics and formats should be defined, and any 
specializations of the correctness conditions for verifying language constructs 
should be specified and documented. Such process adaptations and implemen-
tation procedures should be documented in the Cleanroom Engineering Guide. 
Tables 6.1 through 6.4 provide summaries of key tasks in each process, and enu-
merate the principal work products produced. 









Define and document plans for a Cleanroom 
project, and revise as necessary to accom-
modate changes. Review plans with the 
project team, peer groups, and the customer 
for agreement. 
Manage the Cleanroom incremental develop-
ment and certification process to deliver 
software and associated work products on 
schedule and within budget. Establish and 
train Cleanroom teams, and define quality 
objectives and team performance expecta-


















Meet process performance standards and 
product quality objectives, and improve team 
performance. Use the quantitative measure-
ments of product and process performance 
produced by statistical testing and certification 
of successive increments for objective 
management decision making. 
Evaluate and improve Cleanroom team per-
formance continually, based on conformance 
with the Software Development Plan, process 
control standards, and causal analysis of 
software failures. Analyze and pilot promising 
improvements in software processes and tools, 
and introduce them to the project as appropriate. 
Correct and change the evolving software 
system and associated work products using 
a protocol that preserves correctness and 
integrity. Implement engineering change 
control for all changes. 











Analyze and define initial customer require-
ments for the software system, as well as 
requirements changes arising from customer 
assessment of evolving increments. Express 
requirements in user terms and review with 
the customer for agreement. 
Define the required external behavior of a 
software system in all possible circumstances 
of use based on the Software Requirements. 
Express the specification in box structure form. 
Create complete, consistent, and correct 
specifications, and review with the customer 
for agreement. 
Define all classes of users, major patterns of 
usage, and usage environments for a soft-
ware product based on the Software Require-
ments. Create complete, consistent, and 
correct usage specifications, and review with 
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Analyze architectural assets and define the 
architectural strategy for the software product, 
including major components, high-level 
structure, and software design strategies 
and conventions. Review with the customer 
for agreement. 
Create an incremental development and 
certification plan for the software product such 
that the increments implement user function, 
accumulate into the final system, execute in 
the system environment, and permit system-
atic feedback on process control and product 
function and quality. Maintain referential 
transparency between increment specifications 
and their design decompositions. Use incre-
mental development to reduce or eliminate 
risks and to maintain intellectual control. 







Prepare reused software for incorporation into 
a software product. Restructure and document 
the functional semantics of the reused soft-
ware as necessary to maintain intellectual 
control and to avoid unforeseen failures in 
execution. Determine the fitness for use of 
reused software as necessary through sta-















Design and code the increments for a soft- Increment Design 
ware product through stepwise decomposition 
of box structures, typically from stimulus 
history-based black box specifications into 
state-based state box specifications, and 
then into procedure-based clear box designs 
containing lower level black boxes for further 
refinement. Prepare designs for correctness 
verification by embedding intended function 
definitions that specify the effect on data of 
corresponding control structure decompositions. 







Carry out function-theoretic correctness 
verification of designs, typically through 
verbal proofs of correctness in team reviews, 
to identify and to correct software faults prior 
to first execution. Document all faults found 
and rereview their corrections. 











Create the usage models to be used for soft-
ware testing and certification. Express the 
models in terms of software usage states and 
probabilities of transition between them. 
Develop the models to satisfy objectives such 
as certification for expected operational use or 
certification of infrequently used functions with 
high consequences of failure. Employ usage 
model statistics to provide insight into system 
complexity and the testing effort required to 
meet quality objectives. Develop a statistical 
test plan , p\epare the test environment, and 
generate the statistical test cases. 
Demonstrate the fitness for use of the 
software in a formal statistical experiment. 
Execute statistical test cases under experi-
mental control, evaluate results, and initiate 
engineering change activity if failures are 
encountered. Compare the values of certifica-
tion measures obtained in statistical testing 
with certification goals to assess the software's 
fitness for use. Compare measures of testing 
progress to process control standards to 
assess the likelihood of reaching certification 
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The purpose and content of the work products produced by the Cleanroom 
processes are defined in the following sections. 
Cleanroom Engineering Guide. The Cleanroom Engineering Guide is cre-
ated in the Project Planning Process. It defines the adaptation and refinement of 
the Cleanroom processes to meet project-specific requirements. It includes pro-
cess definitions; work product definitions; and local policies, procedures, tem-
plates, and forms that define how a project will be conducted. It identifies the 
facilities, hardware and software environments, and tools to support Cleanroom 
operations, and defines guidelines for their use. It also defines relationships 
among Cleanroom processes. 
An organization-level Cleanroom Engineering Guide constitutes the "stan-
dard software process" required by the CMM Level 3 Organization Process 
Definition Key Process Area (KPA). The Cleanroom Engineering Guide may 
be successively refined and elaborated for use by organizational divisions, 
product lines, and specific projects. At each level, the guide is tailored for stan-
dards, technologies, languages, and other aspects of the development environ-
ment at that level. 
The Cleanroom Engineering Guide for a project constitutes the "tailored 
version of the organization's standard software process" required by the CMM 
Level 3 Integrated Software Management KPA. The tailored guide also docu-
ments the "plans for the project's software engineering facilities and support 
tools" required by the CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning KPA. 
Configuration Management Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Engineering Change Log. The Engineering Change Log is created and 
maintained in the Engineering Change Process. It is the record of all engineer-
ing change requests, along with their evaluations, impacts, and status. 
Executable System. The Executable System is created in the Statistical 
Testing and Certification Process. It is the executable form of the accumulating 
increments to be used for testing and customer evaluation. 
Function Specification. The Function Specification is created in the Func-
tion Specification Process. It documents (1) software boundaries and interfaces 
with hardware, other software, and human users, and (2) the external view of a 
system in terms of mapping all possible stimuli to their corresponding re-
sponses in all possible circumstances of use, including correct and incorrect, 
frequent and infrequent, and nominal and stress usage conditions. 
The Function Specification is a precise statement of the Software Require-
ments often expressed as a mathematical function. The domain of the function 
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is all possible stimulus histories and the range is all correct responses. The 
mathematical form of the Function Specification as a set of mapping rules pro-
vides a flexible yet verifiable basis for function decomposition. 
From the customer's perspective, the Function Specification is the defini-
tive statement of functional requirements for the software. From a development 
perspective, the Function Specification is the top-level black box in the box 
structure usage hierarchy that will be fully realized in the Increment Design. 
Increment Certification Report. The Increment Certification Report is cre-
ated in the Statistical Testing and Certification Process. It contains values for 
measures of certification goals (the desired "ends") and measures of process 
control (the efficiency of "means" based on historical performance). Certifi-
cation measures may include reliability and confidence, MTTF, representative-
ness of the test case sample, and other measures of product quality. Process 
control measures may include reliability growth rate, error rate per unit volume 
of code, and other measures of process performance. 
The Increment Certification Report documents the quantitative basis for 
management decisions made regarding the testing process. Continuation of 
testing, cessation of testing for engineering change or reengineering, and certi-
fication of the software are justified on the basis of product and process mea-
sures. The Increment Certification Report documents the "analysis of data on 
defects identified in testing" required by the CMM Level 3 Software Product 
Engineering KPA. It also documents the "results of the project's quantitative 
process management activities" required by the CMM Level 4 Quantitative 
Process Management KPA. 
Increment Construction Plan. The Increment Construction Plan is created 
in the Increment Planning Process. It specifies the number of increments into 
which a Cleanroom Project will be divided, the functions that will be imple-
mented in each increment, and the schedule and resources allocated for each 
increment. The Increment Construction Plan is used by management to assign 
tasks, track progress, and monitor product quality and process control. 
The earliest version of the Increment Construction Plan may be based on 
the customer's Statement of Work and/or the Software Requirements. This ver-
sion will contain assumptions that will be explored further in the course of 
preparing the Risk Analysis Plan and the Reuse Analysis Plan. A sound basis for 
increment planning will exist when the Function Specification and the Usage 
Specification have been prepared. The Increment Construction Plan should be 
considered preliminary until these two work products are available. The Incre-
ment Construction Plan is also influenced by the Software Architecture. The 
Increment Construction Plan documents the "software life cycle with pre-
defined stages of manageable size" required by the CMM Level 2 Project 
Planning KPA. 
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Increment Design. The Increment Design is created in the Increment Design 
Process. It is the box structure implementation of a set of functions na~ed in the 
Increment Construction Plan and defined in the Function Specification. The 
Increment Design is a hierarchy of components in which each component is 
represented in black box (history-based), state box (state-based), and clear box 
(procedure-based) forms . 
Clear boxes in the Increment Design may contain new black boxes that are 
either implemented or stubbed. In each Increment Design, some previously 
stubbed functions are implemented. 
Increments are cumulative. An Increment Design is the sum of all specifi-
cation, design, and code to date. The final Increment Design is the completed 
product. 
Increment Evaluation Report. The Increment Evaluation Report is origi-
nated by the customer. It is the customer's documentation of feedback from 
increment execution and evaluation. 
Increment Test Plan. The Increment Test Plan is created in the Usage 
Modeling and Test Planning Process. It contains all information needed by the 
certification team for the Statistical Testing and Certification Process, including 
schedules, staffing, training, hardware and software environments, data collec-
tion forms, test case evaluation procedures, certification goals, and statistical 
models. The Increment Test Plan is the "plan for system testing to demonstrate 
that the software satisfies its requirements" required by the CMM Level 3 
Software Product Engineering KPA. 
Increment Verification Report. The Increment Verification Report is created 
in the Correctness Verification Process. It is the record of experience during the 
Correctness Verification Process, including participants, number of verification 
sessions, time spent in each session, faults found during each session, and any 
other information relevant to the assessment of the correctness of the design. 
Data for sessions in which engineering changes are verified are also included in 
the Increment Verification Report. 
In addition to raw data, the Increment Verification Report may contain other 
measures that provide indications of process control. Such measures may 
include percentage of engineering changes that are found to be incorrect, the dis-
tribution of faults with regard to severity and type, and the number of faults 
found per unit volume of code. The Increment Verification Report constitutes the 
"data on the conduct and results of peer reviews" required by the CMM Level 3 
Peer Reviews KPA. It also documents the "data on defects identified in peer 
reviews" required by the CMM Level3 Software Product Engineering KPA. 
Measurement Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
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Performance Improvement Plan. The Performance Improvement Plan is 
created in the Performance Improvement Process. It defines plans to improve 
team performance by refining the current Cleanroom Engineering Guide and/or 
exploring the use of new software technologies. 
The Performance Improvement Plan contains an analysis of the cause of 
each failure that occurred during statistical testing and includes plans to prevent 
the recurrence of the underlying problem. It also documents the comparison of 
current performance with planned or historical performance for the measures 
defined in the Measurement Plan. 
The Performance Improvement Plan documents the "causal analysis meet-
ings" and "revisions to the project's defined software process resulting from 
defect prevention actions" required by the CMM Level 5 Defect Prevention 
KPA, the "incorporation of appropriate new technologies into a project's 
defined software process" required by the CMM Level 5 Technology Change 
Management KPA, and the "plan for software process improvement" required 
by the CMM Level 5 Process Change Management KPA. 
Project Mission Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Project Organization Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Project Record. The Project Record is created in the Project Management 
Process and is updated in all processes. It includes actions, reviews, decisions, 
measures, and other events throughout a project. The Project Record contains 
formal documents, such as contracts and reports, and informal correspondence, 
such as meeting notes or records of phone conversations. It is the archive of 
documentation about all project events that are not captured in other Cleanroom 
work products . It is a flexible, tailorable work product that is the Cleanroom 
vehicle for fulfilling project documentation requirements not met by other work 
products. 
Reengineering Plan. The Reengineering Plan is created in the Software 
Reengineering Process. It includes the tasks, schedules, and resources required 
to prepare existing artifacts for reuse in the current project. The Reengineering 
Plan elaborates the technical aspects of the Reuse Analysis Plan. It defines spe-
cific investigations required to make decisions about the reusability of a compo-
nent and/or adaptations required to reuse a component in the current system. 
Reuse Analysis Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Reengineered Software. The Reengineered Software is created in the 
Software Reengineering Process. It consists of specifications, designs, code, 
usage models, and/or testing artifacts produced during the reengineering of 
reused components. 
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Risk Analysis Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Schedule and Resource Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Software Architecture. The Software Architecture is created in the Archi-
tecture Specification Process. The Software Architecture identifies the concep-
tual architecture, expressed in terms of principal software components and their 
relationships; the module architecture, expressed in terms of layers of func-
tional decomposition; and the execution architecture, expressed in terms of 
dynamic software operation (Soni, Nord, and Hofmeister, 1995). 
The Software Architecture serves as a vehicle for analyzing application and 
service domains, reference architectures, reusable assets, communication pro-
tocols, standards, and software design strategies. It is a principal input to the 
Increment Planning and Increment Design Processes. 
Software Development Plan. The Software Development Plan is created in 
the Project Planning Process, and is used in the Project Management Process 
for task initiation, performance tracking, and quantitative process management. 
The Software Development Plan is the "software project plan" required by the 
CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning KPA, and is the "software develop-
ment plan" to be used in the CMM Level 2 Software Project Tracking and 
Oversight KPA. The Software Development Plan consists of the following pro-
ject management plans. 
The Project Mission Plan defines the overall mission, goals, and objectives 
of the system and the Cleanroom development project. 
The Project Organization Plan defines the structure, responsibilities, and 
relationships of the Cleanroom project organization and peer organizations. It is 
the "documented plan to communicate intergroup commitments and coordinate 
and track the work performed" required by the CMM Level 3 Intergroup 
Coordination KPA. 
The Work Product Plan defines the Cleanroom work products to be pro-
duced by the project. It constitutes the "identification of software work prod-
ucts" required by the CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning KPA. 
The Schedule and Resource Plan defines estimates for overall tasks, sched-
ules, milestones, budgets, and resources for Cleanroom work product develop-
ment. It documents the "estimates of size, effort, schedule, cost, and critical 
computer resources" required by the CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning 
KPA. 
The Measurement Plan defines product and process measurements, stan-
dards, and goals for managing the project, including those for Cleanroom 
software certification and statistical process control. It defines the "plan for 
quantitative process management" and the "strategy for data collection and 
analysis" required by the CMM Level4 Quantitative Process Management KPA. 
------------------------------------------------------
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The Reuse Analysis Plan identifies sources of reusable assets, and asset 
acquisition and evaluation tasks. It also identifies opportunities to reuse domain 
models, reference architectures, software specifications, designs, code, and 
usage models. The Reuse Analysis Plan is a management plan for identification 
of assets. A related work product, the Reengineering Plan, is a technical plan 
for evaluation and adaptation of assets. 
The Risk Analysis Plan defines methods for risk analysis, identifies project 
risks, and describes strategies for risk management and avoidance. It constitutes 
the "identification, assessment, and documentation of risks associated with the 
cost, resource, schedule, and technical aspects of the project" required by the 
CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning KPA. 
The Standards Plan identifies and defines the application of external stan-
dards that will be used in the project. 
The Training Plan identifies project training requirements, including train-
ing in the application domain, development environments, and Cleanroom tech-
nology and processes. This plan is the "training plan" required by the CMM 
Level 3 Training Program KPA. 
The Configuration Management Plan defines requirements for change 
control of designated work products. This plan is the "software configuration 
management plan" required by the CMM Level 2 Software Configuration 
Management KPA. 
Software Requirements. The Software Requirements are created in the Re-
quirements Analysis Process. They define the functional, usage, performance, 
and environmental requirements for a software system to be developed using 
the Cleanroom process. Included among these requirements are operational 
constraints such as dependencies on other systems, capacity requirements, and 
reliability requirements. The Software Requirements are typically documented 
in user terms, and are the principal input to the Function Specification and 
Usage Specification Processes, in which requirements are defined in the more 
precise terms essential to software development and certification. 
The Software Requirements are the "documentation of allocated require-
ments" required by the CMM Level2 Requirements Management KPA. 
Standards Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Statement of Work. The Statement of Work is originated by the customer. It is 
the "documented and approved statement of work for the software project" 
required by the CMM Level 2 Software Project Planning KPA. 
Statistical Test Cases. The Statistical Test Cases are created in the Usage 
Modeling and Test Planning Process. Statistical Test Cases are generated ran-
domly from a usage model for use in statistical testing of an increment. Once 
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generated, test cases may undergo postprocessing to add information for human 
testers or for an automated test tool. Such information may include additional 
instructions (e.g., events to initiate in the background), invocation of indepen-
dent data feeds, or pointers to the relevant "oracle" for evaluation of responses. 
Each statistical test case is a complete usage scenario given as a sequence 
of user inputs, beginning with a predefined initial event and ending with a pre-
defined terminal event. The Statistical Test Cases become a script for testing, 
and may be annotated during testing to record responses and their evaluations. 
Statistical Testing Report. The Statistical Testing Report is created in the 
Statistical Testing and Certification Process. It is the record of experience in test-
ing, and includes participants, number of compilation sessions, faults found dur-
ing compilation, number of testing sessions, number of test cases executed during 
each session, failures observed during test case executions, faults found during 
investigation of failures, time required to correct each fault, and any other infor-
mation relevant to assessment of the correctness of the executing software. 
The Statistical Testing Report documents the "data on defects identified in 
testing" and the "performance of system testing to demonstrate that the soft-
ware satisfies its requirements" required by the CMM Level 3 Software Product 
Engineering KPA. 
Training Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
Usage Models. The Usage Models are created in the Usage Modeling and 
Test Planning Process. A usage model is a formal representation of software 
use, often expressed as a Markov chain. It defines the usage states of the soft-
ware and the probabilities of transitions between usage states. When software is 
to be certified for normal operational use, usage probabilities are based on 
expected use. When the customer requires certification for other usage condi-
tions, the probabilities reflect those conditions. Usage model analysis provides 
numerous insights into software usage characteristics that are useful in making 
management and technical decisions. Usage models are also used as test case 
generators. 
Usage Specification. The Usage Specification is created in the Usage 
Specification Process. It is a description of the expected users, usage scenarios, 
and usage environments of the software. It contains definitions of high-level 
usage models that record this information, as well as the results of model analy-
sis for management decision making. 
Work Product Plan. See Software Development Plan. 
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6.2 Cleanroom Process 
Definition Format 
The 14 Cleanroom processes are defined in Chapters 7 through 10 in terms of 
the following augmented entry, task, verification, exit (ETVX) format: 
Objectives- The objectives section defines the outcomes of effective pro-
cess performance. 
Entry-The entry section defines the entry criteria that must be satisfied 
for the process to be initiated, and lists the work products that must be 
available as inputs to the process. 
Tasks-The tasks section defines work to be carried out in performing the 
process. The order of the tasks is generally, but not strictly, sequential. 
Some tasks may be concurrent with other tasks. 
Verification-The verification section defines steps for verifying that the 
process has been properly executed and the associated work products meet 
project objectives. 
Measurement- The measurement section defines Cleanroom measures 
for assessing the performance of the process and the characteristics of the 
work products. The measures provided in the measurement section are 
either characteristic of or integral to Cleanroom software engineering. 
Many other measures not provided in the measurement section may also be 
useful or even required in a given project. 
Exit-The exit section defines the exit criteria that must be satisfied for the 
process to be terminated. The exit criteria generally involve completion and 
verification of work products, but may also be stated in terms of quantita-
tive or qualitative conditions of work products. 
In addition to these formatting conventions, boxed text appears in the pro-
cess definitions to (1) explain Cleanroom terms and concepts, (2) recommend 
specific implementation techniques, (3) provide examples, and (4) point to fur-
ther information. Accordingly, the boxes are labeled Explanation, Recommen-
dation, Example, or Reference. In some instances the boxed text summarizes 
key Cleanroom principles and technologies discussed in Part I. This sum-
marization is intended to make the Cleanroom process definitions more self-
contained, and helps to relate specific technologies to their application points in 
the process. 
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6.3 Common Cleanroom 
Process Elements 
The common objectives, participants, entry criteria, tasks, verification, mea-
sures, and exit criteria in Cleanroom processes are defined here as common 
Cleanroom process elements. These elements are part of every Cleanroom 
process. Rather than being restated in each process, the common elements have 
been "factored out" and stated once to avoid repetition and to achieve more com-
pact definitions of the Cleanroom processes described in the remaining chapters 
in Part II. The people responsible for each of the Cleanroom management, spec-
ification, development, and certification processes (i.e., the "process owners") 







Work products created or updated in the process are 
traceable to the entry work products from which they 
were derived. 
Defects in work products created or updated in the pro-
cess are identified through peer review and are eliminated. 
The Cleanroom Engineering Guide and the Software Devel-
opment Plan (developed in the Project Planning Process), 
and the Project Record are available. 
When the process is reentered for changes to work prod-
ucts, the reentry is consistent with the Engineering 




Ensure that all participants understand process require-
ments as documented in the Cleanroom Engineering Guide. 
Create work products according to the formats defined in 
the Cleanroom Engineering Guide. 
Task 3 
Task 4 
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Make changes to work products in compliance with the 
Engineering Change Process and the Configuration Man-
agement Plan. 
Document project activity in the Project Record. 
Document information that will not be recorded in other 
work products in the Project Record. Specifically, document 
process beginning and ending dates, staff assignments, process 





Review the status of the process with management, the 
project team, peer groups, and the customer. 
These verification activities include confirming that the 
process was performed as defined in the Cleanroom Engi-
neering Guide. 
Revjew work products created or updated during the 
process with the project team. 
Work products are verified against properties defined for 
them in the Cleanroom Engineering Guide. Work products 
under review are verified to be fully traceable to the work 
products from which they were derived. 
EXPLANATION: Peer review 
Peer review is a key to intellectual control of work by Clean-
room teams. The work of an individual team member is 
regarded as a draft until there is team consensus that the work 
is correct and of acceptable quality. 
Every Cleanroom work product is peer reviewed, yielding 
substantial benefits. Differing interpretations of requirements 
are uncovered, conventions are established, errors are detected, 
opportunities for economy are identified, understandability is 
tested, and expertise is shared. The results benefit the project, 
the product, and the team members alike. 
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REFERENCE: CMM Peer Reviews and Defect Prevention 
KPAs 
If compliance with these KPAs is an organizational objective, 
their specific requirements should be reviewed when this ver-
ification step is tailored for organizational or project use. 
Common Measurement 
Measurement 1 Measure the process. 
Measure process performance in terms such as deviations 
in resource and schedule actuals from plans. 
Measure the effectiveness of a review in terms of the per-
centage of all defects originating prior to the review that are 
found in the review. These percentages are determined, of 
course, after execution testing. 
Measurement 2 Measure the product. 
Common Exit 
Exit 1 
Measure the size and stability of work products that define 
the software (i.e., the Software Requirements, the Function 
Specification, the Usage Specification, the Software Archi-
tecture, the Usage Models, the Increment Design, and the 
Executable System). 
Measure the quality of work products that define the soft-
ware in terms of the percentage of execution failures that are 
traced to defects in the work products. These percentages are 
determined, of course, after execution testing. 
Tasks and verification activities have been completed and 
the Project Record has been updated. 
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7.1 Project Planning Process 
The purpose of the Project Planning Process is to tailor the CRM (or the organi-
zational reference model) for the project, to define and document plans for the 
Cleanroom project, and to review the plans with the customer, the project team, 
and peer groups for agreement. The work products of the Project Planning Pro-
cess are the Cleanroom Engineering Guide and the Software Development 
Plan. Both are revised as necessary during the project to accommodate cus-
tomer needs and project performance. The Cleanroom Engineering Guide 
defines a tailoring of the Cleanroom processes to meet project-specific process 
requirements . The Software Development Plan is the repository for project 
management plans, including mission, organization, work products, schedules, 
resources, measurements, reuse analysis, risk analysis, standards, training, and 
configuration management. The Software Development Plan is used in the 
Project Management Process for task initiation, performance tracking, and 
quantitative process management. The Cleanroom Engineering Guide and the 
Software Development Plan form the basis for defined, repeatable, managed, 
and optimized performance of Cleanroom activities. 
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Cleanroom software engineering processes are tailored 
for the project and documented. 
The software project plans are defined and documented. 
The customer, the project team, and peer groups agree to 
the Cleanroom processes and project plans. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is satis-
fied. 
A new or revised Statement of Work and/or Software Require-
ments exist for the software project. 
The Software Development Plan and/or Cleanroom Engineer-
ing Guide require revision or elaboration at the beginning of a 
new increment or as necessary. 
Entry work products are available. 
Create the Cleanroom Engineering Guide. 
Use the CRM or the organizational Cleanroom Software 
Engineering Reference Model, if any, as the basis for defin-
ing or revising the project's Cleanroom Engineering Guide, 
including 
1. Project-specific tailoring and refinement of the Clean-
room processes. Define and document clear process im-
plementation guidance for the Cleanroom project. 
2. Identification and documentation of facilities, hardware 
and software environments, and tools to support Clean-
room processes, with guidelines for their use. 
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REFERENCE: CMM Organization Process Definition, 
Integrated Software Management, Software 
Product Engineering, and Software Quality 
Management KPAs 
If compliance with these KPAs is an organizational objective, 
their specific requirements should be reviewed when the 
Cleanroom processes are tailored for organizational or proj-
ect use. 
Create the Software Development Plan. 
REFERENCE: CMM Software Project Planning KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Soft· 
ware Development Plan is developed. 
Use the Statement of Work and/or Software Requirements 
to define or revise the Software Development Plan, including 
the following plans: 
1. Project Mission Plan: Define the overall mission, goals, 
and objectives of the software product and the Clean-
room development project. 
2. Project Organization Plan: Define the structure, respon-
sibilities, and relationships of the Cleanroom project 
organization. Identify points of contact in customer and 
peer organizations. 
REFERENCE: CMM Intergroup Coordination KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Proj-
ect Organization Plan is developed. 
3. Work Product Plan: Define the Cleanroom work prod-
ucts and customer deliverables to be produced during the 
project. 
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4. Schedule and Resource Plan: Define estimates for over-
all schedules, milestones, and budgets. Define staffing, 
system, and other resource requirements. These esti-
mates will be refined in the Increment Planning Process. 
5. Measurement Plan: Define product and process mea-
sures for managing the project, including goals for Clean-
room software certification and standards for statistical 
process control. Define the u se of measures in project 
reviews and decision making. 
ExPLANATION: Quantitative management decisions 
A quantitative basis for management decisions regarding 
product quality and process control is a hallmark of Clean-
room. The organizational database of project measures that 
accumulates over time becomes increasingly useful in plan-
ning and managing activities. A historical baseline of product 
measures (e.g. , size, stability, and quality) and process mea-
sures (e.g., conformance to plans and effectiveness of re-
views) provides a basis for estimating schedules, budgets, 
and resources; defining process control standards for work in 
progress; and defining certification goals for increment and 
product certification. 
REFERENCE: CMM Quantitative Process Management KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Mea-
surement Plan is developed. 
6. Reuse Analysis Plan: Define methods for identifying and 
evaluating opportunities to reuse existing assets and cre-
ate new, reusable assets. Reusable assets include domain 
models, reference architectures, software specifications, 
designs, implementations, and usage models. Define 
specific opportunities for reuse .. 
7. Risk Analysis Plan: Define methods for identifying and 
managing risks throughout the project. Define specific 
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8. Standards Plan: Identify and define the application of 
external standards that will be used in the project. 
9. Training Plan: Identify project training requirements, 
including training in the application domain, develop-
ment environments, and Cleanroom technology and 
processes. 
REFERENCE: CMM Training Program KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the 
Training Plan is developed. 
10. Configuration Management Plan: Identify the work 
products to be maintained under configuration control. 
Define procedures for change management and configu-
ration control of the work products. 
REFEREN CE: CMM Software Configuration Management KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Con-
figuration Management Plan is developed. 
Review the Cleanroom Engineering Guide for agreement. 
Review the Cleanroom Engineering Guide with the proj-
ect team and peer groups to obtain commitments to Clean-
room processes and team performance objectives. 
Review the Cleanroom Engineering Guide with the cus-
tomer. Modify and rereview as necessary to obtain concurrence. 
Review the Software Development Plan for agreement. 
Review the Software Development Plan with the project 
team and peer groups to obtain commitments to project plans 
and schedules. 
Review the Software Development Plan with the customer. 
Modify and rereview as necessary to obtain concurrence. 




(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The Software Development Plan and the Cleanroom Engi-
neering Guide have been completed and reviewed with the 
project team, peer organizations, and the customer, and com-
mitments have been obtained. 
7.2 Project Management Process 
The purpose of the Project Management Process is to manage the Cleanroom 
project to deliver the software on schedule and within budget. Management 
responsibilities include managing interactions with the customer and peer orga-
nizations; establishing and training Cleanroom teams; initiating, tracking, and 
controlling planned Cleanroom processes; eliminating or reducing risks; revis-
ing plans as necessary to accommodate changes and actual project results; and 
continually improving Cleanroom team performance. Cleanroom management 
is guided by quantitative measurements of process and product performance as 
defined in the Measurement Plan- in particular, the measurements produced 
by statistical testing and certification of successive increments throughout the 
project life cycle. 
Overall project processes, schedules, and resource allocations are managed 
according to the Schedule and Resource Plan. The Increment Construction 
Plan, created in the Increment Planning Process, provides detailed schedules 
for managing increment development and certification within the overall sched-
ules. The Risk Analysis Plan defines risks to be managed. 
An important aspect of Cleanroom project management is establishing 
and enforcing standards of performance for Cleanroom operations. The Clean-
room development process is designed for defect prevention through mathemat-
ically based specification, design, and correctness verification. Development 
teams are expected to produce fault-free software that implements specified 
behavior. The Cleanroom testing process is designed for scientific certification 
of software fitness for use through statistical testing. Certification teams are ex-
pected to produce valid statistical estimates of software quality, not to attempt 
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The project plan is implemented using a tailored Clean-
room process, and schedules, budgets, and quality objec-
tives are met. 
The project is performed under statistical quality control. 
The delivered software meets the customer's requirements 
and is statistically certified to be fit for its intended use. 
The process begins when the entry criteria are satisfied. 
The Software Development Plan and the Cleanroom Engi-
neering Guide have been completed, reviewed, and agreed to 
by the project team, peer groups, and the customer. 
All project work products are available for use in this 
process as they are developed. 
Manage customer interaction. 
Establish and maintain communication with points of con-
tact in customer organizations. Maintain all information re-
ceived from the customer. 
Conduct reviews with the customer on project status and 
plans. 
Establish procedures for customer evaluation of completed 
software increments. 
Manage peer organization interaction. 
Establish and maintain communication with points of con-
tact in peer organizations. 
Conduct reviews with peer organizations on project status 
and plans. 
Form, staff, and train the Cleanroom teams. 
Create a Cleanroom organizational structure composed of 
four functions: 
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Task4 
TaskS 
1. Management team led by the project software manager 
2. Specification team led by the chief specification engineer 
3. Development team led by the chief development engineer 
4. Certification team led by the chief certification engineer 
Provide team training in the application domain, develop-
ment environment, and Cleanroom software engineering as 
defined in the Training Plan. 
Initiate Cleanroom processes. 
Initiate Cleanroom processes defined in the Cleanroom 
Engineering Guide, as required by the Software Development 
Plan- in particular, the processes, schedules, and resource 
allocations defined in the Schedule and Resource Plan and 
the Increment Construction Plan. Document process initia-
tion in the Project Record. 
Monitor Cleanroom process performance and work prod-
ucts through measurement, and take corrective action 
when necessary. 
Record measurements of process and product performance 
over the life of the project as defined in the Measurement Plan. 
Use measurements to monitor performance with respect to 
plans. Inspect work products to assess adherence to the pro-
cess. Measurements from the Correctness Verification and the 
Statistical Testing and Certification Processes are especially 
important in assessing product quality and team performance. 
Address performance shortfalls or windfalls. Identify sched-
ule and quality deviations, and implement corrective actions. 
Revise project plans when necessary through the Project 
Planning, Increment Planning, Project Management, and 
Performance Improvement Processes. 
Maintain consistency among related work products pro-
duced by the Cleanroom processes in accordance with the 
Configuration Management Plan. 
REFERENCE: CMM Software Project Tracking and Oversight 
and Quantitative Process Management KPAs 
If compliance with these KPAs is an organizational objective, 
their specific requirements should be reviewed when this task 
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Manage project risks. 
Identify and manage risks according to the Risk Analysis 
Plan. Use the Cleanroom incremental development and certi-
fication process as a risk management strategy. 
Manage Cleanroom team performance. 
Manage team performance and implement improvements 
in Cleanroom processes defined in the Peiformance Improve-
ment Plan. 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The Cleanroom software development project has been com-
pleted and the Project Record has been completed. 
7.3 Performance Improvement Process 
The purpose of the Performance Improvement Process is to evaluate and 
improve team performance continually in the application of Cleanroom and 
other software technologies and processes, and to evaluate and introduce appro-
priate new technologies and processes. 
Frequent and objective evaluation of team performance is essential to 
achieve continuous improvement. Causal analysis of deviations from plans can 
provide early identification of risks. Causal analysis of faults found through the 
Correctness Verification and the Statistical Testing and Certification Processes 
can identify areas that require improvement through better process definition, 
increased emphasis, and/or additional training. 
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Process and product evaluations during review, verification, testing, and 
certification activities provide an objective basis for justifying and targeting 
process improvements. Improvements can be introduced within a project at spe-
cific milestones, such as initiation of successive increments, and across projects 
through coordinated organizational process improvement. New technologies 
and processes can be evaluated in pilot applications for their impact on produc-








The performance of the Cleanroom team is continuously 
improved. 
New Cleanroom and other software technologies and 
processes are evaluated and introduced as appropriate, 
and produce improvement in process performance and 
product quality. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
A process step, a software increment, or a work product has 
been completed and a team review is scheduled. 
New Cleanroom technologies and/or processes are to be eval-
uated. 
Shortfalls in Cleanroom process performance orwork prod-
uct quality have been identified. 
Supporting work products are available. 
The Increment Verification Report, Statistical Testing Re-
port, Increment Certification Report, and Engineering Change 
Log, if any, define measures of Cleanroom process perfor-
mance and software product quality. 
New Cleanroom or other software technology and process 
documentation, if any, may be evaluated. 
Tasks 
Task 1 
7.3 Performance Improvement Process 141 
Evaluate Cleanroom team performance and develop im-
provement plans. 
Evaluate project performance with respect to the Software 
Development Plan, and apply trend and causal analysis to 
deviations. 
Apply causal analysis to faults found in the Correctness 
Verification and the Statistical Testing and Certification 
Processes to identify the steps in which they were introduced 
and to determine why they occurred. 
Compare process and product measurements with histori-
cal team performance to assess process control. 
Develop plans to improve team performance, including 
additional training, improved tools and procedures, and revised 
Cleanroom processes, and document the plans in the Peifor-
mance Improvement Plan. 
REFERENCE: CMM Process Change Management KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when this task is 
tailored for organizational or project use. 
Evaluate new technologies and processes, and develop im-
plementation plans. 
Identify new Cleanroom and other software technologies 
and processes, and evaluate their impact on current Clean-
room processes. Conduct experiments in the project environ-
ment to measure their effectiveness. 
Develop plans for the introduction of proved new tech-
nologies and processes, and document them in the Perfor-
mance Improvement Plan work product. 
Schedule new technology and process introductions for 
the start of subsequent increments or subsequent projects as 
appropriate. 
REFERENCE: CMM Technology Change Management KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when this task is 
tailored for organizational or project use. 
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Verification 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
Measurement 
Measurement 1 Measure performance improvement. 
Exit 
Exit 1 
Assess the effect of process and technology changes by 
examining trends in measures defined in the Measurement 
Plan across successive increments. 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The Performance Improvement Plan has been applied and the 
recommendations have been implemented. Any changes, 
such as revisions to the Software Development Plan or Clean-
room Engineering Guide, have been completed. 
7.4 Engineering Change Process 
The purpose of the Engineering Change Process is to plan and perform addi-
tions, changes, and corrections to work products in a manner that preserves cor-
rectness and is consistent with the Configuration Management Plan. 
Proposed changes to work products are documented in the Engineering 
Change Log. The status of the changes (e.g., proposed, approved, rejected, 
scheduled, in progress, completed) is updated throughout the process. Changes 
are made with full engineering rigor and discipline using the Cleanroom pro-
cesses. The highest level of specification or design affected by a change is iden-
tified as the starting point for any respecification, redesign, reverification, 
recertification, and any other revision activity. 
Objectives 
Objective 1 Additions and changes to work products occur in a man-
ner that preserves correctness and is consistent with the 
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The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
An Increment Verification Report, Statistical Testing Report, 
or report from field use identifies software faults or failures 
that require correction. 
New requirements or insights require engineering changes to 
be made to work products. 
Entry work products and the following work products are 
available. 
The Software Development Plan, Increment Construction 
Plan, and Reengineering Plan may be affected by engineer-
ing change activity. 
Document proposed engineering changes in the Engineer-
ing Change Log. 
Evaluate the impact of proposed engineering changes. 
Analyze the scope and impact of proposed changes on 
project work products, and approve or reject them based on 
the analysis. 
Identify the Cleanroom processes required to perform the 
engineering changes. 
Define the Cleanroom process sequencing and scheduling 
required to perform approved engineering changes, and if 
necessary revise the Software Development Plan, the Incre-
ment Construction Plan, and/or the Reengineering Plan. 
Apply the Cleanroom processes to perform the engineer-
ing changes. 
Apply Cleanroom processes to incorporate the engineer-
ing changes at the highest level of specification affected, 
reengineer subsequent levels of decomposition, and reverify 
all affected work products for correctness. Maintain the cor-
rectness and integrity of all affected work products as the 
engineering changes are made, and satisfy the requirements 
of the Configuration Management Plan. 




Confirm the consistency of engineering change decisions 
with the Configuration Management Plan. 
Measurement 1 Use measurements from other Cleanroom processes. 
Exit 
Exit 1 
Use measurements defined for each Cleanroom process 
initiated through the Engineering Change Process. 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The required engineering changes have been completed, the 
necessary work products have been revised, and the Engi-




8.1 Requirements Analysis Process 
The purpose of the Requirements Analysis Process is to define requirements for 
dte software product, including function, usage, environment, and performance; 
and to obtain agreement with the customer on the requirements as the basis for 
function and usage specification. The specification team creates the Software 
Requirements document as the repository of all requirements information. 
Elicitation and analysis of requirements is carried out in close cooperation with 
dte customer and peer engineering organizations, and the requirements are typi-
ally documented in user terms. 
Requirements analysis may identify opportunities to simplify the cus-
mmer's initial product concept and to reveal requirements that the customer has 
not addressed. Early simplification and clarification of requirements can result 
in schedule and resource savings throughout the development process. 
The Software Requirements are the customer's requirements. They are the 
basis for customer acceptance of the product. The Software Requirements are 
dte principal input to the Function Specification and Usage Specification Pro-
ses, in which they are elaborated into the mathematically complete and con-
. tent form essential to intellectual control over development and certification. 
These processes in tum produce the Function Specification and Usage Specifi-
cation, which serve as the developer's technical specifications for the software 
product. 
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Requirements are reconfirmed or clarified throughout the incremental 
development and certification process. The customer executes completed incre-









Software requirements-including function, usage, envi-
ronment, and performance-are clearly stated, internally 
consistent, technically feasible, and testable. 
The customer agrees with the software requirements as 
the basis for software specification. 
The software requirements are reconfirmed or clarified 
at the completion of software increments through cus-
tomer evaluation. 
REFERENCE: CMM Requirements Management KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Re-
quirements Analysis Process is tailored for organizational or 
project use. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Statement of Work or other initial artifact, such as a state-
ment of allocated system requirements, is available. 
Changes, including additions and corrections to the Software 
Requirements, are proposed. 
A completed increment is ready for customer execution and 
evaluation. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
The Engineering Change Log and the Increment Evalua-
tion Report, if any, contain customer feedback from increment 
execution and may identify proposed changes to requirements. 
Tasks 
Task 1 
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Define the software requirements. 
Understand and analyze the Statement of Work, the cus-
tomer's environment, and the context and mission of the 
product to be developed. 
Define requirements, including software function and 
usage, hardware and software configurations and environ-
ments, interfaces, operational constraints, dependencies, and 
goals for reliability, capacity, and performance. 
ExPLANATION: Sources of requirements 
Requirements come from many different sources depending 
on the nature of the product. 
Software that is part of an embedded system or larger 
software system will be defined on the basis of allocated 
requirements from the system of which it is a part. 
A product that is part of a product line may inherit re-
quirements related to architecture, interfaces, standard 
components, and so forth . 
• Marketing, manufacturing, distribution, and other peer 
organizations may be a source of requirements. 
• Industry standards, regulatory standards, export standards, 
and other commercial or contractual standards can influ-
ence requirements. 
All relevant sources of requirements should be identified for 
the system under development. 
ExPLANATION: Prototyping 
If the requirements definition is 'insufficient for software 
specification, initial software increments can be specified 
and developed as prototypes to obtain user feedback for 
establishing the requirements . 
Simplify requirements and investigate alternatives to 
improve usability and to reduce development and certifica-
tion effort. 








Document requirements and associated assumptions in the 
Software Requirements work product. 
On completion of each increment, reconfirm or clarify 
requirements through customer evaluation of the exe-
cutable system. 
Monitor customer execution and evaluation of completed 
software increments to confirm existing Software Require-
ments or to identify proposed changes. 
Review the evolving Software Requirements work product. 
Conduct frequent specification team reviews of the evolv-
ing Software Requirements for clarity, consistency, feasibil-
ity, and testability. Make simplification of requirements an 
explicit objective. 
Validate the Software Requirements work product with 
the customer and peer organizations. 
Review the Software Requirements with the customer and 
affected peer organizations for agreement on the basis for 
software specification. 
(See Section 6.3 , Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The new or changed Software Requirements are complete and 
verified, and approved by the customer as the basis for further 
development. 
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ExPLANATION: Formal baselining of requirements 
It is often the case that requirements cannot be "baselined" 
and established as the basis for acceptance of the product by 
the customer until well into the Function Specification, Usage 
Specification, and Architecture Specification Processes. The 
Requirements Analysis Process and the aforementioned 
processes are often concurrent-not sequential-processes. 
8.2 Function Specification Process 
The purpose of the Function Specification Process is to specify the complete 
functional behavior of the software in all possible circumstances of use and to 
obtain agreement with the customer on the specified function as the basis for 
oftware development and certification. 
The specification team creates the Function Specification document to sat-
isfy the software requirements. It expresses the requirements in a mathemati-
cally precise, complete, and consistent form. The required behavior of the 
oftware for every user scenario, however likely or unlikely to occur, is defined 
in the specification. The specification is an unambiguous definition of the exter-
nal behavior of the software. No invention of external behavior should be 
required in subsequent software development. 
The Function Specification is based on the Software Requirements. After 
the specification has been completed and validated, it becomes the definitive 
statement of functional behavior for the software. The specification defines the 
capabilities to be created through incremental software development. It also 
erves as the basis for usage specification and usage model development in 
incremental software certification. 
For large systems, a strategy of incremental specification is usually neces-
sary. In this approach, software increments are iteratively specified, developed, 
and certified. This permits user feedback on observed increment behavior in 
execution, and can help to elicit requirements that may have proved difficult to 
define. The Function Specification Process is ongoing. Whenever the evolving 
Function Specification is sufficient to support increment planning and develop-
ment of an increment, that development can be initiated. 








The required behavior of the software in all possible cir-
cumstances of use is defined and documented. 
The function specification is complete, consistent, correct, 
and traceable to the software requirements. 
The customer agrees with the function specification as the 
basis for software development and certification. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Software Requirements have been partially or fully 
completed. 
ExPLANATION: Incremental function specification 
All software requirements must eventually be defined to per-
mit complete function specification. Often, all requirements 
are not fully understood at the outset, and a strategy of incre-
mental function specification based on partial requirements 
definition may be necessary. 
In large-scale developments, incremental function speci-
fication is often a desirable strategy for pacing development, 
maintaining intellectual control, and eliciting customer feed-
back. 
The Function Specification requires revision for changes to 
the Software Requirements or for changes from increment 
specification, development, or certification. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
The Engineering Change Log describes proposed changes, 
if any. The Usage Specification, if any, is used as a check on 
the completeness and consistency of the Function Specifi-
cation. 
... asks 
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Define the format and notation of the Function 
Specification. 
ExAMPLE: Function Specification format 
The mathematical definition of a black box specification pre-
scribes certain elements with a format that must be specified. 
For example, a black box specification can be formatted as 
tables (with columns for current stimulus, conditions on stim-
ulus history, and responses), enumerations of input sequences 
and responses, disjoint conditional rules, or other formalisms 
appropriate to the application. The notation definition should 
include project conventions for naming and typing. 
Define all software boundaries and stimulus-response in-
terfaces with hardware, other software, and human users. 
Specify stimuli from hardware devices and associated 
responses and protocols. 
Specify stimuli from external software and associated 
responses, including formats of files and messages. 
Specify stimuli from user interfaces and associated 
responses, including details of presentation and interaction. 
REcoMMENDATION: Specification of human user interfaces 
The details of human user interfaces should be established 
during function specification, not deferred for completion 
during development. The Function Specification defines the 
complete external behavior of the software, which is closely 
coupled to user interfaces. 
Document the software boundaries and external stimuli 
and responses in the Function Specification work product. 
Specify the required external behavior of the software in 
the black box function form of stimulus history mappings 
to corresponding responses. 
Specify the required external behavior of the software in 
all possible circumstances of use. 
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ExPLANATION: "All possible circumstances of use" 
The Function Specification defines the required behavior of 
the software for all uses, including correct and incorrect, 
frequent and infrequent, and nominal and stress conditions. 
Responses for all possible stimulus histories should be 
specified. 
EXPLANATION: Mathematical function 
"Function" refers to a mathematical function. A mathemati-
cal function defines a mapping from a domain to a range. In a 
black box specification, the domain is the set of all possible 
sequences of inputs (all stimulus histories), and the range is 
the set of all correct responses. A mathematically "complete" 
specification is one in which all possible stimulus histories 
have been mapped to their corresponding responses. A math-
ematically "consistent" specification is one in which no his-
tory has been mapped to more than one response. A "correct" 
specification is one in which the domain, range, and mapping 
have been properly specified in the judgment of domain 
experts. 
REFERENCE: Software specification based on mathematical 
function theory 
See Mills (1986, 1988) and Mills, Dyer, and Linger (1987). 
REcoMMENDATION: Prudent exceptions to black box 
specification 
The black box specification has a state- and procedure-free 
form that is extremely useful for validating requirements and 
driving incremental development and certification. In some 
cases, however, state box and even clear box specifications 
can be considered when they are more natural alternatives. 
Black box specifications are generally best, and are well worth 




8.2 Function Specification Process 153 
Use abstractions such as specification functions in the 
black box specification to maximize understandability, limit 
complexity, and maintain intellectual control. 
ExPLANATION: Specification functions 
"Specification functions" are a common form of abstraction 
used in scaling up black box specifications for large systems. 
Specification functions define conditions or operations that 
are used to simplify function mappings . They appear in the 
mappings as named placeholders. For example, in a specifi-
cation for a database, a specification function named "delete-
ok" operating on stimulus history might define conditions for 
which a "delete" stimulus should produce a deletion; namely, 
that the record to be deleted had been added somewhere in 
the history of use and not subsequently deleted. 
Simplify external software behavior whenever possible to 
improve usability and to reduce the development and certifi-
cation effort. 
Document the black box mapping of stimulus histories to 
responses and associated assumptions in the Function Speci-
fication work product. 
Verify the completeness, consistency, correctness, and clar-
ity of the evolving Function Specification work product in 
frequent team reviews. 
Verify the completed Function Specification work prod-
uct with the customer and the project team. 
Review the Function Specification with the customer, the 
development and certification teams, and affected peer groups 
for agreement as the basis for incremental development and 
certification. 




(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are 
satisfied. 
The Function Specification has been completed, verified 
against the Software Requirements, and agreed to by the cus-
tomer as the basis for software development. 
8.3 Usage Specification Process 
The purpose of the Usage Specification Process is to identify and to classify 
software users, usage scenarios, and environments of use; to establish and to 
analyze the highest level structure and probability distributions for software 
usage models; and to obtain agreement with the customer on the specified usage 
as the basis for software certification. 
The specification team creates the Usage Specification based on the 
Software Requirements and the evolving Function Specification. The informa-
tion in the Usage Specification defines the scope of the testing effort and serves 
as the basis for incremental usage model development. It also assists in com-
pleting and validating the Function Specification. 
Analysis of high-level usage models provides early guidance for allocation 
of development and testing resources. The analysis can provide estimates of rel-
ative long-run usage of specified software functions, which can help prioritize 
development activities. It can also help estimate testing resource and schedule 
requirements. Usage model analysis can be carried out prior to software devel-
opment, before resources are committed to increment development and certifi-
cation. This analysis is an effective management tool for reducing the risk of 
inaccurate resource and schedule estimates. 
Objectives 
Objective 1 The users, usage scenarios, and usage environments of the 
software are defined and documented to clarify the speci-
fication, establish development priorities, and provide a 
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The customer agrees with the usage specification as the 
basis for usage model development and software certifi-
cation. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Software Requirements and the Function Specification 
have been partially or fully completed. 
ExPLANATION: Incremental usage specification 
All software requirements and function specifications must 
eventually be defined to permit a complete usage specifica-
tion. Often, all requirements are not fully understood at the 
outset, and the strategy of incremental usage specification 
based on a partial requirements definition may be necessary. 
In large-scale developments, incremental usage specification 
is often a desirable strategy for pacing development, main-
taining intellectual control, and eliciting customer feedback. 
The Usage Specification requires revlSlon for changes to 
the Software Requirements or Function Specification, or for 
changes from increment specification, development, or certi-
fication. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
product are available. 
The Engineering Change Log describes proposed changes, 
if any. 
Define the format and notation of the Usage Specification. 
The Usage Specification is often represented as a high-
level Markov chain. Naming and documentation conventions 
are established for encoding usage information as elements 
of the chain. 
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Task2 
EXPLANATION: Markov chain 
Software use is treated as a stochastic process that can be 
described as a Markov chain. A Markov chain can be repre-
sented as a directed graph, in which the nodes are states of 
use and the arcs are stimuli that cause transitions between 
states. 
In the Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process, the 
high-level Usage Specification is refined to produce detailed 
Markov chain Usage Models. Additional explanation of Mar-
kov chains is given in that process. 
Specify the expected usage of the software through pro-
gressive stratification of usage characteristics. 
ExPLANATION: Stratification of usage characteristics 
Variation in usage can be described as a hierarchy of progres-
sively narrower categories of usage. A heterogeneous user 
population, for example, may be subdivided into a set of more 
homogeneous user classes. This stratification of usage results 
in a better understanding of software usage requirements and 
provides a high-level basis for test planning. 
Identify and classify all hardware, software, and human 
users of the software. 
Identify the expected proportion of each class of user 
within the set of expected users. 
ExAMPLE: User classifications 
Hardware user classifications include sensors, actuators, and 
other peripheral devices. Software user classifications include 
operating systems, databases, and other controlling or sup-
porting software. Human user classifications include job 
type, access privileges, and experience level. 
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ExPLANATION: Contribution of usage specification to 
function specification 
Identification of users, usage scenarios, and environments of 
use in the Usage Specification Process contributes to the 
completeness and correctness of function definition in the 
Function Specification Process. 
The users of the software are the sources of stimuli and 
the targets of responses. The completeness of the set of iden-
tified users is a necessary condition for the correctness of the 
domain defined in the Function Specification. The principle 
of transaction closure in Cleanroom black box specification 
refers to the requirement that all possible uses by all possible 
users be identified. 
For each class of user, identify and classify all scenarios of 
use, including starting and ending events. 
Identify the expected proportion of each class of scenarios 
within the set of expected scenarios. 
ExAMPLE: Use classifications 
Usage scenarios are defined by considering main and sup-
porting user functions, routine and nonroutine use, safe and 
hazardous use, and other dimensions that stratify and orga-
nize usage patterns. 
Because statistical testing is based on random sampling of 
the population of possible uses, the definition of a "use" is 
critical to the validity of the testing process . A use begins and 
ends with predefined events that are appropriate to the appli-
cation; for example, invocation to termination, switchhook-
up to switchhook-down, power-up to power-down, main menu 
to main menu, transaction start to transaction end, and so on. 
For each class of user and class of use, identify and clas-
sify expected hardware and software environments for the 
software system. 
Identify the expected proportion of each class of environ-
ment within the set of expected environments. 
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Task 3 
EXAMPLE: Environment classifications 
Usage environments can be classified in terms of characteris-
tics such as computer and network configuration, capacity, and 
performance; system and support software capabilities and 
resource requirements; data rates and volumes; and support 
for concurrency. 
ExPLANATION: Operational use as the context for certification 
Cleanroom testing is performed as a statistical experiment in 
which tested use of the software should reflect operational 
use to the greatest extent possible. Careful characterization of 
operational environments permits their accurate simulation 
in testing, which in tum permits valid estimates of fitness for 
use of the software in the operational environments. 
REFERENCE: Usage specification 
See Walton, Poore, and Trammell (1995). 
Document the results in the Usage Specification work product. 
Represent usage information as high-level Markov chains. 
Analyze the models, and make recommendations based 
on analysis of usage model statistics. 
EXPLANATION: Relationship of usage specification to usage 
modeling 
Usage specification is a system-level activity. Detailed usage 
modeling parallels lower-level development activity. The 
high-level usage model developed during the Usage Speci-
fication Process is the top level of the usage model(s) devel-
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Identify any areas in which the functions defined in the 
Function Specification result in excessive complexity and 
cost in usage model development. Make recommendations 
for possible simplification. 
Evaluate software functions in terms of probability of use. 
Make recommendations on development priorities. 
Analyze usage statistics to estimate resources and sched-
ules required to achieve certification goals. 
Verify the evolving Usage Specification work product in 
specification team reviews. 
Conduct frequent specification team reviews of the evolv-
ing Usage Specification for completeness, consistency, cor-
rectness, and clarity. 
Verify the completed Usage Specification work product 
with the customer and the project team. 
Review the Usage Specification with the customer, the 
certification team, and affected peer groups for agreement 
as the basis for usage model development and software 
certification. 
Measurement 1 Apply standard calculations to Markov chain usage mod-
els to derive high-level operational profiles of the software. 
ExPLANATION: Usage model calculations 
Standard calculations on Markov chain usage models pro-
vide estimates of long-term software usage behavior. The 
calculations may be interpreted to identify patterns of use, 
usage features, probabilities of particular usage events, and 
insights relevant to both development and test planning. 
Further discussion of usage model analysis is provided in the 
discussion of the Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process. 
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Exit 
Exit 1 
The process is complete when the exit cr iteria are satisfied. 
The Usage Specification has been completed, verified, and 
agreed to by the customer as the basis for detailed usage 
modeling and test planning. 
8.4 Architecture Specification Process 
The purpose of the Architecture Specification Process is to define the concep-
tual model, the structural organization, and the execution characteristics of the 
software. Architecture definition is a multilevel activity that spans the life cycle 
of the project. Architecture may be inherited from a domain or product line, 
evolve within the constraints of the system of which it is a part, or wholly origi-
nate in the software project. 
The Cleanroom aspect of architecture specification is in decomposition of 
the history-based black box Function Specification into state-based state box 
and procedure-based clear box descriptions. This high-level box structure of the 
software identifies and connects principal components, including their state 
encapsulations and operations. It is the beginning of a referentially transparent 
decomposition of the Function Specification into box structure hierarchies, and 
will be used during increment development. The architecture may take a variety 
of forms , including functional, object based, and so on. 
Key dimensions of an architecture are a conceptual architecture, expressed 
in terms of major software components and their relationships; a module archi-
tecture, expressed in terms of layers of functional decomposition; and an exe-
cution architecture, expressed in terms of dynamic software operation (Soni, 
Nord, and Hofmeister 1995). The architecture is a vehicle for incorporating 
existing reference models, components, protocols, standards, and software 
design strategies. Architecture specification spans the development life cycle. 
The Software Architecture is a principal input to the Increment Planning 
and the Increment Design Processes. 
Objectives 
Objective 1 The architectural strategy leverages existing assets and 
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The architectural structure of the software is defined as 
the complete behavior and interaction of its principal 
components. 
The customer agrees with the software architecture as the 
basis for software development. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Software Requirements and the Function Specification 
are partially or fully completed. 
The Software Architecture requires revision for changes to 
the Software Requirements or Function Specification, or for 
changes from increment specification, development, or certi-
fication. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
The Engineering Change Log describes proposed changes, 
if any. The Usage Specification is used to clarify requirements 
and constraints on the software architecture. 
The Reengineered Software, if any, is used to define the 
use of reengineered components in the architecture. 
Identify architectural assets. 
Identify and analyze architectural assets applicable to the 
software, including existing domain models, reference archi-
tectures, components, communication protocols, standards, 
and design strategies and conventions. 
Record the asset analysis in the Software Architecture 
work product. 
Define a strategy for the software architecture. 
Define a strategy for the architecture based on the Soft-
ware Requirements, the Function Specification, the analysis 
of the architectural assets, and the requirements derived from 
higher level system or subsystem design. 
Document the strategy in the Software Architecture. 
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Decompose the history-based black box specification of 
required external behavior defined in the Function Specifi-
cation into top-level, state-based state box and procedure-
based clear box forms based on the architecture strategy. 
For the state box, invent principal state elements and oper-
ations required to achieve specified black box behavior. 
For the clear box, invent procedures for operations on state 
elements required to achieve specified state box behavior. 
Within the clear box, invent and connect principal software 
components, usually defined as black boxes, whose subse-
quent state box decompositions will encapsulate state at the 
next level. 
Continue the decomposition until the architecture is fully 
elaborated. 
The completed software architecture represents hierar-
chies of box uses, wherein every use of a box is represented 
explicitly in a hierarchy. 
Document the architecture in the Software Architecture 
work product. 
Analyze and validate the software architecture. 
Perform simulations and analysis as necessary to ensure 
that performance, reliability, usability, and other software 
requirements can be met by the architecture. 
Document the analysis in the Software Architecture work 
product. 
Verify the evolving Software Architecture work product in 
team reviews. 
Conduct frequent team reviews of the evolving Software 
Architecture to ensure that it meets requirements. 
Use the Correctness Verification Process to verify that the 
representation of the Software Architecture in top-level box 
structure form is complete, consistent, and correct. 
Verify the completed Software Architecture work product 
with the customer and the project team. 
Review the Software Architecture with the customer, the 
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groups for agreement as the basis for incremental develop-
ment and certification. 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The Software Architecture has been completed, verified, and 
agreed to by the customer. 
8.5 Increment Planning Process 
The purpose of the Increment Planning Process is to allocate customer require-
ments defined in the Function Specification to a series of software increments 
that satisfy the Software Architecture, to define schedule and resource alloca-
tions for increment development and certification, and to obtain agreement with 
the customer on the increment plan. 
The Increment Construction Plan is created by the specification team for 
use by management to assign tasks, track progress, and monitor product quality 
and process control in the Project Management Process. It is revised as neces-
sary to incorporate changes or to accommodate actual project performance. In 
the incremental process, a software system grows from initial to final form 
through a series of increments that implement user function, execute in the sys-
tem environment, and accumulate into the final system. The first increment is 
an end-to-end executable subset (i.e., initial user state to final user state) of the 
functional behavior on which later increments can be built. When the final 
increment is in place, the system is complete. By providing a series of accumu-
lating subsets of the software that grow in capability, the incremental process 
reduces risk and permits early and continual user evaluation and feedback. If 
the customer prefers delivery of the final system only, incremental development 
can still be used by the development organization for management control, risk 
mitigation, and to support development needs such as hardware and software 
co-design. 
Incremental development and certification avoids the risks associated with 
a separate integration step late in a project life cycle. Increments are typically 
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developed in top-down fashion, often with concurrent engineering of incre-
ments . Each increment is a composition of functions and interfaces specified in 
prior increments. This approach permits continual testing and quality assess-










The incremental development and certification plan sup-
ports intellectual control of the work, statistical quality 
control of the process, and risk management of the overall 
project. 
The increment plan ensures ongoing clarification of re-
quirements through user execution and evaluation of 
increments. 
The customer agrees with the increment plan as the basis 
for software development and certification. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Software Requirements, Function Specification, Usage 
Specification, Software Architecture, Reuse Analysis Plan, 
Risk Analysis Plan, and Schedule and Resource Plan are 
partially or fully complete. These work products are the basis 
for developing the Increment Construction Plan, as well as a 
source of revisions to it. 
The Increment Construction Plan requires revision for 
changes from development or certification activity, or as a 
result of new or changed requirements. 
Entry work products are available. 
Partition software functions into a series of increments 
for development and certification. 
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Define the functional content of a series of software incre-
ments that implement user function, execute in the system 
environment, and accumulate into the final system. 
ExPLANATION: "Accumulate into the final system" 
Cleanroom increments accumulate in a top-down fashion. 
The Function Specification and Software Architecture pro-
vide the high-level structure for a series of increments that 
grow from the structure. From the beginning, embedded 
specifications with executable stubs are used as placeholders 
for functions planned for later increments. In this way, all 
testing occurs in a system environment. Traditional integra-
tion testing is unnecessary. 
Use the Software Requirements to identify software require-
ments or system engineering factors that may influence the 
definition of increment content. 
Use the Function Specification and the Software Architec-
ture to identify required software functions and their depen-
dent relationships as a basis for defining increment content. 
Use the Reuse Analysis Plan to identify reused compo-
nents and allocate them to appropriate increments. 
Use the Risk Analysis Plan to identify risks that influence 
increment content. Plan increment content to avoid or manage 
risks, with emphasis on addressing risks early in the project. 
Use the Usage Specification to define increment content in 
consideration of usage probabilities; specifically, to incorpo-
rate functions with high usage probabilities into early incre-
ments . 
Identify special components, such as complex algorithms 
requiring extensive analysis, for independent development 
and certification prior to incorporation into the accumulating 
increments. These components can be incorporated as reusa-
ble assets in the overall increment plan. 
Document the required functional content of the incre-
ments in the Increment Construction Plan. 
166 Cleanroom Specification Processes 
Task 2 Refine the Schedule and Resource Plan by allocating 







Within the overall constraints of the Schedule and Re-
source Plan, allocate development and certification schedules 
and resources for each increment. 
Provide for overlapping or parallel development of incre-
ments as necessary to meet schedules based on the availability 
of development resources. 
Define schedule points for measurement of software 
quality and process control, and for customer evaluation of 
increments. 
Document schedule and resource allocations in the Incre-
ment Construction Plan work product. 
REFERENCE: Increment planning 
See Trammell, Pleszkoch, Linger, and Hevner ( 1996). 
Review the Increment Construction Plan with the cus-
tomer, the development and certification teams, and 
affected peer groups for agreement as the basis for incre-
mental development and certification. 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criteria are satisfied. 
The Increment Construction Plan has been completed, veri-
fied, and agreed to by the customer as the plan for software 
development and certification. 
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9.1 Software Reengineering Process 
The purpose of the Software Reengineering Process is to prepare reused soft-
·are for incorporation into the software product. Reused software can originate 
in Cleanroom or non-Cleanroom environments, and can include commercial 
roducts, customer-furnished software, and components from previous soft-
. ·are developments. Software may be reused as is, reused through interface 
controllers such as wrappers, or reused after reengineering. 
Reused software must satisfy two principal Cleanroom requirements. First, 
ihe functional semantics and interface syntax of reused software must be under-
~tood and documented, to maintain intellectual control and to avoid unforeseen 
failures in execution. If specification and design documentation for reused soft-
ware is incomplete, its functional semantics can be recovered through function 
abstraction and correctness verification. The completeness and correctness of 
pecifications for reused software must satisfy project specification standards. 
Second, the fitness for use of reused software must be either known or 
determined to achieve the project's certification goals. Usage models can be 
developed for reused software, and its fitness for use can be determined through 
illltistical testing. The reliability of reused software must satisfy project certifi-
cation goals. 
The results of the Software Reengineering Process are recorded in the 
Reengineering Plan and Reengineered Software work products. 
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Reengineered software satisfies requirements for the soft-
ware product in which it is used. 
Reengineering activity enables intellectual control over 
the reengineered software. 
Reengineered software is certified to be fit for its intended 
use as necessary to meet certification goals for the soft-
ware product in which it is used. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
Candidate reusable assets identified in the Reuse Analysis Plan 
are to be evaluated and possibly reengineered for use in the 
software product. 
The Reengineering Plan and/or the Reengineered Software 
require revision for changes from specification, development, 
or certification activities. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
Reused software and its supporting documentation are used 
as the basis for creating the Reengineered Software. 
The Engineering Change Log describes proposed changes. 
The Software Requirements, Function Specification, Usage 
Specification, Software Architecture, and Increment Construc-
tion Plan are used to define requirements for reengineering 
reused software. 
Analyze candidate reused software and its documentation 
to develop a reengineering plan. 
Analyze specifications, designs, and implementations of 
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of documentation of its functional semantics, and the extent 
of reengineering necessary to satisfy software product re-
quirements. 
Analyze the usage models, test plans, test procedures, test 
results, and actual usage of reused software to evaluate the 
basis for its reliability estimates. 
Conduct a cost/benefit analysis with respect to project 
certification goals and future software maintenance responsi-
bilities to determine appropriate resource allocations to re-
engineering activities. 
If necessary, develop a plan for reengineering reused soft-
ware to satisfy functional requirements, recover functional 
semantics, and/or assess fitness for use. 
Define and document reengineering tasks, schedules, and 
resources in the Reengineering Plan work product. 
Recover the functional semantics of reused software using 
function abstraction techniques. 
If reused software implementations are not structured, 
transform them into structured form using program structur-
ing techniques to permit function abstraction. 
Carry out stepwise abstraction of structured implementa-
tions as necessary and document embedded intended func-
tions. Continue abstraction until specifications of external 
behavior in all possible circumstances of use have been 
defined. 
Document the functional semantics of reused software in 
the Reengineered Software work product. 
Reengineer reused software to meet software product re-
quirements. 
Respecify, redesign, and reimplement reused software as 
necessary to meet requirements using the Function Specifi-
cation, Increment Design, and Correctness Verification Pro-
cesses. 
Document the reengineering of reused software in the 
Reengineered Software work product. 
Recover the functional semantics of reused software using 
experimental execution. 
If the source code of reused software is not available, con-
duct experimental executions as necessary to derive an under-
standing of its functional semantics. 





RECOMMENDATION: Use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
Software (COTS) or Application 
Program Interfaces (APis) 
If neither specifications nor source code are available, execu-
tion experiments can be used to understand the semantics of 
the software. The use of COTS, API, or otherwise "sealed" 
software in the product under development should be 
restricted to functions that are well understood. 
Document the functional semantics of reused software in 
the Reengineered Software work product. 
Certify the fitness for use of reused software. 
Create usage models and conduct statistical testing as nec-
essary to certify the fitness for use of reused software with 
respect to project certification goals. Use the Usage Model-
ing and Test Planning Process and the Statistical Testing and 
Certification Process. 
Document certification results in the Reengineered Soft-
ware work product. 
Verify the Reengineered Software work product. 
Carry out correctness verification in team reviews as 
necessary to ensure correctness of abstracted specifications 
and/or redeveloped software. Use the Correctness Verifica-
tion Process. 
Measurement 1 Measure the fitness for use of the reengineered software 
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The process is complete when one of the exit criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Reengineered Software has been completed, including 
any necessary redevelopment to meet requirements, abstrac-
tion of functional semantics, and certification of fitness for 
use. 
Reengineering activity has revealed that the candidate soft-
ware is not fit for use in the product, and project plans must 
be changed. 
9.2 Increment Design Process 
The purpose of the Increment Design Process is to design and code a software 
increment that satisfies the Increment Construction Plan, Function Specifica-
Tion, and Software Architecture; and conforms to Cleanroom design principles 
and quality criteria. The development team documents each increment in the 
Increment Design work product. 
Increments are designed and implemented as usage hierarchies through 
box structure decomposition. This process preserves referential transparency 
between successive decompositions to maintain intellectual control. Increment 
designs can be expressed in object, functional, or other forms. Each increment 
· based on a prior specification. Increment specifications are expressed in stim-
ulus history-based black box and state-based state box forms. Increment 
igns and implementations are expressed in procedure-based clear box forms 
that can introduce new black boxes for further decomposition. Reused or 
reengineered components are incorporated as planned. 
Team reviews during the Increment Design Process focus on issues such 
design strategies, simplification, verifiability, maintainability, reuse, and con-
formance to style. In the complementary Correctness Verification Process, the 
Learn. focuses exclusively on correctness. Specifications, designs, and imple-
mentations evolve in the Increment Design Process, and intended functions are 
anbedded in clear box procedure decompositions to permit effective correct-
ess verification. The team performs correctness verification as the last intellec-
Lnal pass through the work. 
The development team does not execute the increment implementation. 
:::USt execution is performed by the certification team in the Statistical Testing 
:md Certification Process after the development team has completed verifica-
·on in the Correctness Verification Process. 










The increment design and implementation satisfy the 
Function Specification, the Software Architecture, and the 
Increment Construction Plan. 
The increment design and implementation are a verifi-
ably correct decomposition of required functions. 
Intellectual control over increment design and implemen-
tation is maintained through team reviews. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Software Requirements, Function Specification, Usage 
Specification, Software Architecture, Reengineered Software, 
and Increment Construction Plan are sufficient for increment 
design, and a software increment is scheduled for develop-
ment or change. These work products are the basis for devel-
oping the Increment Design, as well as a source of revisions 
to it. 
An Increment Verification Report or Increment Certification 
Report identifies faults or failures requiring correction of the 
Increment Design. 
Entry work products and the supporting work product 
are available. 
The Engineering Change Log describes proposed changes. 
Review the work products that are the basis for the incre-
ment design. 
Review the Increment Construction Plan to identify the 
user functions to be implemented in the increment. 
Review the Function Specification for definitions of the 
user functions to be implemented in the increment. 
Review the Software Architecture for the architectural 
strategy to be maintained in the increment. 
Task2 
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Design and implement the software increment as a usage 
hierarchy through box structure decomposition. 
E XPLANATION: Box structure usage hierarchy 
Box structure decomposition results in a usage hierarchy of 
objects, modules, and other units of code. The box structure 
hierarchy for an increment is the completed increment. The 
box structure hierarchy for the final increment is the com-
pleted software product. 
Decompose history-based black box specifications into 
state-based state box specifications with equivalent behavior 
in all circumstances of use. 
Decompose state box specifications into procedure-based 
clear box designs with equivalent behavior in all circum-
stances of use. Introduce new black box uses in clear box 
designs as necessary. 
Create clear box designs as structured procedures that 
fully define control and data relationships among new black 
box uses and other design elements. 
Repeatedly decompose new black boxes into state box and 
clear box forms. Continue decomposition until designs can 
be implemented with no further invention required. 
Maintain referential transparency between decomposi-
tions for intellectual control. 
ExPLANATION: Referential transparency 
Cleanroom minimizes the risk of integration faults through 
development based on the mathematical principle of referen-
tial transparency. Referential transparency in box structure 
hierarchies requires that the black box specifications embed-
ded in clear boxes at each level of decomposition define pre-
cisely the required functional behavior of their subsequent 
decompositions into state and clear boxes. With referential 
transparency, intellectual control is maintained and indepen-
dent work at lower levels can proceed without concern for 
functional interactions at higher levels. 
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Task3 
Incorporate components from the Reengineered Software 
work product into the increment as planned. 
Attach intended functions to the control structures in clear 
box procedure designs for use in correctness verification. 
EXPLANATION: Intended functions 
Intended functions are a key Cleanroom concept and are 
essential to achieving Cleanroom objectives. An intended 
function is a definition of the full functional effect on data of 
the control structure (s equence, i fthenelse, whi ledo, etc.) 
to which it is attached. Intended functions typically appear as 
comments in the clear box. They are often expressed in black 
box or state box form, particularly as conditional rules, and 
are used in verifying their control structure expansions. 
If necessary, translate designs into the implementation 
language and review for correct translation. 
Refer to the Usage Specification document for informa-
tion about the operational environment. Refer to the Increment 
Verification Report or Increment Certification Report for 
faults or failures requiring correction. 
Document the design and code in the Increment Design 
work product. 
REFERENCE: Box structure specification and design 
See Mills (1986, 1988) and Mills, Dyer, and Linger (1987). 
Improve the Increment Design through team reviews. 
Conduct frequent development team reviews of the 
evolving Increment Design to discuss design strategies and 
improvements, and to assess characteristics including under-
standability, verifiability, and maintainability. Make design 
simplification and style compliance explicit review objec-
tives for efficient correctness verification. Redesign for sim-
plicity when cost effective. 
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ExPLANATION: Writing for verification 
Correctness verification is only possible if designs are verifi-
able. This is not to say that designs are not correct unless they 
are verifiable, only that they are not verifiably correct. 
Cleanroom designs are written for verification. The step-
wise unfolding of specification and design in box structure 
decompositions ensures traceability of design to specifica-
tion at every level of the usage hierarchy. Each specification 
is "distributed" as intended functions for design components 
during the Increment Design Process, and design compo-
nents are verified against their intended functions during the 
Correctness Verification Process. 
Identify opportunities for state migration and use of com-
mon services. 
EXPLANATION: State migration 
State migration is a Cleanroom strategy for improving and 
simplifying designs. It concerns placement of state data at the 
most effective level of decomposition for its use. State migra-
tion implements the software engineering principle of infor-
mation hiding for limitation of data scope. State migration 
places data based on its scope of usage at as low a level in a 
system hierarchy as possible, but at as high a level as necessary. 
Migration of state data may be possible whenever new black 
boxes are created in a given clear box. Any state data item 
used solely by one lower level box can be migrated to it. 
EXPLANATION: Common services 
Use of common services is another Cleanroom strategy for 
improving and simplifying designs. Common services are 
reusable components. They may be newly created for a given 
system, or drawn from a reuse library. Common services 
afford economy in system size, effective use of development 
resources, efficient verification, and increased reliability. 
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Apply function-theoretic correctness verification on an 
individual basis to evolving designs, with the objective of 
entering the Correctness Verification Process with few faults. 
Verification of the correctness of the Increment Design is so 
critical to Cleanroom objectives that an entire process is de-
voted to it (see Section 9.3 , Correctness Verification Process). 
(See Section 6.3, Common Cleanroom Process Elements.) 
The process is complete when the exit criterion is satisfied. 
The Increment Design has been completed. 
9.3 Correctness Verification Process 
The purpose of the Correctness Verification Process is to verify the correctness 
of a software increment using mathematically based techniques. Correctness 
verification is carried out in development team reviews using function-theoretic 
reasoning. Black box specifications are verified to be complete, consistent, and 
correct. State box specifications are verified with respect to corresponding 
black box specifications. Clear box procedures are verified with respect to cor-
responding state box specifications. Every control structure in every clear box 
procedure is verified against its intended function using the Correctness 
Conditions of the Correctness Theorem (Linger, Mills, and Witt 1979). Faults 
found during verification reviews are documented in the Increment Verification 
Report and are corrected by the specification and development teams under 
engineering change control. The specifications and designs are then reverified. 
Written proofs of correctness based on function- theoretic techniques provide 
additional rigor if necessary for life-, mission-, and enterprise-critical software. 
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The Correctness Verification Process is concurrent with the Increment 
Design Process. Correctness verification is the last intellectual pass at each 
level of decomposition-the last line of defense against failures encountered 
during statistical testing and certification. The objective of correctness verifica-
tion is to enter the testing phase with no faults in the implemented design. 
Following completion of verification by the development team, the increment is 







The team agrees that the software increment is correct 
with respect to its specification; in other words, that it 
contains no remaining faults. 
Faults and inadequacies found in correctness verification 
are documented to permit subsequent analysis for process 
improvement. 
REFERENCE: CMM Defect Prevention KPA 
If compliance with this KPA is an organizational objective, 
its specific requirements should be reviewed when the Cor-
rectness Verification Process is tailored for organizational or 
project use. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
A new Increment Design has been completed or is in progress. 
A reengineered or corrected Increment Design has been com-
pleted or is in progress. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
The Function Specification defines the required external 
behavior of the functions allocated to the increment in the 
Increment Construction Plan. 
The Software Architecture defines the architectural strat-
egy to be used in the Increment Design. 




Verify the correctness of the software increment using 
mathematically based verification techniques. 
Verify the correctness of every specification and design 
structure in the Increment Design. 
Carry out verbal proofs of correctness based on function-
theoretic techniques in team verification reviews. A consen-
sus of team members is required to establish correctness. 
For black box verification, determine the completeness, 
consistency, and correctness of its specification. 
For state box verification, compare state box behavior to 
corresponding black box behavior for equivalence. 
For clear box verification, apply the Correctness Condi-
tions of the Correctness Theorem to determine the correct-
ness of every control structure (including embedded black 
box specifications) with respect to its intended function. 
RECOMMENDATION: Correctness conditions for other 
recurring constructs 
Modern software development environments employ a wide 
variety of features and constructs that reduce to, but are often 
not easily recognizable as, standard control structures such as 
sequence, if thenel s e, and whi 1 edo. Visual programming 
languages have graphical elements. Real-time facilities have 
timing mechanisms such as process rendezvous. Application 
generators have high-level resources such as GUI builders. 
Multitasking, multiuser, multithreaded applications use such 
control mechanisms as resource locking, and so on. 
A project team should establish the correctness condi-
tions for such recurring constructs using function-theoretic 
reasoning. The development of standard verification proto-
cols for recurring idioms or patterns is precisely the sort of 
process tailoring that needs to be done to adapt the Clean-
room process to a given project and environment. 
Document findings of team verification reviews. 
Create an Increment Verification Report that documents 
all faults, problems, and improvements identified in verifica-
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Create written proofs of correctness as necessary for crit-
ical software. 
Develop written proofs of correctness as necessary for 
life-, mission-, and enterprise-critical software, and verify the 
proofs in team reviews. 
Document the proofs in the Increment Design work 
product. 
Reverify all corrections to faults. 
Perform reverification reviews on corrections to faults, 
including reverification of the full context of corrections to 
avoid unforeseen side effects. 
Confirm that every box structure has been verified as cor-
rect by team consensus. 
Confirm that each black box, state box, and clear box in 
the new and changed portions of the Increment Design has 
been verified to be correct. 





The Correctness Verification Process is a focused team 
review of the Increment Design. Measure the quality of the 
Increment Design and the effectiveness of the Increment 
Design Process in terms such as the number, type, and sever-
ity of faults found during the verification reviews. 
The process is complete when one of the exit criteria is 
satisfied. 
The increment has been verified with no faults found. 
The increment has been verified and contains faults that must 
be corrected and the engineering changes verified. 
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Exit 3 The black box, state box, or intended function definitions are 
insufficient for effective verification, and must be revised 
before verification can be accomplished. 
Exit4 Initial verification has found faults in sufficient quantity and 
severity that the process must be terminated and the incre-
ment redesigned. 
In each case, the Increment Verification Report is created. 
Written proofs, if any, are added to the Increment Design. 
The Correctness Verification Process cannot be completed 
until the Increment Design is completed. 
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10.1 Usage Modeling and 
Test Planning Process 
The purpose of the Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process is to refine the 
Usage Specification into usage models for software testing, to detine test plans, 
to obtain customer agreement on the usage models and test plans as the basis 
for software certification, and to generate statistical test cases and prepare the 
test environment. 
The certification team creates the Usage Models and Increment Test Plan, 
and generates the Statistical Test Cases. Usage models are used to generate sta-
tistical test cases and monitor the progress of testing in the Statistical Testing 
and Certification Process. A usage model for a software system represents an 
infinite population of possible uses. It consists of a structure that defines pos-
sible traversals of states of use by users, together with probabilities that define 
the likelihood that particular traversals will occur. In statistical testing, test 
cases are generated from the usage model based on its transition probabili-
ties. Multiple usage models may be required for multiple classes of users and 
environments. Models are developed incrementally in accordance with the 
Increment Construction Plan, and accumulate into final form in parallel with 
increment designs. The customer reviews the usage models and agrees that they 
will generate all scenarios of use, are correctly weighted, and are appropriate 
for certification. 
Usage model statistics provide a great deal of information about the testing 
effort that will be required to achieve certification goals given projected failure 
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rates in testing. Usage model analysis provides a basis for test planning and is 









Valid usage models are defined that represent all possible 
uses of the software under expected or other usage condi-
tions. 
A statistical testing plan based on the usage models is 
defined and validated through model analysis and simu-
lation. 
The customer agrees to the usage models and statistical 
test plan as the basis for software certification. 
The process begins when one of the entry criteria is 
satisfied. 
The Usage Specification, Function Specification, and/or In-
crement Construction Plan have been completed or changed. 
They are the basis for developing the Usage Models and In-
crement Test Plan, as well as a source of revisions to them. 
The Usage Models or Increment Test Plan require revision 
for changes from increment development or certification. 
Entry work products and the following supporting work 
products are available. 
The Software Architecture and the Reengineered Software 
may also provide information for development of the Usage 
Models. 
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Define the usage models to be developed. 
Use the Usage Specification to define the usage models to 
be elaborated, and the scope and purpose of each. 
Include special-purpose models as necessary (e.g., forcer-
tification of infrequently used functions with high conse-
quences of failure). 
EXPLANATION: Special-purpose models 
A usage model represents the conditions under which soft-
ware is used. In general, expected usage conditions are mod-
eled. In addition, other usage conditions may be of interest as 
well, and are modeled for special purposes. Hazardous usage 
conditions, for example, may be of interest for safety-critical 
software. Malicious usage conditions might be modeled for 
software with special security requirements. Usage can be 
characterized in whatever terms are important in the certifi-
cation context. 
Consider use of actual user input when available. Real-
time data feeds or the output of automated usage capture 
facilities can be used as components of usage models. 
Define the structure of each usage model. 
Refine the Usage Specification to develop the Usage 
Models. For each model, define all possible usage states and 
their transitions based on the functions required by the In -
crement Construction Plan and as defined by the Function 
Specification. 
Define the structure of each model in the Usage Models 
document. 
RECOMMENDATION: Markov chain usage models 
The structure of a usage model can be represented as a 
Markov chain. A Markov chain usage model reflects the sto-
chastic nature of software use, and permits analysis of usage 
and automation of test activity. 
continued 
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REcoMMENDATION: continued 
The usage model structure represents all possible uses of 
the software-expressed in terms of the initial usage state, 
subsequent sequences of possible usage states, and the termi-
nal usage state. The model can be represented as a directed 
graph, with nodes (usage states) that are connected by arcs 
(possible transitions in use) . Any usage scenario can be gen-
erated from a traversal of the model structure. 
Ambiguity, inconsistency, or complexity in the Function 
Specification is often identified during creation of usage model 
structures. 
REFERENCE: Usage modeling 
See Whittaker and Poore (1993), and Whittaker and Agrawal 
(1994). 
REcoMMENDATION: Early planning for test automation 
It is crucial to anticipate test automation requirements during 
usage modeling. Linkage with test tools, pre- and postpro-
cessing steps, live data feeds, response capture facilities, and 
numerous other aspects of automated testing are likely to be 
simpler if test automation is considered during usage modeling. 
Define the transition probabilities of each usage model. 
Determine transition probabilities between usage states 
based on usage information and certification goals. 
Employ user estimates and experience with similar sys-
tems and prior versions as sources of information about usage 
probabilities. 
Define transition probabilities for each model in the Usage 
Models. 
EXPLANATION: Transition probabilities 
While the structure of the usage model defines possible use, the 
transition probabilities define expected use. The probabilities 
continued 
Task4 
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ExPLANATION: continued 
associated with the transitions in the usage model may be 
known, partially known, or unknown. If they are known, as is 
often the case with well-instrumented systems in mature 
domains, the probabilities can be assigned directly. If they are 
not known, they can be estimated or made uniform. If they are 
pmtially known, a combination of these strategies can be used. 
Probabilities can also be defined for other than expected 
use; for example, to emphasize testing of infrequently used 
functions with high consequences offailure. 
The validity of conclusions drawn in statistical testing is 
entirely related to the usage models employed. Systematic 
acquisition of knowledge about expected usage is essential 
for developing accurate usage models. 
REFERENCE: Optimization of usage models 
Cleanroom practice is evolving toward automatic generation 
of transition probabilities from usage constraints. Operations 
research techniques can be applied to optimize usage models 
for an objective function, such as minimum testing cost, sub-
ject to usage constraints that characterize available knowl-
edge about expected use. See Walton (1995). 
Validate the usage models. 
Generate statistics for each usage model. Evaluate the 
statistics to validate the overall usage profile, and to estimate 
resources and schedules required to achieve certification goals. 
Develop recommendations based on the analysis (e.g., cost-
saving simplifications for the user functions defined by the 
Function Specification). 
ExPLANATION: Practical interpretation of usage model analysis 
Important information is available through standard calcula-
tions on a Markov chain usage model; for example, 
• The expected length of a usage scenario (i.e., test case 
length) 
continued 
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EXPLANATION: continued 
• The expected minimum number of usage scenarios until a 
given usage state occurs for the first time 
• The expected occupancy of each state of use (as a propor-
tion of all states of use) in the long-term use of the software 
• The expected minimum number of test cases required to 
cover all states and all transitions of the model 
• The expected number of test cases required to achieve tar-
get levels of reliability and confidence 
Interpretations of these calculations provide insights about 
potential hazards in use, allocation of development and test-
ing resources, and other information for management deci-
sion making. 
REFERENCE: Usage model analysis 
See Whittaker and Thomason (1994). 
Develop a plan for certification testing of the software 
increment. 
Develop a test plan, including schedules, staffing, training, 
hardware and software environment, certification goals, use of 
statistical test cases, use of operational input, procedures for 
verifying correct software performance, and documentation. 
Define the test plan to ensure experimental control, 
including test procedures, test monitoring, results recording, 
failure evaluation, and engineering change control. 
EXPLANATION: Experimental control 
Cleanroom testing is conducted as a statistical experiment to 
permit scientifically valid conclusions about the fitness for 
use of the software. During a statistical experiment, a series 
of random trials is performed under specified conditions, the 
outcomes of the trials are determined according to specified 
continued 
10.1 Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process 189 
EXPLANATION: continued 
criteria, and conclusions about the probabilities of the out-
comes are drawn. 
In statistical testing, the trials are test cases that are gener-
ated randomly from the usage models, the outcomes corre-
spond to the performance of the software, and the conclusions 
concern the probability of correct and incorrect software per-
formance. Conclusions are used to make informed decisions 
regarding test management and product release. 
Many aspects of statistical testing must be controlled to 
preserve the properties of the statistical experiment. Perform-
ing trials under specified conditions means, for example, that 
the same software version must be used in each test case; a 
new software version marks the beginning of a new experi-
ment. Determining the outcomes of the trials according to 
specified criteria means, for example, that the judgments by 
the testers and the evaluations by the test oracles must be 
consistent across all test cases. Explicit policies and operat-
ing procedures are required to ensure experimental integrity 
in statistical testing. 
REFERENCE: Experimental control 
See Trammell ( 1995) and Trammell and Poore (1994 ). 
Plan for additional testing techniques to be applied in con-
junction with statistical testing as necessary. 
EXPLANATION: Other testing strategies 
Statistical testing for reliability certification is a form of ran-
dom testing. Statistical methods for nonrandom testing are 
often used to accomplish specific objectives as well. Test 
cases producing the fastest coverage of the usage model, for 
example, might be generated for use at the beginning of test-
ing to reveal any immediate problems with the software. 
Some forms of nonstatistical testing may be included in the 
test plan as well, such as specific tests that are required by the 
customer, by a standard, or by law. 






Document testing plans in the Increment Test Plan work 
product. 
Generate the statistical test cases. 
Use the Usage Models to generate the Statistical Test Cases 
to be used during statistical testing. 
ExPLANATION: Manual versus automated testing 
For manual testing, the generated test cases might be "scripts" 
of instructions to human testers. For automated testing, the 
scripts might be command sequences. 
Prepare the statistical testing environment. 
Establish the hardware configuration and software envi-
ronment required to test the software. 
EXPLANATION: Test environment 
Preparation of the test environment may be a resource-
intensive task. In such cases it will receive special emphasis 
in the Schedule and Resource Plan developed during the Proj-
ect Planning Process, and in the Usage Specification devel-
oped in the Usage Specification Process . 
Verify the evolving Increment Test Plan and Usage Models 
work products in team reviews. 
Conduct frequent certification team reviews of the evolv-
ing Increment Test Plan and Usage Models for complete-
ness, consistency, correctness, and simplicity. Confirm through 
quantitative analysis of usage model properties, such as the 
long-run probabilities of state occurrence, that the models are 
consistent with user estimates and experience. 
Verify the completed Increment Test Plan and Usage 
Models work products with the customer and the project 
team. 
Measurement 
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Review the Increment Test Plan and Usage Models with 
the customer, the specification and certification teams, and 
affected peer groups to obtain agreement on them as the basis 
for software certification. 
Measurement 1 Measure the Usage Models work product. 
Exit 
Exit 1 
Measure the size ofthe Usage Models in terms such as the 
number of usage states, state transitions, and statistically typ-
ical paths. 
The process is complete when the exit criterion is satisfied. 
The Increment Test Plan and the Usage Models have been 
completed and agreed to by the customer as the basis for soft-
ware certification. 
1 0.2 Statistical Testing and 
Certification Process 
The purpose of the Statistical Testing and Certification Process is to demonstrate 
the software's fitness for use in a formal statistical experiment. Fitness for use is 
defined with respect to the usage models and certification goals employed in the 
testing process. The certification goals, first established in the Measurement 
Plan, and refined in the Increment Test Plan, may be expressed in terms such as 
software reliability, reliability growth rate, and coverage of the usage defined in 
the usage models. 
Software increments undergo first execution in this process. The incre-
ments are compiled, the Executable System is built, the statistical test cases are 
executed under experimental control, and the test results are evaluated. The suc-
cess or failure of test cases is determined by comparison of actual software 
behavior with the required behavior defined in the Function Specification. 
Failures found during statistical testing are documented in the Statistical Test-
ing Report. Intermediate and final test results are evaluated to make informed 
test management decisions. As testing proceeds, the values of certification 
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measures are compared with certification goals . The results of the comparisons 
drive decisions on continuing testing, stopping testing for engineering changes, 
stopping testing for reengineering and reverification, and final software certifi-
cation. 
In addition to measuring software quality and reliability, certification met-
rics are also used as measures of process control. Cleanroom team performance 
standards based on historical data, such as failure rates in statistical testing of 
prior systems, are compared with current metrics to make informed manage-
ment decisions. Evaluations and decisions regarding product quality and 








Software testing is conducted using a formal statistical 
design under experimental control. 
The software is demonstrated to perform correctly with 
respect to its specification. 
Statistically valid estimates of the properties addressed by 
the certification goals are derived for the software. 
Management decisions regarding continuation of testing 
and certification of the software are based on statistical 
estimates of software quality. 
The process begins when the entry criteria are satisfied. 
The Increment Test Plan has been completed, the Statistical 
Test Cases have been generated, and the test environment has 
been prepared. 
A new or corrected Increment Design is available for com-
pilation. 
The Function Specification and Usage Models are avail-
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Prepare the software increment for testing. 
Compile the software increment. If corrections are neces-
sary, initiate the Engineering Change Process. After success-
ful compilation, create the Executable System containing the 
load modules required for execution. 
Perform other types of testing if necessary. 
Perform other types of testing if necessary prior to statisti-
cal testing. For example, special testing may be required to 
demonstrate specific scenarios of use or to achieve complete 
usage model coverage with the minimum number of test cases. 
ExPLANATION: Order of statistical and other testing 
The key consideration in determining whether to perform 
other types of tests before or after statistical testing is the 
effect on certification. When a reliability estimate is made at 
the conclusion of statistical testing, it applies to the specific 
version of the software that was tested. If changes are made 
as a result of subsequent testing, the reliability estimate may 
require revision. It is generally preferable to perform any 
nonstatistical tests prior to statistical testing. Nonstatistical 
tests performed after statistical testing may complicate the 
reliability certification if the software is changed. 
Execute the statistical test cases in the test environment. 
Execute the Statistical Test Cases according to the proce-
dures defined in the Increment Test Plan. 
Evaluate the statistical test case results. 
Evaluate the correctness of the software responses with 
respect to the behavior defined in the Function Specification. 
If failures are observed, evaluate their impact on the con-
tinuation of testing, experimental control, and the validity of 
certification results. If corrections are necessary, initiate the 
Engineering Change Process. 
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Task 5 
ExPLANATION: Independent trials 
A key requirement in a statistical experiment is that the trials 
be independent-that is, the outcome of one trial must have 
no effect on the outcome of any other trial. Although ran-
domly generated test cases may ensure independent trials in 
statistical testing, the requirement for independence can still 
be undermined by failures in testing. For example, if a failure 
on a test case "blocks" access to functions required by a sub-
sequent test case, testing should be stopped and the problem 
fixed. 
Document test results in the Statistical Testing Report. 
Record data for each failure, including the test environment, 
test case, test results, failure type and severity, and any other 
information that will assist in determining its cause. 
Derive certification measures. 
Use the Usage Models, Statistical Test Cases, Statistical 
Testing Re_port, and results of other testing to derive measures 
of the fitness for use of the software with respect to certifica-
tion goals. 
Measures can include reliability and confidence, relia-
bility growth rate, MTTF, representativeness of the test case 
sample, and other measures derived from comparison of 
expected and observed software performance. 
Use statistical methods such as hypothesis testing, interval 
analysis, and analysis of failure data with reliability models. 
ExPLANATION: Reliability measurement 
Software reliability measurement is a hallmark of Cleanroom. 
Reliability estimation based on Markov chain usage models 
is a prominent approach to reliability measurement in Clean-
room practice. The Markov chain approach provides mea-
sures of reliability, confidence, and other stopping criteria. 
Classic statistical hypothesis testing is also used in Clean-
room for reliability estimation. Models of reliability growth 
can be used when their underlying assumptions are justified. 
Task 6 
Task 7 
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REFERENCE: Certification measures 
See Whittaker and Thomason (1994). 
Document certification measures in the Increment Certifi-
cation Report. 
Compare certification measures with certification goals. 
Compare the values of trends in the certification measures 
with project goals for product quality and process control. 
If appropriate, combine certification measures from the 
current statistical testing experiment with measures from 
other experiments. 
ExPLANATION: Conditions for combining test information 
If test conditions (e.g., software version, usage model, execu-
tion environment) are the same, data from various statistical 
testing experiments can simply be combined. If testing con-
ditions are not the same, more complex approaches to com-
bining information must be used to ensure the validity of 
conclusions. 
Document evaluations in the Increment Certification Report. 
Decide whether to stop testing. 
Positive case: Testing can be stopped and the software cer-
tified as fit for use if the current values of the certification 
measures satisfy certification goals and if no failures have 
been observed during testing of the current software version 
(or none worth the cost and risk of correction). 
Negative case: Testing should be stopped and the software 
reengineered and reverified if process control standards have 
been violated. Violation of process control standards occurs 
when certification goals cannot be achieved given current 
values of the certification measures and the remaining sched-
ule and resources for testing. 





ExPLANATION : Certification goals and process control 
standards 
Certification goals are targets for final results. Process con-
trol standards are gauges of intermediate progress toward 
certification goals. The certification goals answer the ques-
tion: Is the software currently fit for its intended use? Process 
control standards answer the question: Is the software likely 
to be certified as fit for use on the expected schedule? In gen-
eral, certification goals are defined by the customer, process 
control standards are defined by the developer, and both exist 
within the context of the predefined certification protocol in 
the test plan. 
Document decisions in the Increment Certification Report. 
Verify that the tests were executed according to the test 
plan. 
Verify the correctness of statistical calculations. 
Measurement 1 Measure the Statistical Test Cases and the results of their 
execution. 
Measure the Statistical Test Cases in terms such as the 
number and size of the test cases, and the execution times for 
each. 
Measure the number and severity of failures reported. 
Measurement 2 Measure the Statistical Testing and Certification Process. 
Measure the sufficiency of testing in terms such as the 
coverage of the usage models employed and the statistical 
similarity between expected usage and tested usage. 
Exit 
= . 1 
= · 2 
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The process is complete when one of the exit criteria is 
satisfied. 
The software increment satisfies certification goals. 
The software increment has failed to satisfy certification 
goals and must be reengineered and reverified before testing 
can resume. 
In either case, the Statistical Testing Report and Increment 
Certification Report are completed. 
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11 
Cleanroom and the 
Capability Maturity 
Model for Software 
11.1 The CMM for Software 
As use of Cleanroom software engineering becomes more widespread, interest 
in its relationship to the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity 
Model (CMM) for Software (Paulk, Weber, Curtis, and Chrissis 1995) has in-
creased. The CMM provides a well-defined paradigm for software process 
improvement that has experienced successful application in many organiza-
tions. Cleanroom software engineering provides well-defined theoretical foun-
dations and practices for software specification, development, testing, and 
certification. The principal focus of the CMM is on management and organi-
zation; the principal focus of Cleanroom is on technology and engineering 
practices. Effective management processes are an essential prerequisite for 
successful software development. However, technology-based solutions to prob-
lems of software development can often produce results that no amount of good 
management can achieve in their absence. For example, the introduction of 
structured programming technology in the 1970s swept away a sea of complex-
ity in software development that had made management of large-scale projects 
a risky proposition indeed. It is for this reason that the integration of technology 
and management in software development is so important and so effective. The 
right technology has the potential to improve and often reshape management 
processes while reducing software development risks and uncertainties. 
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Table 11 .1 CMM maturity levels 
Level Description 
Level 1: Initial The software process is characterized as ad hoc, and occasion-
ally even chaotic. Few processes are defined, and success 
depends on individual effort and heroics. 
Level 2: Repeatable Basic project management processes are established to track 
cost, schedule, and functionality. The necessary process disci-
pline is in place to repeat earlier successes on projects with 
similar applications. 
Level 3: Defined The software processes for both management and engineering 
activities are documented, standardized, and integrated into a 
standard software process for the organization. All projects use 
an approved, tailored version of the organization's standard 
software process for developing and maintaining software. 
Level 4: Managed Detailed measures of the software process and product quality 
are collected. Both the software process and products are quan-
titatively understood and controlled. 
Level 5: Optimizing Continuous process improvement is enabled by quantitative 
feedback from the process and from piloting innovative ideas 
and technologies. 
Table 11.1 characterizes the five CMM maturity levels and highlights the 
primary process changes made at each level. Except for level 1, each maturity 
level is decomposed into several KPAs that indicate the areas on which an orga-
nization should focus to improve its software process. KPAs identify the issues 
that must be addressed to achieve a maturity level. Each KPA identifies a cluster 
of related activities that, when performed collectively, achieve a set of goals 
considered important for enhancing process capability. The six level 2 KPAs 
focus on basic project management controls, as summarized in Table 11 .2. The 
seven KPAs at level 3 address both project and organizational issues, as the or-
ganization establishes an infrastructure for institutionalizing software engineer-
ing and management processes across all projects, as summarized in Table 11.3 . 
The two KPAs at level4 focus on establishing a quantitative understanding 
of both the software process and the software work products being built, as 
summarized in Table 11.4. The three KPAs at level 5 cover the issues that both 
the organization and the projects must address to implement continuous and 
measurable software process improvement, as summarized in Table 11.5 . 
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Table 11.2 CMM level 2 KPAs 















Establish a common understanding between the customer 
and the software project of the customer's requirements 
that will be addressed by the software project. 
Establish reasonable plans for performing the software 
engineering and for managing the software project. 
Establish adequate visibility into actual progress so that man-
agers can take effective actions when the software project's 
performance deviates significantly from the software plans. 
Select qualified software subcontractors and manage 
them effectively. 
Provide management with appropriate visibility into the 
process being used by the software project and the 
products being built. 
Establish and maintain the integrity of the products of the 
software project throughout the project's software life cycle. 
Table 11.3 CMM level 3 KPAs 












Establish the organizational responsibility for software 
process activities that improve the organization 's overall soft-
ware process capability. 
Develop and maintain a usable set of software process 
assets that improve process performance across the proj-
ects and provide a basis for cumulative, long-term benefits 
to the organization . 
Develop the skills and knowledge of individuals so they can 
perform their roles effectively and efficiently. 
Integrate the software engineering and management 
activities into a coherent, defined project software process 
that is tailored from the organization's standard software 
process and related process assets. 
Consistently perform a well-defined engineering process 
that integrates all the software engineering activities to 
produce correct, consistent software products effectively 
and efficiently. 
Establish a means for the software engineering group to 
participate actively with the other engineering groups so 
the project is better able to satisfy the customer's needs 
effectively and efficiently. 
continued 
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Table 11.3 continued 
Key Process Area 
Peer Reviews 
Description 
Remove defects from the software work products early 
and efficiently. An important corollary effect is to develop 
a better understanding of the software work products and 
of the defects that can be prevented. 
Table 11 .4 CMM level 4 KPAs 






Control the process performance of the software project 
quantitatively. 
Develop a quantitative understanding of the quality of 
the project's software products and achieve specific 
quality goals. 
Table 11.5 CMM level 5 KPAs 







Identify the root causes of defects and prevent them from 
recurring. 
Identify beneficial new technologies (e.g., tools, methods, 
and processes) and transfer them into the organization 
in an orderly manner. 
Continually improve the software processes used in the 
organization with the intent of improving software quality, 
increasing productivity, and decreasing the cycle time for 
product development. 
11.2 Cleanroom Process Mappings 
to CMM KPAs 
A number of general process management attributes cut across the KPAs. The 
coverage of these attributes by the Cleanroom processes and work products is 
summarized in Table 11.6. The left column lists the KPA process management 
attributes and the right column lists their location in terms of Cleanroom 
process names, sections, and work products (in italics). 
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Tables 11.8 through 11.11 describe the overall mapping of the Cleanroom 
processes, defined in Chapters 7 through 10, to each of the CMM KPAs. De-
scriptions and references to the CMM can be found in Paulk, Weber, Curtis, and 
Chrissis (1995), and details of the mapping can be found in Linger, Paulk, and 
Trammell (1996). The tables list the KPAs in the left column, principal Clean-
room processes in the middle column, and an assessment of the overall corre-
spondence in the right column, based on the categories identified in Table 11.7. 
There is a scope consideration in mapping Cleanroom to the organizational 
KPAs (i.e., Organizational Process Focus, Organizational Process Definition, 
Table 11.6 Process attribute coverage 
Key Process Area Process 
Management Attribute 
A written policy to do the work exists. 
A documented procedure for doing the 
work exists. 
Responsibility for doing the work has 
been established. 
Affected groups agree to their roles. 
Resources and funding for the work 
exist. 
People are trained to perform the work. 
Work products documenting the work 
are created. 
Baselines for data and work products 
are established. 
Changes to work products occur in a 
controlled fashion. 
The status of work is measured. 
The status of work is reviewed by 
senior management. 
The status of work is reviewed by the 
project manager. 
The status of work is reviewed by the 
software quality assurance (SQA) group. 
Location in 
Cleanroom Processes 
Organization's Clean room Engineering 
Guide 
Project Planning: Cleanroom Engineering 
Guide tailored to the specific project 
Project Planning: Project Organization Plan 
Project Planning: Verification section 
Project Planning: Schedule and Resource 
Plan; Project Management 
Project Planning: Training Plan; 
Project Management 
Project Planning: Work Product Plan; 
all processes: Exit sections 
Project Planning: Configuration 
Management Plan 
Project Planning: Configuration Management 
Plan; Project Management; Engineering 
Change 
All processes: Measurement section 
All processes: Verification section 
All processes: Verification section 
Intent is addressed by the Verification and 
Exit sections of all processes, and indepen-
dent statistical testing and certification 
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Training Program, Technology Change Management, and Process Change 
Management). If Cleanroom is the only process standardized by an organiza-
tion, it could fully address the concerns of an organizational KPA, and the cor-
respondence would be high. The case is more likely, however, that multiple 
methodologies are supported by an organization, one of which is Cleanroom. In 
that case, the implementation of the organizational KPAs goes beyond the 
Cleanroom processes, and the Cleanroom mapping to these KPAs cannot be 
more than partial. This latter case is reflected in the following tables. 
Table 11.7 Cleanroom/CMM correspondence definitions 
Correspondence Category 
The KPA is consistent with Cleanroom, and implementation 
by Cleanroom processes is high. 
The KPA is consistent with Cleanroom, and implementation 
by Cleanroom processes is partial. 
The KPA is consistent with Cleanroom, and implementation 
by Cleanroom processes is low. 
The KPA is consistent with Cleanroom, but is not implemented in 
the Cleanroom processes, or is implemented in an indirect way. 
Table 11.8 Cleanroom/CMM level 2 correspondence 
Key Process Area 
Requirements Management 
Software Project Planning 




Software Quality Assurance 
Software Configuration 
Management 







All processes, especially Project 
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Table 11.9 Cleanroom/CMM level 3 correspondence 
Key Process Area 










Principal Cleanroom Processes 
Project Planning, Project Management, 
Performance Improvement 
Project Planning, Project Management, 
Performance Improvement 
Project Planning, Project Management 
Project Planning, Project Management 
Requirements Analysis, Function 
Specification, Usage Specification, 
Architecture Specification, Increment 
Planning, Increment Design, Correctness 
Verification, Software Reengineering , 
Engineering Change, Usage Modeling 
and Test Planning, Statistical Testing 
and Certification 
Project Planning, Project Management 
All processes, especially 
Correctness Verification 
Table 11.10 Cleanroom/CMM level 4 correspondence 
Key Process Area 
Quantitative Process 
Management 
Principal Cleanroom Processes 
Project Planning, Project Management, 












Software Quality Management Project Planning, Project Management, High 
Statistical Testing and Certification , 
Performance Improvement 
Table 11.11 Cleanroom/CMM level 5 correspondence 
Key Process Area Principal Cleanroom Processes Rating 
Defect Prevention Correctness Verification, High 
Performance Improvement 
Technology Change Performance Improvement Partial 
Management 
Process Change Performance Improvement Partial 
Management 
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As these tables illustrate, Cleanroom and the CMM are compatible and 
mutually supportive. The technology-based practices of Cleanroom provide 
much of the "how" for the "what" defined by the CMM. 
11.3 Integrating CRM Technology 
and CMM Management 
As noted earlier, technology-based solutions to problems of software develop-
ment can often produce results that no amount of good management can 
achieve in their absence. A principle objective of CMM management processes 
is informed decision making based on measurements of software products and 
processes. Quantitative management is particularly important at higher levels of 
the CMM. The technical basis and validity of the measurements is thus very 
important. For example, quality and reliability measurements are vital to effec-
tive and timely management decisions, such as whether to release a software 
product for customer use. Cleanroom testing and certification technologies pro-
vide a scientific basis for such decisions, for which no amount of good manage-
ment based on anecdotal information can substitute. 
As described earlier, Cleanroom statistical usage-based testing is con-
ducted as a fonnal statistical experiment. The infinite population of possible 
executions is sampled by generating test cases randomized against usage distri-
butions, the quality and reliability of the software are measured by executing 
the test cases, and the results are interpreted at a defined level of confidence to 
the entire population of possible executions. In effect, statistical testing pro-
vides a means of estimating system performance for all the usage scenarios in 
the population that could not be executed (which field use will be sampling 
throughout the life of the system). The two Cleanroom processes involved in 
statistical testing and certification are the Usage Modeling and Test Planning 
Process and the Statistical Testing and Certification Process. 
The Usage Modeling and Test Planning Process requires that the system 
usage environment be modeled as a basis for deriving statistical test cases. The 
usage models can represent a variety of conditions, including nominal and 
expected usage, stress situations, and use of infrequently invoked functions 
with high consequences of failure. The Statistical Testing and Certification 
Process requires that testing proceed under experimental control in a formal sta-
tistical design to produce valid statistical measures of software performance 
with respect to certification goals. 
The scientific measurements of quality and reliability produced by these 
processes provide a rigorous basis for informed decision making, and can liter-
ally transform the technical basis of management action. Decision makers 
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can move from nagging uncertainty (which may force additional and perhaps 
unnecessary resource expenditures in testing in an effort to reduce risk) to con-
fidence that software quality and reliability have been measured scientifically 
and that decisions based on these measurements are indeed supported by the 
evidence. Cleanroom technology can provide a useful foundation for the CMM 
management objective of measurement-based decision making. 
11 .4 References 
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Satellite Control System 
Requirements 
12.1 The Satellite Control 
System Case Study 
A case study is presented in Part III for a sufficiently large system to illustrate 
scalability of Cleanroom processes and their associated work products. The 
case study involves development of embedded software for a Satellite Control 
System (SCS), and is based on requirements and specifications included in the 
Object-Orientation/Cleanroom Integration Study by Ett and Trammell (1996). 
The case study includes: 
Black box specification, Chapter 13 
State box specification, Chapter 14 
Clear box design, Chapter 15 
Statistical testing plans and models, Chapter 16 
The case study does not contain examples of all work products from Part II, due 
to space limitations. 
The SCS consists of four components: 
1. The ground control system (GCS) initiates and terminates connec-
tions, and monitors satellite health. 
2. The space vehicle (SV) processes commands from the GCS and sup-
plies half-duplex communications between two other ground sites. 
3. The uplink site (UL) transmits data to the SV when connected. 
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4. The downlink site (DL) receives data from the UL through the half-
duplex connection supplied by the SV. 
The following requirements address only the software component of the 
SV, known as the Satellite Operations Software (SOS), which is used during 
normal operation. Launch, orbital insertion, and deployment are not addressed 
in these requirements. 
12.2 Satellite Operations 
Software Requirements 
The requirements are initially described here in natural language, a form in 
which requirements often first appear. They are subsequently restated in more 
precise terms to support further study and analysis. 
The SOS is initialized by the initialization (IN) command from the GCS. 
On receiving the IN command, the SOS replies with an initialization acknowl-
edgment (INA). The GCS must next command the SOS to enter maintenance 
mode with the maintenance time-slot go (MG) command, and then request the 
SV health with a health request (HR). If a successful health check (HS) is 
reported, the GCS will then send any bandwidth/location (B/L) table update 
requests (BR) and firing requests (FR). 
After successfully completing SV maintenance, the GCS may put the SOS 
into transmit mode by sending UL and DL information in a transmit time-slot 
go (TG) message. The SOS forwards the TG (TGF) to both the ULand DL. The 
two sites complete connection by sending uplink go (UG) and downlink go 
(DG) messages. When both sites have connected, the SOS sends a start data 
transmit (SDT) command to the UL, which then starts sending packets (data 
packet in, or DI). 
The SOS forwards all data packets from the UL (i.e., Dl) to the DL (i.e. , 
data out, or DO). If the DL detects a corrupted packet, it sends a packet bad 
(PB) message with the packet identifier to the SOS. The SOS forwards the 
packet bad message (PBF) to the UL. The ULand DL are responsible for nego-
tiating packet transmit failures. 
When the UL has sent all packets, it sends the transmit-end (TE) message 
to the SOS, which forwards the TE (TEF) to the DL. When the DL site has 
received the TEF and all packets (including any re-sent due to PB messages), it 
sends downlink transmit-end (DTE) to the SOS, which forwards this to the UL 
site as TEF. The connection is then closed, and the SOS informs the GCS of this 
by sending it a TEF. 
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During transmit mode, the GCS may send a time-slot cancel (TC) to the 
SOS to indicate that the transmit window has expired or the GCS operator has 
requested that the SOS exit transmit mode. The SOS immediately forwards the 
time-slot cancel (TCF) to the UL and the DL, and then replies to the GCS with 
TEF and exits transmit mode. 
Protocol errors detected by the SOS should be reported to the GCS using 
an error report (ERR). The SOS should always attempt recovery if possible. If 
the SOS cannot recover, it should exit the mode in which it is currently working 
and send a fatal error (FE) report to the GCS (and the ULand DL if connected). 
Natural language statements such as these must be analyzed and refined by 
systems engineers in consultation with customers to produce a complete set of 
requirements expressed in traceable form. Such a requirements analysis is pro-
vided in Table 12.1 for the SOS, subject to revision as development proceeds. 
Mnemonics are introduced as work progresses, and each requirement is num-
bered for tracing purposes. Many of these requirements were not in the original 
natural language specification, but were derived during analysis. The natural 
language specification could be updated, if desired. 
This statement of requirements is employed in the sequence-based specifi-
cation process used in Chapter 13. A summary of acronyms used is presented in 
Chapter 13. 














The SOS shall accept the IN (initialize) command from the GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the HR (health request) command from the GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the MG (maintenance time-slot go) command 
from the GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the BR (bandwidth/location table update 
request) command from the GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the FR (firing request) command from the GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the TG (transmit time-slot go) command from the 
GCS. 
The SOS shall accept the TC (time-slot cancel) command from the 
GCS. 
On-board system signals 
continued 
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Table 12.1 continued 
Requirement 
No. Requirement 
1 .2.1 The SOS shall accept the OTE (on-board timer expired} signal from 
the on-board countdown timer. 
1.2.2 The SOS shall accept firing report signals from the reaction control 
subsystem (RCS). 
1.2.3 The SOS shall accept ISF (internal/subsystem failure) and ISN 
(internal/subsystem nominal) reports from all internal subsystems. 
1.3 Uplink inputs 
1.3.1 The SOS shall accept inputs from the UL only after a successful TG 
from the GCS. 
1.3.2 The SOS shall accept the UG (uplink go) message from the UL. 
1.3.3 The SOS shall accept the Dl (data packet in) message from the UL. 
1.3.4 The SOS shall accept the TE (transmit end} message from the UL. 
1.3.5 The SOS shall accept the UB (uplink site fail} message from the UL. 
1.4 Downlink inputs 
1.4.1 The SOS shall accept inputs from the DL only after a successful TG 
from the GCS. 
1.4.2 The SOS shall accept the DG (downlink go) message from the DL. 
1.4.3 The SOS shall accept the PB (data packet bad) message from the DL. 
1.4.4 The SOS shall accept the DTE (downlink transmit end) message from 
the DL. 
1.4.5 The SOS shall accept the DB (downlink site fail} message from the DL. 
2 SOS outputs 
2.1 GCS messages 
2.1 .1 The SOS shall output the INA (initialization acknowledgment) 
message. 
2.1.2 The SOS shall output the HF (health check fail} message. 
2.1.3 The SOS shall output the HS (health check success) message. 
2.1.4 The SOS shall output the FF (firing failure) message. 
2.1.5 The SOS shall output the FS (firing success) message. 
2.1 .6 The SOS shall output the TSCAN (time-slot canceled) message. 
2.1.7 The SOS shall output the TEF (transmit end forwarded) message. 
2.1 .8 The SOS shall output the ERR (error report) message. 
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Requirement 
Internal hardware interface 
The SOS shall output the CDI (countdown timer initialize) command. 
The SOS shall output the HT (hardware test) command. 
The SOS shall output the FRF (firing request forwarded) command. 
Uplink messages 
The SOS shall output the TGF (time-slot go forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the SDT (start data transmit) message. 
The SOS shall output the TCF (time-slot cancel forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the TEF (transmit end forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the PBF (packet bad forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the FE (fatal error) message. 
Downlink messages 
The SOS shall output the TGF (time-slot go forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the TCF (time-slot cancel forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the TEF (transmit end forwarded) message. 
The SOS shall output the DO (data out) message. 
The SOS shall output the FE (fatal error) message. 
System initialization 
During system initialization the SOS shall process the IN command 
from the GCS. 
The SOS shall respond to the IN command within TBD seconds. 
System maintenance 
The SOS shall enter maintenance mode when it receives the MG 
command from the GCS. 
The SOS shall require the HR as the first command after entering 
maintenance mode. 
Health request 
The SOS shall process the HR command from the GCS only during 
maintenance mode. 
On receiving the HR command from the GCS, the SOS shall query its 
internal hardware systems (i.e. , HT). 
continued 
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Table 12.1 continued 
Requirement 
No. Requirement 
4.3.3 If the SOS detects a problem during processing of a HR command, or 
if a component does not respond within TBD seconds of the query, the 
SOS shall report an HF to the GCS. 
4.3.4 If the SOS does not detect any problems during processing of an HR 
command, the SOS shall report an HS to the GCS. 
4.4 BL table update 
4.4.1 The SOS shall process the BR command from the GCS only during 
maintenance mode. 
4.4.2 The BA command will specify an index in the SOS B/L table and 
information to overwrite the specified index of the table. 
4.4.3 On receiving a BA command, the SOS shall update its internal B/L 
table with the information specified in the command, overwriting any 
previous information for the specified index. 
4.4.4 B/L table size shall be chosen such that all indices are a fixed number 
of bits and none are illegal (the B/L table size shall be an integer power 












Thruster firing request 
The SOS shall process the FA command from the GCS only during 
maintenance mode. 
The FA command will specify pitch, yaw, and roll information for the 
sos. 
On receiving an FA command, the SOS shall initiate the firing by 
passing an FAF message to the ACS. 
If the ACS reports a successful firing, the SOS shall send an FS report 
to the GCS. 
If the ACS reports a failed firing, the SOS shall send an FF report to 
the GCS. 
If the ACS fails to report firing information to the SOS within TBD 
seconds of the FAF message, then the SOS shall send an FF report 
to the GCS. 
Transmit mode 
The SOS shall only enter transmit mode from maintenance mode. 
The following commands are transmit mode commands and shall only 
be accepted by the SOS during transmit mode: TC, UG, Dl, TE, UB, 
DG, PB, DTE, and DB. 
A site is considered valid only if its information is present in the B/L 
table. 
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Requirement 
No. Requirement 
5.4 The SOS shall enter transmit mode on receiving a TG with valid UL 
and DL sites. 
5.5 On entering transmit mode, the SOS shall send a TGF to both the UL 
and DL. 
5.6 The SOS shall send the TSCAN(1) failure message to the GCS if it 
receives a TG with an invalid ULand a valid DL. 
5.7 The SOS shall send the TSCAN(2) failure message to the GCS if it 
receives a TG with a valid ULand an invalid DL. 
5.8 The SOS shall send the TSCAN(3) failure message to the GCS if it 
receives a TG with an invalid ULand DL. 
5.9 Connecting 
5.9.1 As soon as both the ULand DL are connected, the connection is 
considered fully open and the GCS shall send the SDT command 
to the UL. 
5.9.2 Uplink connection 
5.9.2.1 If the SOS does not receive a UG or UB message from the UL within 
TBD seconds of sending the TGF to the ULand DL, it shall send the 
TSCAN(1) failure message to the GCS and send TCF to both the UL 
and the DL. The SOS shall then exit transmit mode. 
5.9.2.2 If the SOS receives a UB message from the UL within TBD seconds of 
sending the TGF to the ULand the DL, it shall send the TSCAN(1) 
failure message to the GCS and send TCF to both the ULand the DL. 
The SOS shall then exit transmit mode. 
5.9.2.3 If the SOS receives a UG message from the UL within TBD seconds of 
sending the TGF to the ULand the DL, the UL is considered 
connected. 
5.9.3 Downlink connection 
5.9.3.1 If the SOS does not receive a DG or DB message from the DL within 
TBD seconds of sending the TGF to the ULand the DL, it shall send 
the TSCAN(2) failure message to the GCS and send TCF to both the 
ULand the DL. The SOS shall then exit transmit mode. 
5.9.3.2 If the SOS receives a DB message from the DL within TBD seconds of 
sending the TGF to the ULand the DL, it shall send TSCAN(2) failure 
message to the GCS and send the TCF to both the UL and the DL. 
The SOS shall then exit transmit mode. 
5.9.3.3 If the SOS receives a DG message from the DL within TBD seconds of 
sending the TGF to the ULand the DL, the DL shall be considered 
connected. 
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Table 12.1 continued 
Requirement 
No. Requirement 
5.10 Data transmit 
5.1 0.1 If both the ULand the DL are connected , the SOS shall accept Dl 
messages from the UL. 
5.1 0.2 Within TBD seconds of receiving a Dl message from the UL, the SOS 
shall forward the data in a DO message to the DL. 
5.1 0.3 If the SOS receives a PB message from the DL, the SOS shall forward 
the message (i.e. , PBF) to the UL for packet repeat. 
5.11 Disconnecting 
5.11 .1 On exiting transmit mode, the SOS shall send the TEF message to the 
GCS. 
5.11 .2 The SOS shall ignore messages from the ULand the DL if not in 
transmit mode. 
5.11 .3 Transmit end 
5.11 .3.1 On receiving aTE message from the UL, the SOS shall forward the 
message to the DL as a TEF message. 
5.11.3.2 The SOS shall continue to process Dl and PB messages from the UL . 
and the DL after receiving aTE message from the UL. 
5.11 .3.3 On receiving a DTE message from the DL, the SOS shall forward the 
message to the UL as a TEF message. The SOS shall then exit 
transmit mode. 
5.11.4 Transmit cancel 
5.11.4.1 On receiving the TC message from the GCS, the SOS shall send TCF 
messages to the ULand the DL, and immediately exit transmit mode. 
6 Protocol errors 
6.1 If the SOS detects a protocol error due to an unexpected message, it 
shall immediately send an ERR to the GCS. 
6.2 If recovery from a protocol error is not possible, the SOS shall send an 
FE to the GCS and exit any mode in which it is operating. 
6.3 Recovery from a protocol error is declared not possible if the SOS is 
unable to determine how to proceed. 
6.4 The SOS shall attempt recovery from a protocol error by ignoring the 
packet that resulted in the protocol error. 
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Requirement 
No. Requirement 
6.5 If the UL and/or the DL are connected and a protocol error occurs from 
which recovery is not possible, the 808 shall send an FE to the 
connected sites. 
12.3 Reference 
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Black Box Specification 
13.1 Black Box Sequence-Based 
Specification 
The basic work flow for the sequence-based specification process was pre-
sented in Chapter 3 and referenced in the function specification process defined 
in Chapter 8. The instantiation of that work flow used to produce the SOS black 
box specification is summarized in the following steps. 
Step 1: Define the system boundary. 
1. Identify all components of the system to be developed and then iden-
tify all other components in the environment with which the system 
communicates directly. 
2. Identify each interface between a system component and an environ-
ment component, and define the stimuli and responses associated with 
the interface. 
3. Identify any assumptions about each interface. 
Step 2: Enumerate stimulus sequences. 
1. Enumerate sequences in order by length. 
2. Document and trace each sequence (legal and illegal) in the enumera-
tion to the requirements that define its expected response and equiva-
lence (if any). 
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3. If there is no requirement associated with a sequence, document a 
derived requirement subject to confirmation. 
4. Invent and use abstractions as needed to keep the work at a productive 
level. 
5. Stop when every sequence of the longest length is either illegal or 
equivalent to a previous sequence. 
Step 3: Analyze canonical sequences. 
1. Extract all canonical sequences from the enumeration. 
2. Identify and name the system properties and values that will make all 
canonical sequences pairwise distinguishable. 
Step 4: Define specification functions. 
Step 5: Construct the black box tables. 
1. Create one table for each stimulus that contains one row for each 
response in the enumeration. 
2. Enter canonical sequence conditions based on the enumeration and 
canonical sequence analysis. 
With the tagged system requirements from Chapter 12 in hand, develop-
ment of the black box specification can begin. It will be necessary to revise the 
requirements during the specification process; this is natural and desirable. 
Conflicts among requirements and omissions may be identified early in a proj-
ect through development of complete, consistent, and traceably correct black 
box specifications. This emphasis on up-front specification and resolution of 
conflicts and omissions helps to eliminate later requirements changes. The 
black box derivation provides feedback to revise requirements in a controlled 
and documented fashion. 
Two techniques are mentioned earlier in the list of process steps for the 
SCS black box derivation that are used to maintain a productive level of abstrac-
tion in the work flow. First, black box specification functions are mappings 
from the domain of the black box to a co-domain of convenience. The co-
domain is often {true, false} for specification functions that answer a question 
about the sequences. Specification functions may, but need not, map to a subset 
of the black box responses. It is critical that an effective process for actually 
evaluating each specification function be known that could be written if neces-
sary. Some specification functions will be displaced later by state data, others 
will be transformed into state box specification functions, and some might actu-
ally be implemented in code. 
Second, black box abstractions are many-to-one mappings from the do-
main of atomic sequences to a co-domain of convenience. The co-domain often 
consolidates atomic stimuli or represents specific strings to reduce the number 
of items active in an enumeration. 
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The case study is large and necessarily table and acronym intensive. The 
following acronyms are used in the tables and code throughout the remaining 
chapters in Part III. 
ASN all subsystems nominal 
BIL bandwidth/location 
BR BIL table update request 
BRA BIL table update request acknowledge 
CDI countdown timer initialize 
DB downlink bad 
DG downlink go 
DI data packet in 
DL downlink site 
DO data packet out 
DTE downlink transmit end 
ERR error report 
FE fatal error 
FF firing failure 
FFR firing failure report 
FR firing request 
FRF firing request forwarded 
FS firing success 
FSR firing success report 
GCS ground control system 
HF health check fail 
HR health request 
HS health check success 
HT hardware test 
IH interrupt handler 
IN initialization 
INA initialization acknowledgment 
ISF internal subsystem failure 
ISN internal subsystem nominal 
MG maintenance time-slot go 
OTE on-board timer expired 
PB packet bad 
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PBF packet bad forwarded 
RCS reaction control subsystem 
SDT start data transfer 
SF subsystem failure 
sos satellite operations software 
TC time-slot cancel 
TCF time-slot cancel forwarded 
TE transmit end 
TEF transmit end forwarded 
TG transmit time-slot go 
TGF time-slot go forwarded 
TSCAN time-slot canceled 
UB uplink bad 
UG uplink go 
UL uplink site 
13.2 Step 1 : Define the 
System Boundary 
The system consists of only the SOS. The environment consists of the GCS, the 
hardware controllers (which contain the RCS), the UL, and the DL. 
The stimuli and responses for each of the interfaces are listed in Tables 13.1 
through 13.8. The mnemonics for stimulus and response names in the SOS 
requirements defined in Table 12.1 are used here with the exception of 
responses FE, TEF, and TCF, which may have multiple destinations. It is neces-
sary to distinguish among the different possible destinations of these responses, 
so an additional letter (u for UL, d for DL, and g for GCS) will be appended 
to these responses. On-board signals FSR (firing successful report) and FFR 
(firing failure report) are introduced to allow on-board communication to be 
specified in more detail than given in the requirements. 
Even this rudimentary requirements analysis identifies potential problems. 
In this case, requirements 5.11.2 and 5.2 are found to be redundant. This is a 
problem because if one is changed and not the other, the requirements may be 
contradictory. To resolve this problem, requirement 5.11.2 is dropped (the 
requirements are not renumbered). 
Requirements concerning exiting transmit mode (e.g., 5.11.1 and 6.2) are 
in conflict. The following modification is introduced to resolve this: 5.11.1, On 
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exiting transmit mode, the SOS shall send the TEF message to the GCS unless 
there is another message (FE, TSCAN, or INA) pending for the GCS, which 
indicates exit of transmit mode. 




















Health request command 
Maintenance time-slot go command 
8/L table update request command 
Two parameters: 
i. Table index (0- 8191) 
ii . Site information 
Firing request command 
Three parameters : 
i. Pitch 
ii. Yaw 
ii i. Roll 
Transmit time-slot go command 
Two parameters: 
i. Uplink site identifier 
ii. Downlink site identifier 
Transmit time-slot cancel command 
SOS stimuli from on-board subsystems 
Description 
On-board timer expired (from 
on-board timer) 
Firing successful report (from RCS) 
Firing failure report (from RCS) 
Internal subsystem nominal 
(from any subsystem) 
One parameter: 
i. Subsystem identifier 
Internal subsystem failure 
(from any subsystem) 
One parameter: 
i. Subsystem identifier 
Requirements 
1.1.1 ' 3.1 ' 3.2 
1.1.2, 4.2, 4.3.1 ' 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 
4.3.4 
1.1 .3, 4.1 
1.1.4, 
4.4.1 ' 4.4.2 , 4.4.3, 4.4.4 
1.1 .5, 
4.5.1' 4.5.2, 4.5.3 
1.1.6, 
5 .1' 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 
1.1 .7, 5.11.1, 5.11.4.1, 5.2 
Associated 
Requirements 
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Uplink go message 
Data packet in message 
Two parameters: 
i. Packet identifier 
ii. Packet payload 
Transmit end message 
Uplink bad message 
Table 13.4 SOS stimuli from DL 
Requirements 
1.3.1' 1.3.2, 
5.2, 5.9.2.1' 5.9.2.3, 5.1 0.1 ' 
6.5 
1.3.1' 1.3.3, 
5.2, 5.1 0.1' 5.1 0.2, 5.11.3.2 
1.3.1' 1.3.4, 5.2, 5.11.3.1' 
5.11.3.2 
1.3.1' 1.3.5, 








Downlink go message 
Packet bad message 
One parameter: 
i. Packet identifier 
Downlink transmit end message 
Downlink bad message 
Requirements 
1.4 .1 ' 1.4.2, 
5.1.1 ' 5.2, 5.9.3.1' 5.9.3.3, 
6.5 
1 .4.1' 1.4.3, 




5.2, 5.9.3.1 ' 5.9.3.2 
Requirements 6.3 and 6.4 do not appear in the table because they are cur-
rently too ill-defined to map unambiguously to stimuli or responses. They will 
be properly defined during the process of sequence enumeration. 
The following assumption is made. In the SOS system, the BIL table is 
maintained by an external subsystem, but the subsystem's responses are com-
pletely predictable from the point of view of the system (the system's stimulus 
sequence completely determines the behavior of the BIL table subsystem). The 
subsystem is very simple and highly reliable, so it will be treated as part of the 
system. Treating this component as internal to the system eliminates the inter-
face and consequently reduces the complexity of the specification. 
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Table 13.5 SOS responses to the GCS 
Stimulus Associated 
Name Description Requirements 
INA Initialization acknowledgment message 2.1.1, 3.2 
HF Health check fail message 2.1 .2, 4.3.3 
HS Health check success message 2.1.3, 4.3.4 
FF Firing failure message 2.1.4, 4.5.5 , 4.5.6 
FS Firing success message 2.1.5, 4.5.4 
TSCAN Time-slot canceled message 2.1.6, 
One parameter: 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 
i. Reason 5.9 .2.1' 5.9.2.2, 
(1 = invalid UL) 5.9.3.1' 5.9.3.2 
(2 = invalid DL) 
(3 = invalid ULand DL) 
TEFg Transmit-end forwarded message to GCS 2.1.7,5.11.1 
ERR Error report message 2.1 .8, 6.1 
FEg Fatal error message 2.1.9, 6.2 
Table 13.6 Responses to on-board subsystems 
Stimulus Associated 
Name Description Requirements 
CD\ Countdown timer initialize command 2.2.1 
(to on-board timer) 
One parameter: 
i. Duration 
HT Hardware test command (to all 2.2.2, 4.3.2 
subsystems) 
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Table 13.7 Responses to the UL 
Stimulus Associated 
Name Description Requirements 
TGFu Time-slot go forwarded command 2.3.1' 5.5, 5.9.2.1' 5.9.2.2, 
to uplink 5.9.2.3, 5.9.3.1 ' 5.9.3.2, 
5.9.3.3 
SOT Start data transmit command 2.3.2, 5.9.1 
TCFu Time-slot cancel forwarded 2.3.3, 5.9.2.1' 5.9.2.2, 
command to uplink 5.9.3.1' 5.9.3.2, 5.11 .4.1 
TEFu Transmit end forwarded command 2.3.4, 5.11.3.3, 5.11.1 
to uplink 
PBF Packet bad forwarded command 2.3.5, 5.1 0.3 
One parameter: 
i. Packet identifier 
FEu Fatal error message 2.3.6, 6.5 
Table 13.8 Responses to the DL 
Stimulus Associated 
Name Description Requirements 
TGFd Time-slot go forwarded command 2.4.1' 5.5, 5.9.2.1 ' 5.9.2 .2, 
to downlink 5.9 .2.3, 5.9.3.1 ' 5.9 .3.2, 
5.9.3.3 
TCFd Time-slot cancel forwarded 2.4.2, 5.9.2.1 ' 5.9.2.2, 
command to downlink 5.9.3.1 ' 5.9.3.2, 5.11.4.1 
TEFd Transmit end forwarded command 2.4.3, 5.11.3.1 
to downlink 
DO Data packet out command 2.4.4, 5.1 0.2 
Two parameters: 
i. Packet identifier 
ii . Packet payload 
FEd Fatal error message 2.4.5, 6.5 
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13.3 Step 2: Enumerate 
Stimulus Sequences 
The organization of the SV functionality into subsystems is likely to change 
because future versions of the SV are likely to have additional subsystems. The 
specification can be made independent of the final decision about the subsystem 
list by using abstract stimuli. Specifically, two abstract stimuli are required: 
1. All subsystems nominal (ASN). This abstract stimulus corresponds to 
one ISN from every subsystem (and no ISFs from any subsystem) fol-
lowing the most recent HR that led to an HT not followed by an OTE. 
2. Subsystem failure (SF). This stimulus corresponds to either an ISN or 
an ISF from every subsystem (with at least one ISF following the most 
recent HR that led to an HT) or an OTE with at least one subsystem not 
responding following the most recent HR that led to an HT. 
The first part of the sequence enumeration is provided in Table 13.9. 
Derived requirements are assigned numbers and explained in the Derived 
Requirements and Notes column. 
During the enumeration of Table 13.9, a potential problem is discovered. 
All BR stimuli must be kept in the enumeration so that the UL and the DL can 
be validated for a TG (in accordance with requirement 5.3). However, keeping 
these stimuli in the enumeration will make it very long. There are really only 
four cases for a TG: 
1. Neither the UL nor the DL is valid. 
2. The UL is valid but the DL is not. 
3. The DL is valid but the UL is not. 
4. Both the ULand the DL are valid. 
If abstract stimuli could be introduced to capture these four cases, the enu-
meration could be shortened substantially. For the purpose of illustration, these 
abstract stimuli are defined formally, hiding any unknowns in as-yet undefined 
specification functions. Given a sequence, it is possible to determine if a partic-
ular site has been added (and not overwritten) with a BR stimulus. 
All specification functions will be given in prefix recursive form; that is, 
they will be written as recursive functions computed on prefixes of sequences. 
This is a very natural way to write functions over sequences, and has valuable 
theoretical properties. In the following function definitions, h will always be a 
stimulus sequence. The variable p denotes the prefix of h, up to but not includ-
ing the last stimulus. The variable s denotes the last (most recent) stimulus. 
Thus h = ps. The tables can be read as follows: Given that prefix conditions 
Table 13.9 Initial enumeration 
1\) 
w 
0 Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN INA 3.1 , 3.2, 3.3 3.3 
The SOS shall respond to the IN 
command with the INA message. 
illegal 3.4 3.4 
Power-on is observed by the SOS 
as an IN message. 
Note: All other length-one 
sequences are illegal because 
power must be on before the SOS 
can observe messages. 
IN IN INA IN 3.1 , 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 
3.5 IN messages subsequent to the 
first shall cause the SOS to exit 
immediately any mode it might be 
in without issuing any messages 
other than an INA. 
IN HR ERR IN 3.6, 4.3.1, 6.1, 3.6 
6.4 Initially the SOS shall not be con-
side red to be in any mode. 
INMG null 4.1, 4.1.1 4.1.1 
The system shall issue no 
response for an MG. 
IN BR ERR IN 4.4.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN FR ERR IN 4.5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN TG EAR IN 
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Table 13.10 Specification function B/L(h, n) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions Value Trace 
h = empty empty 4.4.5 
The B/L table is initially empty. 
BR(n, s) Mode(p) = maintenance s 4.4.2, 4.4.3 
s otherwise (h = ps) 8/L(p, n) Method 
hold, then for stimulus the function evaluates to value. Table 13.10 presents a 
specification function to determine the site information at a particular index in 
the B!L table. 
Note that the function of Table 13.10 references another specification func-
tion, "Mode," which has not been defined. This is because there is not yet 
enough information to determine precisely the current mode of the SOS. 
Now the abstract stimuli can be defined: 
1. TG will denote both the UL and the DL invalid. Let TG denote TG(u, 
d) when there are no indices m and n in the table such that BIL(h, m) = 
u and B/L(h, n) = d for current stimulus sequence h. 
2. TGu will denote a valid UL and an invalid DL. Let TGu denote TG(u, 
d) when there exists index m such that B!L(h, m) = u and there is no 
index n such that B!L(h, n) = d for current stimulus sequence h. 
3. TGd will denote an invalid UL and a valid DL. Let TGd denote TG(u, 
d) when there exists index m such that B!L(h, m) = d and there is no 
index n such that B!L(h, n) = u for current stimulus sequence h. 
4. TGud will denote both the UL and the DL valid. Let TGud denote 
TG(u, d) when there exists indices m and n in the table such that B!L(h, 
m) = u and BIL(h, n) = d for current stimulus sequence h. 
Using these four abstract stimuli, there is no longer a need to keep the BR stim-
uli in the abstract enumeration. Note that none of the omitted atomic stimuli are 
used in Table 13.9, so there is no need to restart enumeration. 
The enumeration proceeds in Table 13.11 , completing the extensions of IN. 
A new derived requirement (1.2.4) is required to deal with unexpected signals 
from the internal subsystems. 
Only one sequence of Table 13.9 must be extended. Sequence IN MG is 
canonical and is extended in Table 13.12. The sequence IN MG OTE presents 
a problem. When the SOS has received MG, it expects to receive an HR. 
However, it instead receives OTE. Although this is an on-board signal and 
not (strictly speaking) a protocol error, it does illustrate the problem. It is better 
in this case to ignore the signal, in keeping with requirement 1.2.4, than to 
1\) Table 13.11 Remaining extensions of IN (continued from Table 13.9) w 
1\) 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
INTGu ERR IN 5.1' 6.1' 6.4 
INTGd ERR IN 5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
INTGud ERR IN 5.1' 6.1' 6.4 
INTC ERR IN 5.2, 6.1' 6.4 
!NOTE null IN 1.2.4 1.2.4 
The SOS shall ignore any unex-
peeled interrupts or signals from 
internal subsystems. 
IN FSR null IN 1.2.4 
IN FFR null IN 1.2.4 
INASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because no HR has occurred. The 
situation is impossible. 
IN SF illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because no HR has occurred. The 
situation is impossible. 
IN UG null IN 5.2 Policy: Ignoring a command is 
preferable to generating a protocol 
error. 








c: Cll Ul 












































N Table 13.12 Extensions of IN MG (.,) .... 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
INMGIN INA IN 3.5 
INMG HR CDI, HT 4.3.2, 4.3.3 
INMGMG ERR INMG 4.2, 4.2.1' 6.1' 4.2.1 
6.4 MG commands issued in 
maintenance mode shall be 
treated as protocol errors. 
IN MG BR ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG FR ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MGTG ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MGTGu ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MGTGd ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MGTGud ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MGTC ERR INMG 4.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG OTE null INMG 1.2.4 
IN MG FSR null INMG 1.2.4 
IN MG FFR null INMG 1.2.4 
IN MGASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because no HR has occurred. The 









IN MG UB 
INMG DG 
IN MG PB 












Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because no HR has occurred. The 
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generate a protocol error, in keeping with requirement 6.1. This is a policy deci-
sion and it is documented in the enumeration. 
Again, only one sequence of Table 13.12 must be extended. IN MG HR is 
extended in Table 13.13. A number of new cases of behavior are encountered in 
Table 13.13; specifically, the interruption of commands (such as FR), which 
require time to execute. Derived requirements and a new policy are documented 
to resolve this. 
Only IN MG HR ASN of Table 13.13 is canonical. It is extended in Table 
13.14. On reaching the sequence IN MG HR ASN BR, a question arises: How 
will the GCS know if the BR was received and processed by the SOS? This is 
resolved by adding the new response BRA. 
The enumeration continues with extensions of IN MG HR ASN FR in 
Table 13.15, and extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud in Table 13.16. 
Significant new behavior is discovered in Table 13.16, including information 
about when the mode of the SOS changes and when it does not. Without this 
information, attempts to define precisely many of the abstractions presented 
earlier could not proceed. There are two canonical sequences to be extended: IN 
MG HR ASN TGud UG and IN MG HR ASN TGud DG. These are shown in 
Tables 13.17 and 13.18 respectively. 
More missing but important requirements are discovered when IN MG 
HR ASN TGud UG DG is extended in Table 13.19. What happens if UB or 
DB is sent on a fully open connection? These situations are handled with 
derived requirements, and the single canonical sequence IN MG HR ASN 
TGud UG DG TE is extended in Table 13.20, completing the enumeration. The 
complete enumeration denotes a complete, consistent, and traceably correct 
specification of system behavior at the given level of abstraction. 
Table 13.13 Extensions of IN MG HR 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
INMGHR IN INA IN 3.5 
INMGHRHR ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5, 4.3.5 
6.1, 6.4 If the 808 receives a command 
(other than IN) from the GC8 dur-
ing processing of a previous com-
mand, a protocol error shall be 
generated and processing of the 
previous command shall continue. 
Policy: Avoid interrupting com-
mands that require processing 
(such as thruster firings). 
INMG HRMG ERR IN MG HR 4 .3.5, 4.3.6, 4.3.6 
6.1 , 6.4 MG commands issued during 
maintenance mode that otherwise 
would be ignored shall generate a 
protocol error if they interrupt a 
command. 
IN MG HR BR ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5 , 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HR FR ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5, 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HRTG ERR INMGHR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 




N Table 13.13 continued w 
00 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HRTGd ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HRTGud ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HRTC ERR IN MG HR 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HROTE HF IN MG HRASN 4.3.3, 4.3.7 4.3.7 
The outcome of an HT shall be re-
ported by the SOS but shall not at-
feet subsequent SOS functionality. 
IN MG HR FSR null IN MG HR 1.2.4 
IN MG HR FFR null IN MG HR 1.2.4 
IN MG HRASN HS 4.3.4 
IN MG HR SF HF IN MG HRASN 4.3.3, 4.3.7 
IN MG HR UG null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HR Dl null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HRTE null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HR UB null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MGHRDG null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HR PB null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HR DTE null IN MG HR 5.2 
IN MG HR DB null IN MG HR 5.2 
Table 13.14 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN IN INA IN 3.5 
IN MG HR ASN HR COl, HT IN MG HR 4.3.2, 4.3.3 
IN MG HR ASN MG ERR IN MG HRASN 4.2.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN BR BRA IN MG HRASN 4.4.6 4.4.6 
The SOS shall respond to the BR 
with an acknowledgment message 
(i.e., BRA). 
IN MG HR ASN FR COl, FRF 4.5.3, 4.5.6 
IN MG HR ASN TG TSCAN(3) IN MG HRASN 5.8, 5.6.1 5.6.1 
The SOS shall not enter transmit 
mode on receipt of a TG with an 
invalid UL or OL. 
IN MG HR ASN TGu TSCAN(2) IN MG HRASN 5.7, 5.6.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGd TSCAN(1) IN MG HRASN 5.6, 5.6.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGud COl, TGFu, TGFd 5.4, 5.5, 5.9.2.1' 
5.9.2.2 , 5.9.3.1' 
5.9.3.2 
IN MG HR ASN TC ERR IN MG HRASN 5.2, 6.1' 6.4 





N Table 13.14 continued .,.. 
0 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN FSR null IN MG HRASN 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN FFR null IN MG HRASN 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN ASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN SF illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported . The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN UG null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN Dl null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN TE null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN UB null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN DG null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN PB null IN MG HR ASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN DTE null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN DB null IN MG HRASN 5.2 
Table 13.15 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN FR 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN FR IN INA IN 3.5 
IN MG HR ASN FR HR ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR MG ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR BR ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR FR ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR TG ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR TGu ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR TGd ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR TGud ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR TC ERR IN MG HR ASN FR 4.3.5, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR OTE FF IN MG HRASN 4.5.6 
IN MG HR ASN FR FSR FS IN MG HRASN 4.5.4 
IN MG HR ASN FR FFR FF IN MG HRASN 4.5.5 
IN MG HR ASN FR ASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
1\) continued .... ..... 
1\) Table 13.15 continued 
""" 1\) 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN FR SF illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN FR UG null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR Dl null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR TE null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR UB null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR DG null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR PB null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR DTE null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
IN MG HR ASN FR DB null IN MG HR ASN FR 5.2 
N 
"" w 
Table 13.16 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud 
Sequence Response 
IN MG HR ASNTGud IN INA 
IN MG HR ASN TGud HR ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud MG ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud BR ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud FR ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TG ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TGu ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TGd ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TGud ERR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TC TCFu, TCFd, TEFg 
IN MG HR ASN TGud OTE TSCAN(3), TCFu, TCFd 
Equivalence Trace 
IN 3.5 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.3.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG Ht:l ASN TGud 4.1.2 , 6 .1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.4.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 4 .5.1, 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1, 6 .1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1' 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1 ' 6.1 , 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1' 6.1, 6.4 
IN 5.11 .1, 5.11.4.1 
IN 5.9.1.1 
Derived Requirements and Notes 
4.1.2 
The SOS shall not enter mainte-
nance mode from transmit mode. 
5.9.1 .1 
If the UL fails to respond with UB 
or UG within TBD seconds of 
sending TGFu, and the DL also 
fails to respond with DB or DG 
within TBD seconds of sending 
TGFd, the SOS shall send the 
TSCAN(3) failure message to the 
GCS and send TCF to both the UL 
and the DL. The SOS shall then 
exit transmit mode. 
continued 
N Table 13.16 continued 
""' ""' 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud FSR null IN MG HR ASN TGud 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud FFR null IN MG HR ASN TGud 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud ASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud SF illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported in. The situation 
is impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG null 5.9.2.3 
IN MG HR ASN TGud Dl ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.10.1.1 ' 5.10.1.1 
6.1 , 6.4 If either the UL or the DL is not 
connected, Dl and PB messages 
will result in a protocol error. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud TE FEg IN 5.11 .3.4, 6.2 5.11.3.4 
Unexpected TE and DTE mes-
sages shall be declared unrecov-
erable protocol errors. 




IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud PB 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DTE 





TSCAN(2), TCFu, TCFd 
Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
5.9.3.3 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.10.1 .1' 
6.1' 6.4 
IN 5.11.3.4, 6.2 
IN 5.9.3.2 
1\) Table 13.17 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 
""" en 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG IN INA IN 3.5 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG HR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.3.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG MG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.1.2, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG BR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.4.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG FR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TGu ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 , 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TGd ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 , 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TGud ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TC TCFu, TCFd, TEFg IN 5.11 .1 , 5.11 .4.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG OTE TSCAN(2), TCFu, TCFd IN 5.9.3.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG FSR null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG FFR null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG ASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG SF illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG UG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.9.2.4 5.9.2.4 
Any UG subsequent to an initial 
UG shall be ignored. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG Dl ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.10.1 .1, 
6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG TE FEg,FEu IN 5.11 .3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG UB TSCAN(1 ), TCFu, TCFd IN 5.9.2.2 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG SOT 5.9.1' 5.9.2.3, 
5.9.3.3 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG PB ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 0.1 .1' 
6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DTE FEg, FEu IN 5.11.3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DB TSCAN(2), TCFu, TCFd IN 5.9.3.2 
1\) 
:!j 
1\) Table 13.18 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 
~ 
():) 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG IN INA IN 3.5 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG HR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 4.3.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG MG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 4.1.2, 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG BR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 4.4.1 ' 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG FR ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 4.5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.1 , 6.1 , 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TGu ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TGd ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.1 ' 6.1 ' 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TGud ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TC TCFu, TCFd, TEFg IN 5.11 .1' 5.11 .4.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG OTE TSCAN(1), TCFu, TCFd IN 5.9.3.1 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG FSR null IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG FFR null IN MG HR ASNTGud DG 1.2.4 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG ASN illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 





IN MG HR ASN TGud DG SF 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG UG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG Dl 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG TE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG UB 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG PB 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG DTE 










TSCAN(2) , TCFu, TCFd 
Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.9.1 , 5.9.2.3, 
UG DG 5.9.3.3 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.10.1.1 , 
6.1 , 6.4 
IN 5.11.3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
IN 5.9.2.2 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.9.3.4 5.9.3.4 
Any DG subsequent to an initial 
DG shall be ignored. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 5.10.1.1, 
6.1, 6.4 
IN 5.11.3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
IN 5.9.3.2 
1\) Table 13.19 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG U1 
0 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG INA IN 3.5 
IN 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.3.1' 6.1' 6.4 
HR UG DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.1.2, 6.1' 6.4 
MG UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.4.1' 6.1' 6.4 
BR UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 4.5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
FR UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
TG UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1' 6.1 ' 6.4 
TGu UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1' 6.1 ' 6.4 
TGd UGDG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.1' 6.1 ' 6.4 
DGTGud UG DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TC TCFu, TCFd, TEFg IN 5.11 .1' 5.11.4.1 





IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
FSR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
FFR 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
ASN 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
SF 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
UG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG 
01 










Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 1.2.4 
UG DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 1.2.4 
UGDG 
Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud 5.9.2.4 
UGDG 




~ Table 13.19 continued 
1\) 
Sequence Response Equivalence 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG UB TSCAN(1) , TCFu, TCFd IN 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 
DG 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG PB PBF IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 
DG 
-
IN MG HR ASNTGud UG FEg,FEu,FEd IN 
DG DTE 





5.11 .3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
5.9.3.5 
Derived Requirements and Notes 
5.9.2.5 
If the UL reports UB during trans-
mit mode on a fully open connec-
tion, the SOS shall send TCF 
messages to the ULand the DL, 
shall send TSCAN(1) to the GCS, 
and shall exit transmit mode. 
5.9.3.5 
If the DL reports DB during trans-
mit mode on a fully open connec-
tion , the SOS shall send TCF 
messages to the ULand the DL, 
shall send TSCAN(2) to the GCS, 
and shall exit transmit mode. 
Table 13.20 Extensions of IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TE 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG INA IN 3.5 
TEIN 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.3.1' 6 .1 ' 6.4 
TEHR DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.1.2, 6.1 ' 6.4 
TEMG DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.4.1' 6.1' 6.4 
TEBR DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 4.5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
TEFR DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1' 6.1 ' 6.4 
TETG DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1' 6.1' 6.4 
TETGu DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 ' 6.1 ' 6.4 
TETGd DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG ERR IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 ' 6.1' 6.4 
TETGud DGTE 





1\) Table 13.20 continued (11 .... 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 1.2.4 
TEOTE DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 1.2.4 
TE FSR DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 1.2.4 
TEFFR DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG illegal Definition of ASN Note: The definition of the abstract 
TEASN stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported. The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG illegal Definition of SF Note: The definition of the abstract 
TESF stimulus cannot be satisfied 
because all subsystems have 
already reported . The situation is 
impossible. 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.9.2.4 
TEUG DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG DO IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 0.2, 5.11.3.2 
TEDI DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TEFd IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.11.3.1 
TETE DGTE 
Sequence Response Equivalence Trace Derived Requirements and Notes 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TSCAN(1), TCFu, TCFd IN 5.9.2.5 
TEUB 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG null IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.9.3.4 
TEDG DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG PBF IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 5.1 0.3, 5.11.3.2 
TEPB DGTE 
IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TEFu, TEFg IN 5.11 .1' 5.11 .3.3 
TEDTE 




256 Satellite Control System Black Box Specification 
13.4 Step 3: Analyze 
Canonical Sequences 
Canonical sequence analysis is an iterative process for identifying and naming 
important system properties. During analysis of the SOS enumeration's canoni-
cal sequences, the following properties are chosen. Other choices are possible. 
The choice made will depend on domain architectures and how designers view 
the importance of various aspects of the system. 
1. Has the system been initialized for the first time? Call this "Initialized" 
and assign values of true (the system has been initialized) and false 
(the system has not been initialized). 
2. In what mode is the system currently operating? Call this "Mode" and 
assign it values of transmit, maintenance, and none. 
3. Has the initial health check required on entry to maintenance mode 
been performed? Call this "HealthCheck" and assign it values of done 
Table 13.21 Sequence analysis 
Health 
Sequence Initialized Mode Processing Check Connected 
Empty false 
IN true none 
INMG true maintenance idle pending 
IN MG HR true maintenance health pending 
IN MG HRASN true maintenance idle done 
IN MG HRASN true maintenance firing done 
FR 
IN MG HRASN true transmit none 
TGud 
IN MG HRASN true transmit uplink 
TGud UG 
IN MG HRASN true transmit downlink 
TGud DG 
IN MG HRASN true transmit full 
TGud UG DG 
IN MG HRASN true transmit half 
TGud UG DGTE 
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(the health check has been performed) and pending (a health check is 
in progress or has not been performed). 
4. Is the system currently processing a GCS command (i.e., waiting for 
internal signals before replying to the GCS)? Call this "Processing" 
and assign it values of idle (not processing), firing (waiting for a reply 
from the RCS), and health (waiting for replies to an HT from internal 
subsystems). 
5. Is the system partially or completely connected? Call this "Con-
nected" and assign it values of none (no connection), uplink (the 
uplink is connected but not the downlink), downlink (the downlink is 
connected but not the uplink), full (both uplink and downlink are con-
nected), and half (the connection is half-closed because the uplink has 
sent TE). 
The complete analysis is provided in Table 13.21. 
13.5 Step 4: Define 
Specification Functions 
Additional specification functions identified during canonical sequence analy-
sis are defined in this step. All information necessary for this step is provided by 
the canonical sequence analysis and the sequence enumeration. The resulting 
specification functions are given in Tables 13.22 through 13.26. 
Table 13.22 Specification function: lnitialized(h) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions Value 
h= empty false 
IN any true 
s otherwise (h = ps) lnitialized(p) 
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Mode(p) = none 
Any 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) =transmit 
(Connected(p) = none or 
Connected(p) = downlink or 
Connected(p) = uplink) 
lnitialized(p} =true 
Mode(p} = transmit 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) =transmit 
(Connected(p) =none or 
Connected(p) = downlink or 
Connected(p) = uplink) 
otherwise (h = ps) 
Table 13.24 Specification function: Processing(h) 
Stimulus 
HR 
IN , OTE, ASN, SF 
FR 





Mode(p} = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
lnitialized(p} =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = health 
HealthCheck(p) = pending 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =firing 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
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Processing(p) = health 
HealthCheck(p) = pending 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p} = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
Any 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = none or 
Connected(p) = uplink or 
Connected(p) = downlink) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
otherwise (h = ps) 
Table 13.26 Specification function: Connected(h) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions 
h= empty 
UG lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = none 
DG lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = none 
IN, TC, UB, DTE, DB lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = uplink or 
Connected(p) = downlink or 
Connected(p) = full or 
Connected(p) = half) 
OTE, TE lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = uplink or 
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Connected(p) = uplink 
lnitialized(p) =true 





otherwise (h = ps) 
13.6 Step 5: Construct 






All information necessary to construct the black box tables is provided by the 
canonical sequence analysis and the sequence enumeration. The resulting tables 
make reference to the specification function tables generated in the previous 
step. 
First, a black box table is defined for each abstract stimulus. Second, the 
table rows are defined directly from the enumeration and canonical sequence 
analysis as a mechanical process; no other information is necessary. The result-
ing tables are included here as Tables 13.27 through 13.49. These tables define 
the intended software response for each of the stimuli. As with the specification 
function tables, p denotes the prefix up to but not including the current stimulus 
(which is fixed for a given table) . 
Note that every property has been replaced with a reference to the corre-
sponding specification function . The black box tables are now complete. 
13.6 Step 5: Construct the Black Box Tables 261 
Table 13.27 Current stimulus: IN 
Prefix Conditions 
any 




(Mode(p) =f. maintenance or 
Processing(p) =f. idle) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
Table 13.29 Current stimulus: MG 
Prefix Conditions 
lnitialized(p) =false 
lnitial ized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = none 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) =f. none 




(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) =f. idle or 
HealthCheck(p) =f. done) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) =maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 

















3.1 , 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 
Trace 
3.4 
3.6, 4.3.1, 4.3 .5, 6 .1, 
6.4 
4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.1 
Trace 
3.4 
4.1, 4.1 .1 
4 .1 .2, 4.2, 4.2.1 , 4.3.5, 
4.3.6, 6.1, 6.4 
Trace 
3.4 
4.4.1, 6.1 , 6.4 
4.2, 4.3.5, 6.1 , 6.4 
4.4.6 
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(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) * idle or 
HealthCheck(p) * done) 
lnitialized(p) = true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 




(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) * idle or 
HealthCheck(p) *done) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =idle 













4.5.1, 6.1 , 6.4 




5.1, 6.1 , 6.4 
4.2, 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.4 
5.8, 5.6.1 
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Table 13.33 Current stimulus: TGu 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 5.1 ' 6.1 ' 6.4 
(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 4.2, 4.3.5 , 6.1' 6.4 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) * idle or 
HealthCheck(p) *done) 
lnitialized(p) =true TSCAN(2) 5.7, 5.6.1 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
Table 13.34 Current Stimulus: TGd 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 5.1, 6.1, 6.4 
(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 4.2, 4.3.5, 6.1 ' 6.4 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) * idle or 
HealthCheck(p) *done) 
lnitialized(p) =true TSCAN(1) 5.6, 5.6.1 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
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(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) =transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
(Processing(p) * idle or 
HealthCheck(p) * done) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 




Mode(p) * transmit 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 




Mode(p) = none 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =idle 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = health 
HealthCheck(p) = pending 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =firing 









5.1 , 6.1, 6.4 
4.2, 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.4 
5.4, 5.5, 5.9.2 .1, 5.9.2 .2, 
5.9 .3.1, 5.9.3.2 
Response Trace 
illegal 3.4 
ERR 4.2, 4.3.5, 5.2, 6.1, 6.4 





null 1.2.4, 4.2, 6.1, 6.4 
HF 4.3.3, 4.3.7 
FF 4.5.6 
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Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) = true TSCAN(3), 5.9.1.1 
Mode(p) =transmit TCFu, TCFd 
Connected(p) = none 
lnitialized(p) = true TSCAN(2), 5.9.3.1 
Mode(p) = transmit TCFu, TCFd 
Connected(p) = uplink 
lnitialized(p) = true TSCAN(1) , 5.9.3.1 
Mode(p) = transmit TCFu, TCFd 
Connected(p) = downlink 
lnitialized(p) = true null 1.2.4 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) =full orConnected(p) = half) 
Table 13.38 Current stimulus: FSR 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) = false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p) =true null 1.2.4 
(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) =transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true null 1.2.4 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) * firing 
lnitialized(p) = true FS 4.5.4 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =firing 
Table 13.39 Current stimulus: FFR 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) = false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p) =true null 1.2.4 
(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) = true null 1.2.4 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) * firing 
lnitialized(p) =true FF 4.5 .5 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = firing 
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(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) * health 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =health 
Table 13.41 Current stimulus: SF 
Prefix Conditions 
lnitialized(p) = false 
lnitialized(p) =true 
(Mode(p) = none or Mode(p) = transmit) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) * health 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) =health 













Prefix Conditions Response 
lnitialized(p) = false illegal 
lnitialized(p)= true null 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true null 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) * downlink 
lnitialized(p) =true SDT 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = downlink 
Trace 
3.4 
Definition of ASN 




Definition of SF 






5.9.1 , 5.9.2.3, 5.9.3.3 
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Table 13.43 Current stimulus: Dl 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p)= true null 5.2 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 5.10.1.1 , 6.1, 6.4 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) * full and Connected(p) * half) 
lnitialized(p) =true DO 5.10.1, 5.10.2 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = full or Connected(p) = half) 
Table 13.44 Current stimulus: TE 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p)= true null 5.2 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true FEg 5.11 .3.4, 6.2 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = none 
lnitialized(p) =true FEg, FEu 5.11 .3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) =uplink 
lnitialized(p) =true FEg, FEd 5.11.3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = downlink 
lnitialized(p) =true TEFd 5.11.3.1 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) =full orConnected(p) =half) 
Table 13.45 Current stimulus: UB 
Prefix Conditions Response Trace 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 3.4 
lnitialized(p)= true null 5.2 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true TSCAN(1), 5.9.2.2, 5.9.2.5 
Mode(p) = transmit TCFu, TCFd 
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Table 13.46 Current stimulus: DG 
Prefix Conditions Response 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 
lnitialized(p)= true null 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true null 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) * uplink 
lnitialized(p) =true SDT 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = uplink 
Table 13.47 Current stimulus: PB 
Prefix Conditions Response 
lnitialized(p) =false illegal 
lnitialized(p)= true null 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true ERR 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) * full 
Connected(p) * half 
lnitialized(p) =true PBF 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) =full orConnected(p) =half) 




(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = none 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = uplink 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
















5.10.1 .1, 6.1, 6.4 





5.11 .3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
5.11.3.4, 6.2, 6.5 
Prefix Conditions 
lnitialized(p) = true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = full 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
Connected(p) = half 
Table 13.49 Current stimulus: DB 
Prefix Conditions 
lnitialized(p) = false 
lnitialized(p)= true 
(Mode(p) =none orMode(p) =maintenance) 
lnitialized(p) = true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
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Response Trace 












13.7 Removing Abstractions 
Although the black box is finished, it contains abstractions. As noted earlier, 
formal definitions could be created for abstractions after a system's function is 
understood. Although this is seldom necessary, it will be done in this case to 
illustrate the technique. 
Recall that the definition of specification function B/L required a specifica-
tion function Mode to determine whether the system was in maintenance mode. 
A specification function Mode was defined earlier, but is at the wrong level of 
abstraction (it mentions TGud, which depends on B/L, which depends on 
Mode, etc.). Fortunately, all recursion is to prefixes, and the abstraction defini-
tions can be composed with the specification function definition (a benefit of 
the referential transparency of abstractions and specification functions) by sim-
ple substitution. The changes are shown in bold type in Table 13.50. 
This leaves abstract stimuli ASN and SF. Formal definitions for these are 
now very simple. Let Sys denote the set of all SV subsystems. Let p denote the 
previous stimulus sequence in the following definitions. Let Good_Systems(p) 
and Bad_Systems(p) be the sets consisting of systems that have passed their 
health check and that have failed their health check respectively for history p 
(these will be defined as specification functions later). 
Let ASN denote ISN (x) when x is in Sys, Good_Systems( p) = Sys - { x}, 
Bad_Systems(p) = {} , and Processing(p) = health. Thus the SOS has just 
received a positive health report from every subsystem. 
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Table 13.50 Specification function revisited: Mode(h) 










TG(u, d) lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
transmit 
OTE 
There exist indices m and n such that 
8/L(p, m) = u and 8 /L(p, n) = d 
lnitialized(p) =true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = none or 
Connected(p) = downlink or 
Connected(p) = uplink) 
none 
TC, UB, DTE, 
DB 
lnitialized(p) =true 




lnitialized(p) = true 
Mode(p) = transmit 
(Connected(p) = none or 
Connected(p) =downlink or 
Connected(p) = uplink) 
otherwise (h = ps) 
Let SF denote any of the following conditions: 
none 
Mode(p) 
1. ISN(x) when xis in Sys, Good_Systems(p) U Bad_Systems(p) = Sys 
- { x}, Bad_Systems( p) * { } , and Processing( p) = health. Thus the 
SOS has just received a success or failure report from every subsys-
tem, and at least one failed. 
2. ISF(x) whenx is in Sys, Good_Systems(p) U Bad_Systems(p) = Sys-
{ x}, and Processing( p) = health. Thus the SOS has just received a suc-
cess or failure report from every subsystem, and at least one failed. 
3. OTE when Processing( p) = health. Thus the timer has expired prior to 
completion of a health check. 
These definitions make use of the Processing specification function, which 
is written in terms of abstract stimuli ASN and SF. Again, the recursion is 
always to proper prefixes, and the specification function can be rewritten by 
substitution. The result is shown in Table 13.51. 
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Table 13.51 Specification function : Processing(h) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions Value 
h= empty idle 
HR lnitialized(p) =true health 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
ISF(x) , ISN(x) lnitialized(p) =true idle 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = health 
HealthCheck(p) = pending 
xis in Sys 
Good_Systems(p) u Bad_Systems(p) 
= Sys-{x} 
IN, OTE lnitialized(p) =true idle 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = health 
·HealthCheck(p) = pending 
FR lnitialized(p) =true firing 
Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = idle 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
IN, OTE, FSR, lnitialized(p) =true idle 
FFR Mode(p) = maintenance 
Processing(p) = firing 
HealthCheck(p) = done 
s otherwise (h = ps) Processing(p) 
Finally, there are two new specification functions mentioned: 
Good_Systems and Bad_Systems. They must return the sets of subsystems 
reporting good health and bad health respectively. Their definitions are 
very simple, given what is now known. The specification function for 
Good_Systems is defined in Table 13.52, and the function for Bad_Systems is 
defined in Table 13.53. 
Every specification function and every black box table could be easily 
rewritten in terms of the atomic stimuli. This would give a black box at the 
atomic level and would reveal any details that might have been overlooked 
because of the abstraction. In short, it is always possible to remove all abstrac-
tions at the black box level, but this requires formally defining all abstractions. 
The abstractions will be left in for this case study so that removal at a later stage 
can be illustrated. 
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Table 13.52 Specification function: Good_Systems(h) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions Value 
h =empty {} 
ISN(x) Processing(p) = health Good_Systems(p) u {x} 
any Processing(p) * health {} 
s otherwise (h = ps) Good_Systems(p) 
Table 13.53 Specification function: Bad_Systems(h) 
Stimulus Prefix Conditions Value 
h= empty {} 
ISF(x) Processing(p) = health Bad_Systems(p) u {x} 
any Processing(p) * health {} 
. S otherwise (h = ps) Bad_Systems(p) 
This completes the black box development, and work continues with state 
box specification in Chapter 14. This chapter concludes with comments on 
abstraction techniques. 
13.8 Common Sequence 
Abstraction Techniques 
Sequence abstraction is a fundamental technique in sequence-based specifica-
tion. There are many different ways to define abstract stimuli to solve problems. 
Practitioners should use the abstract stimuli that seem, to them, most natural, 
and then document their choices. This section describes common forms of 
abstract stimuli that are often used in sequence-based specification. It also pro-
vides guidance for constructing informal abstract stimulus definitions. 
13.8.1 Informal Abstract Stimulus Definitions 
When an informal abstract stimulus definition is constructed, it is important to 
ensure that it is in fact a proper abstract stimulus. A proper abstract stimulus 
must satisfy three properties: 
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1. The abstract stimulus definition must depend only on stimulus 
sequences. If an abstraction needs information that cannot be obtained 
from the atomic stimulus sequence, the system boundary must be 
revisited. 
2. The abstract stimulus definition must depend only on stimulus history, 
never future stimuli, and must be computable. 
3. All abstract stimuli used simultaneously must be disjoint. That is, two 
abstract stimuli can never apply at the same time because this gives a 
one-to-many relation, and not a many-to-one mapping as required. If it 
must be decided whether two or more conditions apply simultane-
ously, invent a single abstract stimulus for that case, or use an abstract 
stimulus along with specification functions. 
Any informal definition used must be sufficiently precise to show that these 
criteria are satisfied. (Obviously, it must also be defined precisely enough to 
communicate its meaning unambiguously.) Condition 3 is the easiest to miss. 
Here is an example of two abstract stimuli that fail to be disjoint: 
1. Let V denote every fifth clock pulse. 
2. Let X denote every tenth clock pulse. 
Which abstract stimulus corresponds to the tenth clock pulse, X or V? Given the 
definitions, both do. The definitions provide the opportunity to introduce incon-
sistency into the enumeration. If this error is missed, the sequences "abc V V" 
and "a b c V X" might be mapped to different responses, resulting in an incon-
sistent enumeration. This can be resolved by changing the definitions: 
1. Every tenth clock pulse is denoted X. 
2. Every fifth clock pulse which is not also a tenth clock pulse is de-
noted V. 
13.8.2 Stimulus-Based Abstractions 
Stimulus-based abstractions are commonly used early in the process, often 
before enumeration has even started. There are three common forms: 
1. A bundle abstraction replaces ("bundles") several atomic stimuli 
under a single abstract stimulus. For example, a program may provide 
several ways to save a file. A user might choose Save from a File 
menu, click an icon of a disk, type Control+S, or press F6. These may 
be very different events from the point of view of the software, but all 
are intended to have the same result. These could be "bundled" 
together, replacing them with the abstract stimulus Save. This reduces 
the number of stimuli to be enumerated. 
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2. A partition abstraction partitions a collection of stimuli into one of 
several abstract stimuli. For example, there are many different possi-
bilities for file names, but for the purposes of specification only valid 
(properly constructed) and invalid file names need be considered. Each 
file name is really a different stimulus, however these can be parti-
tioned into valid and invalid, replacing the many different stimuli with 
only two abstract stimuli. This can reduce significantly the number of 
stimuli to be enumerated. 
3. A deletion abstraction deletes all but a particular collection of distin-
guished stimuli. There are two primary forms: indexed and nonin-
dexed. A nonindexed deletion abstraction allows developers to focus 
on one interface or aspect of system behavior. For example, there may 
be a particular dialog with an operation that is largely independent of 
all other dialogs. The stimuli for only that dialog may be enumerated 
to determine its behavior independently of the rest of the system or to 
identify those instances in which its behavior depends on the rest of 
the system. 
An indexed deletion is used when a software system has a large 
number of identical interfaces. For example, a disk array might have 
several identical small computer systems interfaces (SCSis) . To deter-
mine the behavior for the system, enumerate stimuli for a single 
instance of the interface, with the knowledge that the results will appl 
equally to all interfaces. 
13.8.3 Sequence-Based Abstractions 
Sequence-based abstractions are commonly invented during enumeration. A 
useful heuristic is to observe when practitioners invent a name for a particular 
sequence of events (just opened a valid project, just closed the last open file, just 
completed entering the number, just entered the correct combination). In such a 
case, an abstract stimulus can be invented for that event sequence, and refer-
enced as work proceeds. This makes an abstraction that practitioners were 
already using an explicit part of the specification. Sequence-based abstractions 
are primarily introduced to allow equivalences to be created and thus allow the 
enumeration to be completed. There are three common forms of sequence-
based abstraction: 
1. A counting abstraction is invented whenever the nth occurrence of an 
event is significant. The simplest example is a time-out, when the 
behavior is directly tied to some large number of clock pulses. 
2. A history-encapsulating abstraction eliminates the need to keep cer-
tain events in the sequence by encapsulating those events into other 
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stimuli. For example, a request for a network connection might gener-
ate an error message if there are already, say, 16 open connections. To 
map a request for a network connection to a response, therefore, all 
network connection information must be kept in the sequence. This 
results in very long sequences before the behavior is revealed. 
Alternately, an abstraction can be invented that breaks the network 
connection request stimulus into two abstract stimuli (one for which 
there are fewer than 16 open connections, and one for which there are 
16). The network connection events can then be discarded from the 
abstract sequence. The TG, TGu, TGd, and TGud abstract stimuli used 
earlier are examples of this. 
3. An accumulating abstraction is one that collects information from the 
sequence into a single abstract stimulus. For example, a software sys-
tem might deal with entering a phone number. The atomic sequence 
would then contain single-digit presses, although the primary concern 
is the phone number dialed. An abstract stimulus might be constructed 
that replaces history "Off-hook 4 clock_pulse clock_pulse 4 
clock_pulse 2 clock_pulse clock_pulse clock_pulse 1 clock_pulse 2 
7" with abstract stimulus "Dial(442-127)." 

14 
Satellite Control System 
State Box Specification 
14.1 State Box Specification 
With the black box completed in Chapter 13, development of the state box spec-
ification can begin. The state box progresses toward the implementation by 
moving from an external, sequence-based view of the system to a state-based 
view. The state box is derived from the black box. Completeness and consis-
tency were established at the black box and need only be preserved. 
The basic work flow for creating a state-based specification from a 
sequence-based specification is given in Chapter 4 and in the Cleanroom 
Specification Process defined in Chapter 8. The instantiation used to produce 
the SOS state box is summarized in the following list: 
Step 1: Invent the state data. 
1. Invent an item of state data for each specification function used in the 
black box. 
2. Invent any additional state required to compute each abstraction. 
3. Invent any additional state required to compute the black box mapping 
rule. 
4. Invent any additional state required to compute responses. 
Step 2: Construct the state box tables. 
1. Replace every reference to previous stimuli with a reference to state data. 
2. Introduce additional information required for state update. 
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Step 3: Verify the state box to the black box. 
1. Transform each state-based entity into a sequence-based function. 
2. Compare the derived sequenced-based function to the corresponding 
black box function. 
(Because of space considerations and because the verification artifacts add 
no new information for the reader, verification of the state box is not presented 
for the case study.) 
14.2 Step 1 : Invent the State Data 
The black box sources of state data are the following: 
1. Each specification function can be transformed into an item of state 
data, although all may not be required. This transformation will be 
direct if the specification functions are written in prefix-recursive 
form. 
2. Abstractions may also reference stimulus histories and may require 
state data to remove the dependency on prior stimuli. 
3. The mapping rule may also reference stimulus histories, and these ref-
erences must be replaced with state data references. 
4. If abstract responses were used, these can be removed at this stage by 
adding any necessary state data to compute the response. 
It is not necessary to remove all abstractions at this stage. Abstractions 
may be left until later in the process, especially if they have a natural, well-
established representation as a procedure. For example, algorithms are known 
to exist for determining whether or not a number is prime, and thus an abstrac-
tion into prime and composite numbers can be left in until code is written. An 
abstraction from individual bits or bytes to packets might even be left in the 
clear box to be removed in a lower level black box. 
14.2.1 Specification Functions 
Tables 14.1 through 14.4 are derived directly from the specification function 
tables presented in Chapter 13. The initial state value is given in the first row of 
each table. 
Note that the original specification functions with the abstract stimuli were 
used because not all specification functions were converted to atomic stimuli in 
the previous section. 
These tables reveal how the state data items must be updated. They may be 
integrated into the state box tables or they may remain separate. The primary 
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TC UB DTE DB 
Current State 
initial value = none 
Mode= none 
any 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
Mode = transmit 
(Connected = none or 
Connected= uplink or 
Connected = downlink) 
Mode = transmit 
Table 14.2 State data item: Processing 
Stimulus Current State 
initial value = idle 
HR Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
IN, OTE, ASN, SF Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
HealthCheck = pending 
FR Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
IN, OTE, FSR, FFR Mode = maintenance 
Processing = firing 












benefit of integrating them is that the state box tables are more representative of 
the final code. The primary benefits of leaving them separate is that the tables 
more closely resemble the black box tables. 
14.2.2 Abstractions 
Abstractions may also be a source of state data if they are to be removed. At this 
step, the TG, TGu, TGd, and TGud abstract stimuli will be removed as an illus-
tration. (Note that this illustration will duplicate some of the work done in the 
black box.) 
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Table 14.3 State data item: HealthCheck 
Stimulus 




TC, UB, DTE, DB 
Current State 
initial value= pending 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing= health 
HealthCheck = pending 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
any 
Mode = transmit 
(Connected= none or Connected= uplink or 
Connected = downlink) 
Mode = transmit 





initial value = none 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = none 
Mode = transmit 










IN, TC, UB, DTE, DB Mode= transmit none 
(Connected= uplink or Connected= downlink or 
Connected= full or Connected= half) 
OTE, TE Mode= transmit none 




Mode = transmit 
Connected= uplink 
Mode = transmit 
Connected =downlink 
Mode = transmit 
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The definitions of the TG abstract stimuli could be rewritten using only 
state data if the BIL specification function were converted to state data. This 
has been done in Table 14.5. (This is only required if the abstraction is to be 
removed.) 
The state data item definition for BIL says nothing about how the data are 
to be stored. It simply reports the initial value of a given index n, and records 
that the value is changed by BR(n, s). At the state box level one should say what 
must be stored, but avoid saying how. Although it may seem obvious that BIL 
should be implemented as an array, there may be time constraints on determin-
ing whether a site is stored in BIL. In this case the item might be implemented 
as a hash table, tree, or some other structure to optimize the look-up. There is 
seldom enough information at the state box level to determine the exact imple-
mentation of each state data item, and this decision should be deferred. 
This definition makes use of the state data item Mode, which has an update 
table that is based on abstract stimuli. The definition for state data item Mode is 
rewritten in Table 14.6. 




initial value = empty 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
Health Check = done 






TC, UB, DTE, DB 
Current State 
initial value = none 
Mode= none 
any 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
There are indices m and n such 
that 8/L[m] = u and 8/L[n] = d 
Mode = transmit 
(Connected = none or Connected= uplink or 
Connected = downlink) 
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The abstract stimuli ASN and SF may also be removed at this stage by intro-
ducing state data. To do this, the specification functions Processing, 
Good_Systems, and Bad_Systems must be rewritten to use state data and atomic 
stimuli. Processing is rewritten in Table 14.7, Good_Systems is rewritten in Table 
14.8, and Bad_Systems is rewritten in Table 14.9. 







IN, OTE, FSR, FFR 
Current State 
initial value = idle 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 




Mode = maintenance idle 
Processing = health 
HealthCheck = pending 
xis in Sys 
Good_ Systems u Bad_ Systems = Sys- {x} 
Mode = maintenance idle 
Processing = health 
HealthCheck = pending 
xis in Sys 
Good_ Systems u Bad_ Systems = Sys- {x} 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = firing 
HealthCheck = done 
firing 
idle 
Table 14.8 State data item: Good_Systems 
Stimulus Current State New Value 
initial value = { } 
ISN(x) Processing = health Good_System u {x} 
any Processing * health {} 
14.3 Step 2: Construct the State Box Tables 283 
Table 14.9 State data item: Bad_Systems 
Stimulus Current State New Value 
initial value = { } 
ISF(x) Processing =health Bad_Systems u {x} 
any Processing i= health {} 
It is now possible to remove the ASN and SF abstract stimuli from the spec-
ification, and this will be done in the next section when the state box tables are 
constructed. 
14.2.3 Responses 
Other state data may be associated with responses. For example, an HF may 
include a list of all subsystems that reported their health to allow the ground 
crew to diagnose the problem. The necessary state data are already available; 
Good_Systems and Bad_Systems capture these data. 
14.3 Step 2: Construct the 
State Box Tables 
State box construction involves rewriting each black box table to eliminate 
stimulus history references: 
1. Replace every reference to previous stimuli with a reference to state 
data. In the case of specification functions, this is often direct, as illus-
trated in the previous section. There may be other references. It is not 
uncommon to use expressions such as "there has been an X stimulus 
more recently than all Y stimuli" or "the argument of the most recent A 
stimulus." Such expressions are references to previous stimuli and 
must be replaced with references to state data items. 
2. Introduce additional information for state update. Under what condi-
tions must the value of the state data item change? This additional 
information most often comes directly from the specification function 
tables, as illustrated in the previous section. 
Several specification function tables were transformed into state data item 
tables in the previous section. HealthCheck and Connected are transformed 
here as Tables 14.10 and 14.11 respectively. 
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TC, UB, DTE, DB 
Current State 
initial value= pending 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
Health Check = pending 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
HealthCheck = pending 
xis in Sys 
Good_ Systems u Bad_ Systems= Sys- {x} 
Mode= maintenance 
Processing = health 
Health Check= pending 
xis in Sys 
Good Systems u Bad_ Systems = Sys- {x} 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
any 
Mode =transmit 
(Connected = none or Connected = uplink or 
Connected = downlink) 
Mode =transmit 





initial value = none 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = none 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = none 
IN, TC, UB, DTE, DB Mode= transmit 
OTE, TE 
(Connected= uplink or Connected= downlink or 
Connected= full or Connected= half) 
Mode = transmit 
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Stimulus Current state New value 
DG Mode = transmit full 
Connected = uplink 
UG Mode = transmit full 
Connected = downlink 
TE Mode = transmit half 
Connected = full 
Next the black box tables are transformed into state box tables. Note that it 
is now possible to construct state box tables for the atomic stimulus TG(u, d). 
The response information will be integrated with the state update information 
from the state data item tables because this helps advance the specification 
toward code. The state data item tables should still be kept, however, because 
they will be useful in correctness verification of the clear box. The resulting 
state box tables, one per stimulus, appear in Tables 14.12 through 14.31. Note 
that several rows had to be split to accommodate the state data changes, and that 
rows for illegal behavior have been dropped. Because of the strong correspon-
dence between state box rows and black box rows, the trace information is the 
same as for the black box and is not repeated here. 
In the following tables, an asterisk in the New State column indicates that a 
state data item may already have the indicated value (in other words, two or 
more rows of the table have been combined to reduce the table length). 
Table 14.12 Current stimulus: IN 
Current State Response New State 
any INA Mode:= none 
Processing := idle 
HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Good_ Systems := {} 
Bad_Systems := { } 
Table 14.13 Current stimulus: HR 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode * maintenance or ERR no change 
Processing * idle) 
Mode = maintenance CDI, HT Processing := health 
Processing = idle HealthCheck := pending* 
Good_Systems := { }* 
Bad_ Systems:= { }* 
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Table 14.14 Current stimulus: MG 
Current State Response 
Mode= none null 
Mode i= none ERR 
Table 14.15 Current stimulus: BR(n, s) 
Current State Response 
(Mode = none or Mode = transmit) 
Mode = maintenance 
(Processing i= idle or 
HealthCheck i= done) 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
Table 14.16 Current stimulus: FR 
Current State 
(Mode= none or Mode= transmit) 
Mode = maintenance 
(Processing i= idle or 
HealthCheck * done) 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 







COl , FRF 
Table 14.17 Current stimulus: TG(u, d) 
Current State 
(Mode = none or Mode = transmit) 
Mode = maintenance 
(Processing i= idle or 
HealthCheck i= done) 
Mode= maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
There is no index m such that B/L[m] = u 
















Good_Systems := { }* 
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Current State 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
Health Check = done 
There is an index m such that 
B/L[m] = u 
There is no index n such that 
B/L[n] = d 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
There is no index m such that 
B/L[m] = u 
There is an index n such that 
B/L[n] = d 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
HealthCheck = done 
There is an index m such that 
B/L[m] = u 
There is an index n such that 
B/L[n] = d 
Table 14.18 Current stimulus: TC 
Current State 
Mode * transmit 










Table 14.19 Current stimulus: OTE 
Current State 
Mode= none 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = idle 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 












HealthCheck := pending 




Processing := idle 
HealthCheck := done 
Good_Systems := { } 
Bad_ Systems := {} 
continued 
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Table 14.19 continued 
Current State 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing= firing 
HealthCheck = done 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = none 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = uplink 
Mode = transmit 
Connected= downlink 
Mode = transmit 
(Connected = full or 








TCFu , TCFd 
null 
Table 14.20 Current stimulus: FSR 
Current State 
(Mode = none or Mode = transmit) 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing * firing 






Table 14.21 Current stimulus: FFR 
Current State 
(Mode= none or Mode= transmit) 
Mode = maintenance 








Processing := idle 
Good_ Systems := {} 
Bad_ Systems := {} 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck :=pending 





Processing := idle 
Good_ Systems := { }* 




Processing := idle 
Good_ Systems := { }* 
Bad_ Systems := { }* 
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Table 14.22 Current stimulus: ISN(x) 
Current State 
Mode = none or Mode = transmit 
Mode= maintenance 
Processing * health 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
Good_Systems U Bad_Systems 
* Sys-{x) 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
Good_Systems u Bad_Systems 
= Sys-{x) 
Bad_Systems * { } 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 







Table 14.23 Current stimulus: ISF(x) 
Current State 
Mode = none or Mode = transmit 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing * health 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
Good_Systems u Bad_Systems 
* Sys-{x) 
Mode = maintenance 
Processing = health 
Good_Systems u Bad_Systems 










Good_Systems u {x} 
Processing := idle 
HealthCheck := done 
Good_ Systems := {} 
Bad_ Systems := {} 
Processing := idle 
HealthCheck := done 
Good_ Systems := {} 





Bad_Systems U {x} 
Processing := idle 
HealthCheck := done 
Good_ Systems := {} 
Bad_ Systems := {} 
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Table 14.24 Current stimulus: UG 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit null Connected := uplink 
Connected = none 
Mode = transmit null no change 
Connected * none 
Connected * downlink 
Mode = transmit SOT Connected := full 
Connected= downlink 
Table 14.25 Current stimulus: Dl 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit ERR no change 
Connected * full 
Connected * half 
Mode = transmit DO no change 
(Connected= full or Connected 
=half) 
Table 14.26 Current stimulus: TE 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit FEg Mode:= none 
Connected = none HealthCheck :=pending 
Mode =transmit FEg,FEu Mode:= none 
Connected = uplink HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Mode = transmit FEg, FEd Mode:= none 
Connected = downlink HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
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Current State Response New State 
Mode = transmit TEFd Connected := half 
Connected = full 
Mode =transmit TEFd no change 
Connected = half 
Table 14.27 Current stimulus: UB 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit TSCAN(1} , Mode:= none 
TCFu, TCFd HealthCheck := pending 
Connected :=none* 
Table 14.28 Current stimulus: DG 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit null Connected :=downlink 
Connected = none 
Mode = transmit null no change 
Connected * none 
Connected * uplink 
Mode = transmit SOT Connected := full 
Connected = uplink 
Table 14.29 Current stimulus: PB 
Current State Response New State 
(Mode = none or Mode = null no change 
maintenance) 
Mode = transmit ERR no change 
Connected * full 
Connected * half 
Mode = transmit PBF no change 
(Connected= full or Connected 
=half) 
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Table 14.30 Current stimulus: DTE 
Current State 




Mode = transmit 
Connected = uplink 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = downlink 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = full 
Mode = transmit 
Connected = half 
Table 14.31 Current stimulus: DB 
Current State 
(Mode= none or Mode= 
maintenance) 











TCFu , TCFd 
New State 
no change 
Mode := none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none 
Mode:= none 
HealthCheck := pending 




HealthCheck := pending 
Connected := none* 
15 
Satellite Control System 
Clear Box Design 
15.1 Clear Box Implementation 
Following the completion of the state-based specification, clear box procedures 
and algorithms can be developed to implement the state box. The fundamentals 
of clear box design were provided in Chapter 4. 
A summary of the work flow used in the portion of the SOS implementa-
tion presented in this chapter is provided in the following list: 
Step 1: Select a high-level software architecture. 
Step 2: Select an implementation for stimulus gathering. 
1. For each stimulus, elaborate specifically how the running software 
will obtain the stimulus. 
2. Plan for interrupt handlers, callbacks, or other mechanisms required to 
get stimuli . 
Step 3: Select an implementation for response generation. 
1. For each response, elaborate specifically how the running software 
will generate the response. 
Step 4: Select an implementation for the state data items. 
Step 5: Select an implementation for each entry in the state box table. 
1. Rewrite each cell of the state box tables using the chosen state imple-
mentations. 
Step 6: Reorganize the implementations into executable code. 
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15.2 Step 1: Select a High-Level 
Software Architecture 
15.2.1 Invocation and Termination 
All software systems must deal with invocation; however, some software sys-
tems may be intended never to terminate. In the case of the SOS, termination of 
the embedded software is unacceptable. 
Software invocation of the SOS happens whenever the system receives 
power. The BIL table need not be initialized because it will be stored in non-
volatile memory, which is initialized prior to satellite launch. All other state 
data items will be reset to their initial values on invocation. 
Because software termination is unacceptable, practitioners must consider 
each potential source of termination and exclude it. This includes ensuring that 
all software exceptions are caught, that power supplies are adequate and suffi-
ciently responsive to changes in power demands, and that no execution path 
exists that exits or returns from the main program. 
15.2.2 Target Hardware Architecture 
The SOS will execute on a single processor on a Java virtual machine, and will 
be driven by hardware and software interrupts. 
On software invocation, a Java virtual machine is started and the main () 
method of the Control object is invoked. The main ( l method first instantiates 
the interrupt handler (IH), then all other objects. Each object that is to process 
an interrupt registers itself during construction with the IH by invoking the 
IH. addObserver ( ) method, telling it which interrupt it is interested in. When all 
objects are instantiated, the processor enters power save mode until an interrupt 
occurs. This start-up sequence is shown in Figure 15.1. 
When an interrupt is generated by internal hardware (possibly in response 
to a signal from ground, uplink, or downlink) the processor is switched on and 
the i rqNot ify () method of the IH is invoked. The IH then invokes the 
no tify ( ) method of each object registered for the interrupt, in sequence. These 
objects may emit responses, invoke methods of other objects, and so on. When 
all registered objects have been notified and have completed execution, the IH 
returns and, if no further events are pending, the processor enters power save 
mode. The execution sequence is shown in Figure 15.2. 
15.2.3 Hardware Interface 
The hardware interfaces will be implemented by classes consisting only of static 
native methods (i.e., they need not be instantiated and are implemented in 
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firmware). Only the classes, methods, variables, and constants required for the 
discussion are presented. All classes presented here are part of the scs. kernel 
package, and constitute the "operating system" for the satellite hardware. The 
reader may skip the class definitions here and return only as necessary to under-
stand the software implementation . 
Kernel Interface to the Impulse Control Subsystem (ICS). The ICS Is 
accessed through the methods of the ICS class. 
II Impulse control subsystem interface. 
package scs.kernel; 
I** This class encapsulates the low-level interface to the impulse 
control subsystem. *I 
public final class ICS 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Request firing. The controller hardware must have been armed 
first. Success or failure is reported through a hardware 
interrupt after the firing is completed. 
@param pitch The change in pitch (wrt SV body) 
@param yaw The change in yaw (wrt SV body). 
@param roll The change in roll (wrt SV body). *I 
public static native void fire(double pitch, double yaw, double 
I** Arm the reaction control hardware for a firing. The hardware 
is disarmed at the end of the firing. *I 
public static native void arm(); 
I** Return current status. See the constants defined in this class 
for the various possible return values. 
@return Current status of impulse control system. *I 
public static native int getStatus(); 
II The following are public class constants that define 
II the various possible statuses of the impulse control 
II subsystem, as reported by the getStatus() method. 
II These must be the same as the native code. 
public static final int SUCCESS = 0; 
public static final int FAILURE = 1; 
public static final int NOT_READY = 2; 
public static final int IN_PROGRESS = 3; 
,. 
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Kernel Interrupt Controller Interface. The Interrupt class encapsulates all 
low-level interrupt handling. 
II Interrupt handler. 
package scs.kernel; 
import java.util.Vector; 
I** This class encapsulates the low-level interrupt controller 
interface. *I 
public final class Interrupt ( 
II This class has no constructors. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Set the interrupt vector to the irqNotify() method 
of an object. The object must implement the IRQObserver 
interface. 
@param o The object to notify. 
@return The previously stored vector as a long. *I 
public static native long setiRQVector(IRQObserver o); 
I** This interface must be implemented by any object that wishes 
Lo have interrupt events vectored to it. *I 
public interface IRQObserver 
I** Notify an object that an interrupt has occurred. *I 
public void irqNotify(); 
I** Push the specified value onto the return stack so that 
the next return directs control to the address specified 
by the argument. 
@param v The address as a long. *I 
public static native long redirectStack(long v); 
I** Get the type of the most recent IRQ event. 
@return The most recent IRQ event type. *I 
public static native int getiRQID(); 
I** Get any arguments for the most recent IRQ event. These 
will be stored in a Java vector. 
@return A Java Vector that holds the arguments, or null 
if there are no arguments. *I 
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I** Return true if the most recent interrupt is a maskable hardware 
interrupt. Return false if the most recent interrupt is a 
nonmaskable interrupt (NMI) or a software interrupt (SWI). 
@return True if the last interrupt is a hardware interrupt. *· 
public static native boolean isHWI(); 
I** Return true if the most recent interrupt is a software 
interrupt. 
@return True if the last interrupt is a software interrupt. *. 
public static native boolean isSWI(); 
I** Schedule a timer event. 
@param o The object requesting the timer 
implement the TimerObserver interface. 
@param c The number of milliseconds from now to generate the 
timer event. *I 
public static native void scheduleTimer(TimerObserver o, long c); 
I** This interface must be implemented by any object that wishes 
to receive timer events. *I 
public interface TimerObserver 
I** Notify the caller that a requested timer has expired. *I 
public void timerNotify(); 
I** Clear any scheduled timer events. *I 
public static native void resetTimer(); 
II The following are public class constants that define 
II the various types of interrupt events. These values 
II should be used for the irqid. 
public static final int HWI_TRANSMIT_GROUND = Ox00010001; 
public static final int HWI_TRANSMIT UPLINK Ox00010002; 
public static final int HWI_TRANSMIT_DOWNLINK = Ox00010003; 
public static final int HWI_DATA_RECEIVED = Ox00020001; 
public static final int HWI FIRING_COMPLETE = Ox00030005; 
public static final int HWI_ONBOARD_TIMER_EXPIRED = Ox00050001; 
public static final int HWI_INTERNAL_SUBSYSTEM_NOMINAL 
public static final int HWI INTERNAL_SUBSYSTEM_FAILURE OxOOOOOO 
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Kernel Interface to the System Data Bus for Internal Messaging 
II Handle internal messaging. 
package scs.kernel; 
import java.util.Vector; 
I** This class encapsulates access to the internal data bus. *I 
public final class Message { 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Set all lines high to signal system initialization to all 
devices on the bus. This method may only be used if the 
bus has been captured; otherwise it will be ignored. *I 
public static native void initialize(); 
I** Capture the bus. Other devices are forbidden to send signals on 
the bus during a capture. *I 
public static native void capture(); 
I** Release the bus. Devices may resume signaling on the bus. *I 
public static native void release(); 
I** Send a message on the bus. No capture is required. 
@param id The id of the device or group to which the message 
is being sent. 
@param message The message to be sent. *I 
public static native void send(long id, long message); 
II The following are public class constants that define 
II the various destinations for messages and the messages 
II themselves. 
public static final long BROADCAST= Ox80000000;II Send to everyone. 
public static final long HEALTH_TEST = OxOOOOOOOl; 
Kernel Nonvolatile Memory Manager 
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I** This class encapsulates the nonvolatile memory manager. *I 
public final class NVMM ( 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Put information into nonvolatile memory, associating it wit~ 
both a string and an integer. The integer must be unique; if 
there is already an item associated with the integer, it wil~ 
be overwritten. 
@param id The unique integer identifying this item. 
@param name A (possibly nonunique) name for this item. 
@param o The data to store. *I 
public static native void put(long id, String name, Object o); 
I** Get the data item for a given id. If the id does not exist, 
null is returned. 
@param id The unique integer identifying the item. 
@return The item, if found, and null if not. *I 
public static native Object getData(long id); 
I** Get the name for a given data item. If no matching item is 
found, null is returned. 
@param id The unique integer identifying the item. 
@return The item's name, if found, and null if not. *I 
public static native String getName(long id); 
I** Get a data item for a given string. The id of the first 
item is returned. If no matching item is found, null is 
returned. 
@param name The name to find. 
@return The unique id of a data item with the specified name, 
or a negative value if none can be found. *I 
public static native long search(String name); 
Kernel Interface to Transmitter Hardware 
II Transmitter hardware interface. 
package scs.kernel; 
import java.util.Vector; 
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public final class Transmit { 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Transmit a stream of bytes to the selected destination. 
301 
An interrupt will be generated when transmit is completed. 
@see scs.kernel.Interrupt for interrupt information. 
@param data The data to send. 
@param count The number of bytes in the data. *I 
public static native void transmit(byte[] data, long count); 
I** Select a particular destination for future transmit requests. 
@param i The destination, provided by one of the constants 
defined in this class. *I 
public static native void select(int i); 
I** Specify uplink site information. The transmit hardware will 
attempt to locate and establish communication with the uplink 
site, which should then send either UG or UB. 
@param si The site information. *I 
public static native void setUplink(Siteinfo si); 
I** Specify downlink site information. The transmit hardware will 
attempt to locate and establish communication with the downlink 
site, which should then send either DG or DB. 
@param si The site information. *I 
public static native void setDownlink(Siteinfo si); 
I** A class for encapsulating all necessary site information. *I 
public final class Siteinfo; 
I** Forget the uplink site connection. *I 
public static native void detachUplink(); 
I** Forget the downlink site connection. *I 
public static native void detachDownlink(); 
II The following are public class constants that define the 
II various destinations for transmit. These values should be 
II used with the select () method. 
public static final int GROUND 0; 
public static final int UPLINK 1· 
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15.2.4 Software Architecture 
The software implementation will be a Java application. It is assumed that suffi-
cient prototyping work has been done to ensure that all processing speed, 
response time, capacity, and precision requirements can l;>e met. All data flow 
will be push, based on the observer design pattern, with only a few exceptions 
for state-encapsulating objects such as Mode. 
The SOS will be implemented using a single-threaded architecture. Object 
creation will be tightly constrained so that memory management issues are min-
imized. The incoming data stream is read by hardware decoders, which queue 
their input until it can be processed. This is not expected to be a problem 
because processor speeds far outstrip maximum transmission bandwidth. 
The state machine represented by the state box will be allocated to several 
top-level classes. These are described in Table 15.1. Following the table is the 
Java code for each class. Most of these classes are incomplete. The behavioral 
information from the state box tables will be merged with the architectural 
information to complete the definitions by implementing each of the methods . 















Handles all interrupts and dispatches events to registered 
callers. 
Manages invocation and sets up interrupt handling. 
Preserves the mode globally. This class maintains the mode in 
a class variable accessible everywhere through class acces-
sor and mutator methods. 
The Health Check object administers the health check via the 
interrupts passed to it from the I H. 
The BLTable object handles all updates to the B/L table stored 
in nonvolatile memory. 
The FiringControl object handles all firing requests. 
The Connection class handles construction of a new connec-
tion as well as shutdown of an existing connection. In addition, 
the Connection class will handle events that change mode 
(such as IN and MG). 
The PacketParser object transforms information from the 
receiver hardware into packets for consumption by the other 
classes. It receives hardware interrupts from the IH and gener-
ates software interrupts. 
The PacketScheduler object handles sending of packets to 
uplink, downlink, and ground sites. 
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Class: scs.sos.IH 






I** This class is the "top level" of the SOS. Interrupt events (stimuli) 
arrive here and are dispatched to the appropriate class. *I 
public final class IH implements Interrupt.IRQObserver { 
I** Construct a new interrupt handler and install it as a "wedge." *I 
public IH () 
II Install the interrupt handler, saving the previous vector. 
oldvector = Interrupt.setiRQVector(this); 
I** Register an object to receive forwarded interrupt events. 
@param o The object wishing to receive event notification. 
This object must implement the InterruptObserver interface. 
@param irqid The event (from constants defined in the 
Interrupt class or here). *I 
public void addObserver(InterruptObserver o, int irqid) 
II Change the irqid into a Java object so we can get its 
II hash code. 
Integer Irqid new Integer(irqid); 
II Get the list of registered observers from the hash table. 
Vector obs = (Vector)registry.get(Irqid); 
if(obs ==null) 
II The list of observers is empty. Create a new list. 
obs = new Vector(); 
registry.put(Irqid, obs); 
II Add this object to the list of observers. 
obs.addElement(o); 
I** This interface must be implemented by any object wishing to 
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public interface InterruptObserver { 
I** This method is invoked to notify an object that an eve~~ 
has occurred. 
@param irqid The event type (from the constants definea 
in the Interrupt class or here) . 
@param args A Vector of any additional arguments for t~e 
event, or null if none. *I 
public void notify(int irqid, Vector args); 
I** Interrupts are directed here. This code then dispatches the 
event to the appropriate object(s). *I 
public void irqNotify() 
II Get the interrupt id. 
int irqid = Interrupt.getiRQID(); 
II Get any arguments for the interrupt. 
Vector args = Interrupt.getiRQArguments(); 
II Now get the list of observers for this event. 
Integer Irqid = new Integer(irqid); 
Vector obs = (Vector)registry.get(Irqid); 
if(obs !=null) 
II There are observers for this event. Notify all 
II of them. 
Enumeration e = obs.elements(); 
while(e.hasMoreElements()) 
II Notify an observer. 
InterruptObserver o = (InterruptObserver)e.nextEl 
o.notify(irqid, args); 
II Now return control to the previously installed interrupt 
II handler. 
Interrupt.redirectStack(oldvector); 
II Private data. 
private long oldvector = 0; 
private Hashtable registry= new Hashtable(); 
II The following are public class constants that define 
II the various types of software interrupts. These values 
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II are defined here because the kernel doesn't know about 
II software interrupts. 
public static final int SWI IN OxOOOlFOOl; 
public static final int SWI - HR Ox0001F002; 
public static final int SWI _MG Ox0001F003; 
public static final int SWI - BR Ox0001F004; 
public static final int SWI - FR OxOOOlFOOS; 
public static final int SWI - TG Ox0001F006; 
public static final int SWI TC Ox0001F007; 
public static final int SWI _UG Ox0002F001; 
public static final int SWI - DI Ox0002F002; 
public static final int SWI - TE Ox0002F003; 
public static final int SWI _UB Ox0002F004; 
public static final int SWI DG Ox0003F001; 
public static final int SWI PB Ox0003F002; 
public static final int SWI - DTE = Ox0003F003; 
public static final int SWI _DB = Ox0003F004; 
Class: scs.sos.Control 
II Start-up for SOS. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class starts execution of the SOS by installing the 
interrupt handler. *I 
public final class Control 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** This is the main method, which executes on start-up. It 
creates and installs the interrupt handler, then creates 
all other required objects. *I 
public static void main() { 
II Create a new interrupt handler. The constructor installs 
II the interrupt handler. 
IH ih =new IH(); 
Class: scs.sos.Mode 
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package scs.sos; 
I** This class encapsulates the state data item Mode. *I 
public final class Mode { 
II This class has no constructor. 
II All methods are class methods. 
I** Set the system mode. 
@param m The new mode, from the constants defined in this cl 
public static void setMode(int m) 
mode = m; 
I** Get the system mode. 
@return One of the constants defined in this class. *I 
public static int getMode() 
return mode; 
II The following are public class constants that define the 
II various system modes. 
public static final int NONE = 0; 
public static final int MAINTENANCE = 1; 
public static final int TRANSMIT= 2; 
II A private class variable that holds the current mode. 
private static int mode = NONE; 
Class: scs.sos.HealthCheck 
II Administer the health check. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class administers the health check through 
interrupts. *I 
public final class HealthCheck 
implements IH.InterruptObserver 
I** Interrupt notification arrives here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
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public void notify(long irqid, Vector args); 
II Will be implemented later. 
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I** Force the health check object to reset its state and halt 
any current checks. *I 
public void reset(); II Will be implemented later. 
I** Return the current status of the health check. 
@return The current status as one of the class constants. *I 
public int getStatus(); II Will be implemented later. 
II These are public class constants that define the statuses for 
II the HealthCheck object. 
public static final int PENDING = 0; 
public static final int PROCESSING 1· 
public static final int COMPLETE= 2· 
Class: scs.sos.BLTable 
II Manage the BIL table. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class manages the BIL table updates and accesses. *I 
public final class BLTable 
implements IH.InterruptObserver 
I** Interrupt notification arrives here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(long irqid, Vector args); 
II Will be implemented later. 
I** Request for a BIL entry for a site. If there is an entry, the 
site data is returned. Otherwise, null is returned. *I 
public Transmit.Siteinfo findSite(String name) 
II Look for the site. 
long id = NVMM.search(name); 
if(id < 0) return null; 


















308 Satellite Control System Clear Box Design 
Class: scs.sos.FiringControl 
II Handle thruster firings. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class handles thruster firing requests. *I 
public final class FiringControl 
implements IH.InterruptObserver 
I** Interrupt notification arrives here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(long irqid, Vector args); 
II Will be implemented later. 
I** Force the firing/control object to reset its state and halt 
any firings. *I 
public void reset(); II Will be implemented later. 
Class: scs.sos.Connection 
II Manage the connection. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class manages the connection. *I 
public final class Connection 
implements IH.InterruptObserver 
I** Interrupt notification arrives here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(long irqid, Vector args); 
II Will be implemented later. 
Class: scs.sos.PacketParser 
II Parse incoming packets. 
package scs.sos; 
I** This class parses the incoming data streams into packets, and 
then generates appropriate software interrupts. *I 
public final class PacketParser 
implements IH.InterruptObserver 
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I** Interrupt notification arrives here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(long irqid, Vector args); 
II Will be implemented later. 
Class: scs.sos.PacketScheduler 








I** This class handles construction and transmit of packages to 
the uplink I downlink I ground. *I 
public final class PacketScheduler implements IH.InterruptObserver 
II This class uses the default constructor. 
I** Interrupt notification arrive~ here. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(int irqid, Vector args) 
II See what happenned. 
Queue q = null; 
int destination = 0; 
if(irqid == Interrupt.HWI_TRANSMIT_DOWNLINK) 
q = downlink; 
destination = Transmit.DOWNLINK; 
else if(irqid == Interrupt.HWI_TRANSMIT_UPLINK) 
q = uplink; 
destination Transmit.UPLINK; 
else if(irqid == Interrupt.HWI_TRANSMIT_GROUND) 
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else return; 
II A packet was just sent. See if another 




II Another packet is waiting to be sent. Send it now. 
Transmit.select(destination); 
Transmit.transmit( 
( (ByteArrayOutputStream)q.next()) .toByteArray(), 
( (ByteArrayOutputStream)q.next()) .size()); 
I** Construct and queue a packet for transmit. 
@param destination The destination of the packet, from 
the constants defined in Transmit. 
@param type The type of packet to send, from the constants 
defined in this class. 
@param args Any additional arguments to include in the packe~. 
public void send(long destination, long type, Vector args) 
II Figure out the destination. 
Queue q = null; 









II This serializes each of the objects to a byte output stre~ . 
II This will be correctly handled by the kernel transmit metcod_ 
ByteArrayOutputStream baos =new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
II Wrap the stream in an object output stream. 
ObjectOutputStream oos = null; 
try 
oos =new ObjectOutputStream(baos); 
II Write the packet type. 
oos.writeLong(type); 
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oos.writeObject(args); 
catch(Exception e) 
II If there is an exception, then just ignore the packet. 
return; 
II If the appropriate queue is empty, this data can be 
II sent now. 
II Otherwise, just queue it. Packets are dequeued only 






II Private queues. 
Queue downlink= new Queue(); 
Queue uplink new Queue(); 
Queue ground new Queue(); 
II The following are public class constants that define the 
II various types of packets that can be sent. 
public static final long INA OxOOOlOOOO; 
public static final long HF 
public static final long HS 
public static final long FF 
public static final long FS 
public static final long TSCAN 
public static final long TEF 
public static final long ERR 
public static final long FE 
public static final long TGF 
public static final long SDT 
public static final long TCF 
public static final long PBF 














312 Satellite Control System Clear Box Design 
15.3 Step 2: Select an Implementation 
for Stimulus Gathering 
The list of stimuli to the SOS is provided in Table 15.2, along with the mechanism 
by which the stimulus will be collected. Each stimulus from the GCS, UL, or DL 
is actually a packet that contains security information (to avoid unauthorized 
access to the satellite), and any required parameters. The design of the packet 
parser is beyond the scope of this case study, but is a well-studied problem (there 
are many powerful parser generators available, including JavaCC for developing 
Java parsers- it is seldom necessary to create such a parser from scratch). The 
packet parser will be driven by hardware interrupts from the decoders. 
Table 15.2 Stimuli and stimulus gathering 
Stimulus Stimulus-Gathering Mechanism 
Stimuli received from GCS 
IN Processor power-on vector stored in read-only memory, and message from 
ground site decoded through the PacketParser and made available as soft-
ware interrupt IH. SIH IN. 
HR Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH. SWI HR. 
MG Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH . SWI MG. 
BR(i, s) Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH. SWI_ BR with arguments i and s. 
FR(p, y, () Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH . SW I _FR with arguments p, y, and r. 
TG(u, d) Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt I H . SWI_TG with arguments u and d. 
TC Message from ground decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH. SWI_TC. 
Stimuli received from on-board subsystems 
OTE Implemented by internal hardware interrupt 
Interrupt. HWI_ONBOARD_TIMER_EXPIRED. When the timer interrupt 
occurs, the kernel IH will pass control to the requesting object. If no object 
has requested the timer, the kerneiiH will ignore the event per requirement 
1.2.4. 
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Stimulus Stimulus-Gathering Mechanism 





Implemented by internal hardware interrupt 
I n terrup t. HWI_FIRI NG_ COMPLETE . If ICS. g e tStatu s ( ) returns 
SUCCESS , FSR is intended; if ICS . ge t status () does not return 
SUCCES S, FFR is intended. 
Implemented by internal hardware interrupt 
Interrupt . HWI_INTERNAL_SUBSYSTEM_NOMINAL with argument id. 
Implemented by internal hardware interrupt 
Interr upt. HWI_INTERNAL_ SUBSYSTEM_ FAI LURE with argument id. 





Message from uplink decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH . swi_ UG. 
Message from uplink decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt I H. SWI_DI with arguments id and p. 
Message from uplink decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH . SWI_TE. 
Message from uplink decoded through PacketParser and made available as 
software interrupt IH . SWI_UB. 





Message from downlink decoded through PacketParser and made available 
as software interrupt IH. SWI_DG. 
Message from downlink decoded through PacketParser and made available 
as software interrupt IH. SWI_PB with argument id. 
Message from downlink decoded through PacketParser and made available 
as software interrupt IH . SWI_DTE. 
Message from downlink decoded through PacketParser and made available 
as software interrupt IH . SWI_DB. 
15.4. Step 3: Select an Implementation 
for Response Generation 
The list of SOS responses is provided in Table 15.3 along with a description of 
how each response will be generated by the running software. 
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Table 15.3 Responses and response generation 
Response Response Generation Mechanism 







The INA message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. INA, null) method. 
The HF message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. HF, l) method, where l is a vector composed of 
the lists of subsystems reporting a successful health check and the list of 
subsystems reporting a failed health check. 
The HS message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler . HS, null) method. 
The FF message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
PacketScheduler. FF, null) method. 
The FS message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. FS, null) method. 
The TSCAN message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. TSCAN, n) method, where n is a vector containing 
one of the values 1, 2, or 3. 
TEFg The TEF message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. TEF, null) method. 
ERR The ERR message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler . send(Transmit.GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. ERR, null) method. 
FEg The FE message will be sent to the GCS via the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit . GROUND, 
Packet Scheduler. FE, null) method. 
Responses to on-board subsystems 
CDI(d) 
HT 
The CDI message will be sent to the on-board countdown timer via invoca-
tion of the Interrupt. scheduleTimer (caller, d) method of the ker-
neiiH, where dis the requested duration, and caller is the object 
requesting the countdown. The object caller must implement the 
Interrupt. TimerObserver interface. 
The HT command is sent to all subsystems by the 
Message . send (Message. BROADCAST, Message. HEALTH_ TEST) ker-
nel method. 
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Response Response Generation Mechanism 
Responses to on-board subsystems 
FRF(p, y, i) The FRF command is sent to the impulse control hardware via the 
res . arm () and the res . fire (p, y, r) kernel methods. 
Responses to UL 
TGFu The TGF command is sent to the UL by the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit . UPLINK, 
Packet Schedule r . TGF , null) method. 
SDT The SOT command is sent to the UL by the 
PacketScheduler . send(Transmit . UPLINK, 
Packet Scheduler . SDT, null) method. 
TCFu The TCF command is sent to the UL by the 
Pac ketScheduler . send (Transmit . UPL I NK, 
Packet Scheduler . TeF , null) method. 
TEFu The TEF command is sent to the UL by the 
Packe t Scheduler . send(Transmit . UPLINK, 
Packet Schedul e r . TEF, null) method. 
PBF(idj 
FEu 
The PBF command is sent to the UL by the 
PacketScheduler .send(Transmit . UPLINK, 
Packet Schedul er . PBF, id) method, where id is a vector containing 
the packet identifier of the bad packet. 
The FE message is sent to the UL by the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit . UPLINK, 
Packet Scheduler . FE, null) method. 
Responses to DL 
TGFd 
TCFd 
The TGF command is sent to the DL by the 
PacketScheduler . send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, 
Packet Schedu l er . TGF , null) method. 
The TCF command is sent to the DL by the 
PacketScheduler.send(Transmit.DOWNLrNK, 
Packet Scheduler . TeF, null) method. 
TEFd The TEF commana is sent to the DL by the 
PacketSchedul e r .send (Transmit . DOWNLrNK, 
Packet Schedul er. TEF, null) method. 
DO(id, p) 
FEd 
The DO command is sent to the DL by the 
PacketScheduler . send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, 
Packet Sche dul e r . DO, x ) method, where xis a vector containing id 
and p . 
The FE message is sent to the DL by the 
PacketScheduler . send(Transmit.DOWNLrNK, 
Packet Scheduler. FE, null) method. 
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15.5 Step 4: Select an Implementation 
for the State Data Items 
15.5.1 Allocation of Data to Objects 
The state data items may now be allocated to the objects (Table 15.4). All access 
to the encapsulated state will be through accessor and mutator methods (there 
are no public variables). 
Table 15.4 State data allocation to objects 
State Data Item Owner 
Mode Mode class 
Processing HealthCheck object 
FiringControl object 
HealthCheck HealthCheck object 
Connected Connection object 
B/L[n] BLTable object 
Good_Systems HealthCheck object 
Bad_ Systems Health Check object 
15.5.2 State Tests and Updates 
Every case of a test of state data or an update to state data must be accounted for 
(Table 15.5). State data items have been migrated to objects and, in some cases, 
completely hidden from the top level. 
Table 15.5 State data access and modification 




Hea l thCheck . getStatus() 
ICS . getStatus() 
Updating 
Mode . s etMode () 
Heal thCheck. reset ( ) sets to 
pending; otherwise, maintained 
internally by the HealthCheck 
object. 
FiringControl . reset() 
sets to idle; otherwise, main-
tained internally by the ICS ker-
nel class object. 
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State Data Item Testing Updating 
HealthCheck Hea l t h Check.getS t atu s() Heal thCheck. r e set ( ) sets to 
pending; otherwise, maintained 
internally by the HealthCheck 
object. 
Connected Maintained internally by the Handled internally by the 
Connection object. No public Connection object. 
access required. 
Good_ Systems Maintained internally by the Handled internally by the 
Health Check object. No public HealthCheck object. 
access required. 
Bad_ Systems Maintained internally by the Handled internally by the 
HealthCheck object. No public Health Check object. 
access required. 
B/L BLTable . get (I Handled internally by the 
BLTable object. 
15.6 Step 5: Select an Implementation 
for Each Entry in the 
State Box Table 
Each of the state box tables can now be rewritten as Java code based on the cho-
sen implementation. Each stimulus implementation has been chosen, and each 
state data item is encapsulated in an object. The behavior described by each 
state box table is now allocated to an object. Additional object constraints are 
indicated in a Notes section in Tables 15.6 through 15.25, as appropriate. Each 
cell of the table must be verified against the corresponding state box cell (which 
is the intended function) to ensure correctness. 
~ Table 15.6 Current stimulus: IN Implemented in Connection. notify () with irqid == swr_IN 
():) 
Current State Response State Update 
any I I Initialize hardware. 
Message . capture() ; 
Message. ini tial ize() ; 
Message . release (); 
I I Send INA. 
t his .ps.send (Transmi t . GROUND, 
PacketScheduler.INA,null ) ; 
I I Set Mode to none. 
Mode . setMode(Mode .NONE) ; 
I I Set Processing to idle, 
llandHeal thCheckto 
I I pendi ng, a nd both 
I I Good_Sy s t ems and 
I I Bad_Sys terns to (} . 
this .fc. reset() ; 
this .hc.reset (); 
I I Set Connected to none . 
this .conn = Connect ion . NONE; 
Notes: The PacketScheduler, FiringControl, and HealthCheck objects will be provided to the Connection object constructor, and will be maintained in private 
instance variables-ps, fc, and he respectively. 




Table 15.7 Current stimulus: HR 
Implemented by HealthCheck.notify () with irqid == SWI _ HR 
Current State 
Mode . get Mode ( ) ! = Mode . MAINTENANCE I I 
this . get Status () ==Heal thCheck. PROCESSING I I 
ICS. getStatus () == I CS. IN_ PROGRESS 
Mode. get Mode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this . get Status () ! = HealthCheck. PROCESS ING && 
ICS. getStatus () ! = ICS. IN_PROGRESS 
Response 
I I Send ERR to GCS. 
this . ps . send( 
Transmit . GROUND, 
PacketScheduler . ERR, null ); 
I I Send the heal th test . 
Message.send( 
Message . BROADCAST, 
Message.HEALTH_TEST) ; 
I I Initialize the 
I I countdown t imer. 
I n terrupt . schedu l eTimer( 
this , 
HealthCheck . HCTIME); 
State Update 
no change 
I I Set the 
I I HealthCheck to 
I I pend i ng and 
I I Process ing to 
I I health. 
this. status= 
Heal thCheck.PROCESSING; 
I I Set both 
I I Good_ Systems 
I I and 
I I Bad_Systems 
I I to { l. 
this. good= new Vector (); 
this . bad= new Vec tor (); 
Notes: The PacketScheduler object will be provided to the HealthCheck object constructor and will be maintained in private instance variable ps. 
HCTIME will be a class constant equal to the number of milliseconds allowed for a health test. 
The HealthCheck object will maintain a private instance variable status that will hold the current health check status, and private instance variables 




Table 15.8 Current stimulus: MG 
Implemented in Connection. notify () with irq id = = SWI_MG 
Current State Response State Update 
Mode.ge tMode () == Mode.NONE null Mode.setMode(Mode.MAINTENANCE); 
Mode .getMode () != Mode.NONE II Send ERR to GC S. 
t h is.ps.send( 
Transmi t.GROUND, PacketScheduler. ERR null ); 
Table 15.9 Current stimulus: BR(n, s) 
no change 
Implemented in BLTable .notify () with i r qid == SWI_BR and args == (n, s) 
Current State 
Mode . getMode ( ) ==Mode. NONE I I 
Mode . getMode() ==Mode.TRANSMIT 
Mode. getMode ( ) == Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
( thi s .hc.getS t atu s () ! = 
HealthCheck.COMPLETE I I 
ICS .getSta tus() == ICS.IN_ PROGRESS) 
Mode. getMode ( ) ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this .hc. ge tS tatus () == 
Heal t hCheck. COMPLETE && 
ICS. ge tS tatus () ! = ICS . IN_PROGRES S 
Response 
I I Send ERR to GCS 
t his.ps.send( 
Transmit . GROUND, PacketScheduler . ERR, nul l) ; 
I I Send ERR to GCS 
t his.ps . s end( 
Transmi t.GROUND, 
PacketSchedul er. ERR, null); 
I I Send BRA to GCS 
thi s.ps . s end( 






I I Save the d ata 
I I in the BIL 
I I tab le. 
NVMM .put (n , 
s . ge tName ( )., s); 
I I The n and s are 
I I obtained from 
I I the a rgsVec tor. 
Notes: The PacketScheduler and HealthCheck objects will be provided to the BLTable object constructor and stored in private instance variables ps and he 
respectively. 
w ,.., .... 
Table 15.10 Current stimulus: FR(p, y, r) 
Implemented in FiringCont rol.notify with irqid == SWI _ FR and a rgs == (p, y , r) 
Current State 
Mode . getMode () == Mode. NONE I I 
Mode . getMode() ==Mode.TRANSMIT 
Mode. getMode () == Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
( this .hc.ge tStatus () ! = 
HealthCheck.COMPLETE I I 
ICS .getS t atus () == ICS. IN_PROGRESS) 
Mode . getMode ( ) ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this . he. getStatu s () == 
Heal thCheck . COMPLETE && 
I CS . getS t atus () ! = ICS. I N_PROGRESS 
Response 
I I Sen d ERR to GCS 
thi s . ps . send( 
Transmit . GROUND, PacketScheduler. ERR, null); 
I I Sen d ERR to GCS 
t his.ps.send( 
Transmit.GROUND, Pac ketSchedu l er.ERR, null); 
1 I send FRF to res. 
I CS . arm(); 
ICS. fire (p, y; r ); 
I I I ni tial i ze the 
I I countdown time r . 
Interrupt . scheduleTi mer( 





(ICS will change status.) 
Notes: The PacketScheduler and HealthCheck objects will be provided to the BLTable object constructor and stored in private instance variables ps and he 
respectively. 




Table 15.11 Current stimulus: TG( u, d) 
Implemented in Connection. notify () with irqi d == SWI_TG and args == ( u, d) 
Current State 
Mode. getMode (} == Mode. NONE I I 
Mode.getMode(} ==Mode .TRANSMIT 
Mode. getMode (} ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
(this.hc.getStatus(} ! = 
HealthCheck.COMPLETE I I 
ICS. getStatus (} == ICS. IN_PROGRESS} 
Mode. getMode ( } ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this .he .ge t Status (} == 
Heal thCheck . COMPLETE && 
ICS. getSta tus (} ! = I CS . IN_PROGRESS && 
this.blt. findSite (u.getName(}} ==null && 
this .blt. findS ite (d.getName(}} ==null 
Mode. ge t Mode (} ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this. he . getStatus (} == 
HealthCheck . COMPLETE&& 
I CS . getStatus (} ! = ICS . IN_ PROGRESS && 
this .blt. fi n dSite (u. getName (}} ! = null && 
t his .blt. findSite (d.ge tName (}} ==null 
Response 
I I Send ERR to GCS 
thi s . ps.send( 
Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.ERR, n ull}; 
I I Sen d ERR to GCS 
thi s . ps.send( 
Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler .ERR, null}; 
I I Send TSCAN ( 3 } t o GCS 
Vector v =new Vector (}; 
v.addElement (new Integer (3}}; 
t hi s . ps . send( 
Transmit.GROUND, Pac ke tSch edul er.TSCAN,v}; 
I I Send TSCAN ( 2} to GCS 
Vector v = new Vector (}; 
v. addElement (new Integer ( 2} } ; 
this.ps .send( 









Mode. getMode () ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this.hc.getStatus() = = 
HealthCheck . COMPLETE&& 
ICS. getStatus () ! = ICS. IN_PROGRESS && 
this .bl t. f i n dSi te (u. getName ( ) ) ==nul l && 
this . b l t. f indS i te (d . getName () ) ! =null 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode . MAI NTENANCE && 
this . he. getStatus ( ) == 
Heal thCheck. COMPLETE && 
ICS. getStatus () ! = ICS. IN_PROGRESS && 
this . bl t. findSi te (u. getName () ) ! = null && 
this . blt. findSite (d. getName ()) ! =nul l 
Response 
I I Send TSCAN ( 1 ) to GCS 
Vector v =new Vector ( ); 
v. addEleme n t (new Integer ( 1) ) ; 
this.ps.send( 
Transmi t.GROUND, PacketScheduler . TSCAN, v); 
I I Send TGF to both the 
I I UL and the DL. 
t hi s .ps . send( 
Transmi t.UPL I NK, Packet Scheduler . TGF,null) ; 
this.ps.send( 
Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler.TGF,nul l ) ; 
I I Initial ize the 
I I countdown timer. 
I n ter rupt.scheduleTimer( 




(Mode . TRANSMIT); 
Notes: The BLTable object will be provided to the Connection object constructor and wi ll be maintained in private instance variable bit. 




Table 15.12 Current stimulus: TC 
Implemented in Connection. notify () with i rq i d == SWI_ TC 
Current State 
Mode . get Mode () ! =Mode . TRANSMIT 
Mode . getMode() ==Mode.TRANSMIT 
Response 
I I Send ERR to GCS . 
this . ps .send ( 
Transmit .GROUND,PacketScheduler.ERR,null) ; 
//Send TCFtotheUL 
I I a n d the DL, then send 
I I TEF to the GCS . 
this . ps . send( 
State Update 
no change 
I I Se t Connected 
I I to non e . 
this . conn= Connection . NONE ; 
Transmit . UPLINK, PacketScheduler . TCF, nul l); //Reset the 
this . ps . send( //HealthCheck 
Transmit . DOWNLINK, Packet Scheduler. TCF , null); I I and Mode . 
this . ps . send( Mode . setMode(Mode .NONE); 
Transmit . GROUND, PacketScheduler .TEF, n u l l ); this . hc . reset( ); 
I I Reset the timer , i f 
I I waiting for OTE. 
if ( t his . conn ! = Connec t ion . FULL && this . conn ! = 
Connection . HALF) 




Table 15.13 Current stimulus: OTE 
Implemented in Heal thCheck. timerNotify (), in FiringControl. timerNotify (), and in 
Connection.timerNotify() 
Current State 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode. NONE 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
ICS . getStatus () ! = ICS. IN_PROGRESS && 
this.hc.getStatus() != 
HealthCheck.PROCESSING 




If in FiringControl object and 






I I Send HF to GCS. 
this.ps.send( 
Transmit.GROUND,PacketScheduler.HF,null); 






I I Set HealthCheck 
I I to done. 
this . status= 
HealthCheck . COMPLETE; 
I I Reset good and 
I I bad systems 
I I lists. 
this. good= new Vector () ; 
this .bad= new Vector (); 
no change 
(ICS has set status.) 
continued 
~ Table 15.13 continued 
01 
Current State 
If in Connection object and 
Mode . get Mode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this .con n == Connec tion.NONE 
If in Connection object and 
Mode . getMode ( ) ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
t his . conn== Connection. UPLINK 
Response 
I I Send TSCAN ( 3 ) to GCS 
Vector v = new Vee tor () ; 
v.addElement(new 
I nteger ( 3) ) ; 
this .ps . send( 
Tr ansmit . GROUND,PacketSchedu ler . TSCAN, v) ; 
I I Send TCF to UL a nd DL 
this .ps. send( 
Transmi t . UPLINK, Pac ketSchedule r .TCF, null) ; 
this .ps . send ( 
Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler . TCF, nul l); 
I I Send TSCAN ( 2) to GC S 
Vec tor v = new Vec tor (); 
v . addElement(new 
Integer ( 2) ) ; 
this . ps. send ( 
Transmit .GROUND,Packe tSchedu l er.TSCAN, v) ; 
I I Send TCF to UL a nd DL 
this .ps.send( 
State Update 
I I Set Mode to 
I I none and 
I I Hea l thCh eck 
I I to p endin g . 
Mode . s etMode(Mode.NONE); 
thi s.hc . reset( ); 
I I Set Mode to 
I I n one and 
I I Heal thCheck 
I I t o pending. 
Mode . s e tMode(Mode . NONE) ; 
this . hc . reset() ; 
I I Re s et 
I I c onnection. 
Transmit . UPL INK, Packet Scheduler . TCF, null ); this . conn= 
this .ps . send( Connec tion .NONE; 




If in Connection object and 
Mode . getMod e () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
t his. c onn == Connec tion . DOWNL I NK 
If in Connection object and 
Mode. getMode ( ) == Mode . TRANSMI T & & 
(this . conn == Connection . FULL I I 
t h i s . c onn == Conn ec t i on . HALF) 
Response 
I I Send TSCAN ( 1) t o GCS 
Ve ctor v =new Vec t or ( ) ; 
v . addElemen t (new 
I n t e g er ( 1 ) ) ; 
t his . p s . send ( 
Transmit . GROUND, Pa c k etSchedu ler .TSCAN, v ) ; 
State update 
I I Set Mode to 
I /non e and 
I I Hea l t hCheck 
I I t o p endin g . 
Mode . setMode(Mode . NONE ) ; 
t h is . hc . r e se t () ; 
I I Re set 
I I Sen d TCF to UL and DL I I con n ect i on. 
t h is . p s . s end ( t h is . conn = 
Tr an smi t . UPLI NK, Pa ck e t Schedu l e r . TCF, nul l); Con nec tion. NONE; 
thi s . p s . s end ( 
Transmit . DOWNL I NK, Pa cket Sc hedu l er . TCF', null) ; 
null no change 
Note: For FF it does not make sense to check res. g etStatus == res . IN_ P:<.OGRESS because the ICS class may reset the status prior to generating 




Table 15.14 Current stimulus: FSR 
Implemented in Firi ngControl. notify () with irqid == HWI_F IRING_COMPLETE and ICS . getStatus () 
==SUCCESS 
Current State 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode . NONE I I 
Mode.getMode() ==Mode.TRANSMIT 
Mode . getMod e() ==Mode.MAINTENANCE 
Response 
null 
I I Send FS to GCS . 
this.ps.send( 
Transrnit . GROUND,PacketScheduler .FS,null ); 
I I Reset the timer. 
Interrupt. timerReset (); 
Note: An ICS status of SUCCESS ensures that the firing is complete. 
Processing is equal to firing, since execution is in firing control. 




(ICS has set status.) 
Implemented in FiringContro l . notify () with irqid == HWI_FIRING_COMPLETE and ICS. getStatus () 
== FAIL 
Current State 
Mode. getMode () == Mode . NONE I I 




I I Send FF to GCS . 
this.ps . send( 
Transmit.GROUND,PacketScheduler .FF, nu l l) ; 
I I Reset the timer. 




(ICS has set status.) 
Table 15.16 Current stimulus: ISN(x) 
Implemented in HealthCheck.noti fy () with irqid == HWI_INTERNAL_SUBSYSTEM_ NOMINAL and 
args == (x) 
Current State 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode. NONE I I 
Mode. get Mode ( ) ==Mode . TRANSMIT 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this . get Status () ! =PROCESSING 
Mode . get Mode () ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this . get Status () == PROCESSING && 
if( ! this . good . contains(x)) this.good . addElement(x) 
&& this . good. size () +this . bad . size () 
< Heal thCheck. NUMSYS 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this . get Status () == PROCESSING && 
if( ! this.good . contains(x)) this . good . addElement(x) 
&&this .good.s ize() +this.bad .size() >= 
Heal thCheck. NUMSYS && 
thi s.bad . size() ! = 0 
Mode . get Mode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this . getStatus () ==PROCESSING && 
if(!this . good.contains(x)) this.good . addElement(x) 
&&this . good . size () >= HealthCheck . NUMSYS && 





I I Send HF to GCS . 
Vector v =new Vector (); 
v. addElement (this. good) ; 
v . addElement(this.bad) ; 
this.ps.send( 
Transmit . GROUND, 
PacketScheduler . HF , v) ; 
I I Send HS to GCS . 








(good was modified 
in the condition .) 
I I Reset the 
I I Heal thCheck 
this. reset () ; 
I I Reset good and 
I I bad system 
I I lists . 
this. good= new Vector () ; 
this . bad= new Vector () ; 
I I Reset the 
I I Heal thCheck 
this . reset (); 
I I Reset good and 
I I bad system 
I I lists. 
w th i s. good= new Vector () ; 
~ this . bad= new Vector (); 
Notes: NUMSYS is a class constant that is equal to the number of subsystems participating in the health check. 
w w 
0 
Table 15.17 Current stimulus: ISF(x) 
Implemented in HealthCheck.not ify (} with irqid == HWI _INTERNAL_SUBSYSTEM_FAILURE and 
a rgs == (x} 
Current State 
Mode . g etMode () ==Mode. NONE I I 
Mode . getMode() == Mode . TRANSMIT 
Mode . g etMode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE && 
this . getStatus () ! = PROCESSING 
Mode . g etMod e ( ) ==Mode. MAI NTENANCE && 
this . g etStatus () == PROCESSING && 
i f (!thi s . b a d . contains (x)) t his . bad . addElement (x) && 
this. bad. s i ze () + thi s. good . size () < HealthCheck. NUMSYS 
Mode . g etMod e ( ) ==Mode. MAINTENANCE && 
this .getSta tus () ==PROCESSING && 
i f (! th is . good. con tains (x)) this . good . addElement (x) && 





I I Send HF to GCS . 
Vect or v =new Ve ctor () ; 
v.addElemen t(thi s . good) ; 
v.addElement(th is.ba d ); 
this . ps . send( 
Tr a n smi t. GROUND, 





(b ad was modified in the 
condition.) 
I I Reset the 
I I Heal thCheck 
thi s . reset ( ); 
I I Reset good a n d 
I I bad sys tem 
I I l ists . 
this . good= new Vec t or () ; 
thi s. bad= new Vect or (); 
w w .... 
Table 15.18 Current stimulus: UG 
Implemented in Connection . noti fy () with i rqid == swr_UG 
Current State 
Mode. getMode ( ) == Mode . NONE I I 
Mode.getMode() == Mode .MAINTENANCE 
Mode . getMode () == Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connection . NONE 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
t h is . conn ! =Connection . NONE && 
t h is . conn ! =Connection . DOWNLINK 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
t his . conn == Connection. DOWNLINK 





I I Send SDT to UL. 
this . ps . send( 
Transmit . UPLI NK, Packe tScheduler .SDT, 
nu ll) ; 
Implemented in Connection . notify () with irqid == SWI_DI and args == ( id, p) 
Current State 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . NONE I I 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this . conn ! = Connection . FULL && 
this . conn ! =Connection. HALF 
Response 
null 
I I Send ERR to GCS. 
thi s . ps . send( 





Connection . UPLINK; 
no change 





Mode . getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
( this . conn ==Connection.FULL II 
this. conn== Connection . HALF) 
1 I Send DO to DL. no change 
this . ps. sen d ( 
Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler .DO, 
args); 
Note: The interrupt arguments (args) are exactly the required arguments for the DO message. 
w w 
1\) 
Table 15.20 Current stimulus: TE 
Implemented in Connect ion.notify() with irqid == SWI_TE 
Current State 
Mode. getMode ( ) == Mode. NONE I I 
Mode.getMode() == Mode.MAINTENANCE 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this .conn== Connection.NONE 
Mode. ge tMode ( ) == Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn == Connection . UPLINK 
Mode. getMode () == Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connec tion. DOWNLINK 
Response 
null 








this . ps . send ( 
Transmi t .UPLINK,PacketScheduler . FE, 
null); 









I I Reset mode . 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
I I Reset HealthCheck. 
this . hc.reset(); 
I I Reset mode. 
Mode . setMode(Mode.NONE); 
I I Reset Hea l thCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
I I Reset 
I I connection. 
this. conn= Connection. NONE; 
I I Reset mode. 
Mode .setMode(Mode.NONE); 
IIResetHealthCheck. 
this .hc. reset(); 
I I Reset 
I I connection. 





Mode . g etMode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this . conn == Connec tion . FULL 
Mode. getMode ( ) == Mod e . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn == Connection . HALF 
Table 15.21 Current stimulus: UB 
Response 
I I Send TEF t o DL. 
t hi s . ps . send( 
Transmit. DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler . TEF, 
null ); 
I I Send TEF to DL. 
this .ps .send( 
Transmi t.DOWNLI NK, PacketSchedu ler . TEF, 
null ); 
State Update 
this . conn= Connection . HALF 
no change 
Implemented in Connection . n o tify () with irqid == SWI_UB 
Current State 
Mode . g etMode ( ) ==Mo de . NONE I I 
Mode .getMode() ==Mode .MAINTENANCE 
Mode .getMode( ) ==Mode . TRANSMIT 
Response 
null 
I I Send TSCAN ( 1 ) to GCS . 
Vector v =new Vector (); 
v . addE lement(new Integer(l) ) ; 
this . ps.send( 
Transmit . GROUND,PacketSchedu l er.TSCAN, v); 




I I Reset mode. 
Mode .s etMode( Mode .NONE ); 
I I Re s et 
I I Heal thCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
Tran smit. UPLINK, Packet Scheduler . TCF, null ); I I Reset 
this . ps . sen d ( I I connection. 
Transmit . DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler . TCF, null) ; this . conn= Connection . NONE; 
(.) 
(.) 
Table 15.22 Current stimulus: DG 
Implemented in Connect ion. not ify () with irqid == SWI DG 
""" Current State Response State Update 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . NONE I I 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . MAINTENANCE 
Mode . ge t Mode () ==Mode . TRANSMI T && 
this. c onn= = Connect ion . NONE 
Mode. getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn ! =Connection . NONE && 
thi s . c onn ! = Connect ion . UPLINK 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connection . UPLINK 




I I Send SDT to UL. 
t his.ps . send( 
Trans mit . UPLINK, PacketScheduler. SDT, 
null) ; 
no change 
this . conn= Connec t ion . DOWNLINK; 
no change 
this.conn= Connec tion .FULL 
Implemented in Connect ion. noti fy () with irqid == SWI _ PB and args == ( id ) 
Current State 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . NONE I I 
Mode . getMode () == Mode . MAINTENANCE 
Mode. get Mode ( ) == Mode. TRANSMIT && 
thi s . conn ! =Connection . FULL && 
this . conn ! =Connec t ion. HALF 
Mode . getMode () == Mode . TRANSMIT && 
(this. conn == Connection . FULL I I 
Response 
null 
I I Send ERR to GCS. 
this . ps .send ( 
Transmi t.GROUND,PacketScheduler .ERR, null) ; 
I I Send PBF to UL. 
this . ps . send( 








Table 15.24 Current stimulus: DTE 
Implemented in Connection .notify () with irqid == SWI _DTE 
Current State 
Mode . g etMode ( ) == Mode . NONE I I 
Mode . getMode() ==Mode. MAINTENANCE 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this . conn== Connection .NONE 
Mode . g et Mode () ==Mode . TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connection . UPL I NK 
Mode. getMode () == Mode . TRANSMIT & & 
this . conn== Connection. DOWNLINK 
Response 
null 
I I Send FE to GCS . 
this.ps . send( 
Transmit .GROUND, PacketScheduler . FE, 
null); 
I I Send FE to GCS and DL. 
this . ps . send( 
Transmit.GROUND,PacketScheduler . FE, 
null) ; 
this.ps . send( 
Transmit.UPLINK,PacketScheduler . FE, 
null ); 
I I Send FE to GC S and DL. 
this .ps. send( 
Transmi t . GROUND, Pa.cketScheduler. FE, 
n ull); 
this.ps.send( 




I I Reset mode. 
Mode . setMode(Mode.NONE) ; 
I I Reset Heal thCheck. 
this.hc . reset(); 
I I Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
I I Reset HealthCheck. 
this . hc . reset() ; 
I I connection. 
th i s . conn= Connection .NONE; 
I I Reset mode . 
Mode . setMode(Mode.NONE) ; 
I I Reset Hea l thCheck. 
this. he. reset (); 
I I Reset 
I I connection. 
thi s. c onn= Conne ction .NONE; 
continued 
~ Table 15.24 continued 
Ol 
Current State 
Mode. getMode () == Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connection . FULL 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode. TRANSMIT && 
this. conn== Connect i on . HALF 
Response 
I I Send FE to GCS, UL, DL. 
this . ps .send( 
Tran smi t. GROUND, PacketScheduler . FE, 
n ul l); 
this. ps.sen d( 
Tr ansmi t.UPLINK,PacketScheduler .FE, 
n ull); 
this . ps .send( 
Trans mit.DOWNLINK, Pac ketScheduler.FE, 
null); 
I I Send TEF to ULand DL . 
this.ps.send( 
Transmi t. UPLI NK, PacketScheduler .TEF, 
nul l); 
this.ps .send( 
Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler . TEF, 
null ); 
State Update 
I I Reset mode . 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
I I Reset Heal thCheck. 
t hi s .hc . reset(); 
I I Reset 
I I connection. 
t hi s. conn= Connection . NONE; 
I I Reset mode . 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
I I Reset Heal thCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
I I Reset 
I I connection. 
thi s. conn= Conn ec tion. NONE; 
w w ..... 
Table 15.25 Current stimulus: DB 
Implemented in Connect ion. notify(} with irqi d == SWI_DB 
Current State Response 
Mode . getMode () == Mode. NONE I I null 
Mode .getMode() ==Mode . MAINTENANCE 
Mode . getMode () ==Mode . TRANSMI T I I Send TSCAN ( 2) to GCS . 
vector v = new Vec t or ( ) ; 
v . addElement(new I nteger(2) ); 
this . ps . send( 
Transmit .GROUND, PacketScheduler.TSCAN, v) ; 
I I Send TCF to ULand DL. 
this . ps . send( 
Transmit . UPLINK, PacketScheduler.TCF, 
null); 
this.ps.send( 




I I Reset mode. 
Mode . setMode(Mode . NONE) ; 
I I Reset 
HealthCheck.this.hc.reset() ; 
I I Rese t 
I I connect ion. 
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15.7 Step 6: Reorganize the 
Implementations into 
Executable Code 
When the implemented state box tables are complete, they may be transformed 
to executable code. In this step the architecture is merged with the behavioral 
specification of the state box. The resulting code may be reorganized to meet 
efficiency, performance, or other goals. 
The transformation of Connection class to code is shown in the following 
pages. The stimuli with tables that have functionality allocated to Connection 
are IN, MG, TG(u, d), OTE, UG, DI(id, p), TE, UB, DG, PB(id), DTE, and DB. 
Collecting the information from these tables leads to the following final expan-
sion of the Connection class. 
Class: scs.sos.Connection 







I** This class manages the connection. *I 
public final class Connection 
implements IH.InterruptObserver, Interrupt.TimerObserver 
I** Constructor for the connection object. 
@param he A health check object. 
@param ps A packet scheduler object. 
@param fc A firing control object. 
@param blt A bll table object. *I 
public Connection(HealthCheck he, PacketScheduler ps, 
FiringControl fc, BLTable blt) { 
II Save the objects passed in. 
this.hc he; 
this.ps = ps; 
this.fc = fc; 
this.blt = blt; 
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this.conn Connection.NONE; 
I** Interrupt notification arrives here. Interrupts indicate that 
the most recent request to the transmit hardware has completed. 
@param irqid The interrupt id. 
@param args Any arguments associated with the interrupt. *I 
public void notify(int irqid, vector args) 
II The following implements table 15.6. 
if(irqid == IH.SWI_IN) 




II Send INA. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.INA, null); 
II Set mode to none. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck and FiringControl. 
this.fc.reset(); 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Set the connection to none. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II The following implements table 15.8. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_MG) 
if(Mode.getMode() == Mode.NONE) Mode.setMode(Mode.MAINTENANCE); 
else this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.ERR, null); 
return; 
II The following implements table 15.11. 
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catch(Exception e) 
II Do nothing. 
return; 
II Make sure the command is allowable here. 
if(Mode.getMode() == Mode.NONE I I 
Mode. getMode () Mode. TRANSMIT I I 
(Mode.getMode() == Mode.MAINTENANCE && 
(this.hc.getStatus() != HealthCheck.COMPLETE I I 
ICS.getStatus() == ICS.IN_PROGRESS) )) { 
II Send ERR to GCS. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.ERR, n~22t 
return; 
else 
if(u ==null && d == null) { 
II Send TSCAN(3) to GCS. 





else if(d ==null) { 
II Send TSCAN(2) to GCS. 





else if (u == null) { 
II Send TSCAN(l) to GCS. 
















II Initialize the countdown timer. 
Interrupt.scheduleTimer(this, Connection.CTIME); 
II Set mode to transmit. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.TRANSMIT); 
return; 
II IH.SWI_TG case 
II The following implements table 15.12. 
else if(irqid IH.SWI_TC) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() !~ Mode.TRANSMIT) 
else 












II Reset the timer, if waiting for OTE. 
if(this.conn !~ Connection.FULL && 
this.conn !~ Connection.HALF) 
Interrupt.resetTimer(); 
II Set connected to none. 
this.conn ~ Connection.NONE; 








: f \\ 
'" 
;-... 
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~ 
this.hc.reset(); 
II IH.SWI_TC case 
II The following implements table 15.18. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_UG) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If the downlink has connected, the connection is complete. 
if(this.conn == Connection.DOWNLINK) 




else if (this.conn == Connection.NONE) 
this.conn = Connection.UPLINK; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_UG case 
II The following implements table 15.19. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_DI) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If not fully connected, generate an error. 
if(this.conn != Connection.FULL I I 
this.conn != Connection.HALF) 
else 








II IH.SWI_DI case 
II The following implements table 15.20. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_TE) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If connection is full or half, forward the message. 
"' 
·~ 
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if(this.conn Connection.FULL I I 
this.conn Connection.HALF) { 
else 
II Send TEF to the DL. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, 
PacketScheduler.TEF, null); 
II The connection is now half open. 
this.conn = Connection.HALF; 
return; 
II Send FE to GCS. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
PacketScheduler.FE, null); 
II Send FE to a connected site. 
if(this.conn == Connection.UPLINK) 
this.ps.send(Transmit.UPLINK, 
PacketScheduler.FE, null); 
if(this.conn == Connection.DOWNLINK) 
this.ps.send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, 
PacketScheduler.FE, null); 
II Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Reset the connection. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_TE case 
II The following implements table 15.21. 
else if(irqid IH.SWI_UB) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II Send TSCAN(l) to GCS. 
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"' 
PacketScheduler.TSCAN, v); 





II Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Reset the connection. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_UB case 
II The following implements table 15.22. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_DG) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If the uplink has connected, the connection is complete. 
if(this.conn == Connection.UPLINK) 
II Send SDT to the UL. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.UPLINK, 
PacketScheduler.SDT, null); 
this.conn = Connection.FULL; 
else if (this.conn == Connection.NONE) 
this.conn = Connection.DOWNLINK; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_DG case 
II The following implements table 15.23. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_PB) 
. 
'" ,•, 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If not fully connected, generate an error. 
if(this.conn != Connection.FULL I I 
this.conn != Connection.HALF) { 
II Send ERR to GCS. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, 
PacketScheduler.ERR, null); 
: ,' ~ 
....,_ ... __ _ 
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else 
return; 




II IH.SWI PB case 
II The following implements table 15.24. 
else if(irqid IH.SWI_DTE) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II If connection is half, close the connection. 
if(this.conn == Connection.HALF) { 





II Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
else 
II The connection is now closed. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II Send FE to GCS. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, 
PacketScheduler.FE, null); 
II Send FE to any connected sites. 
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if(this.conn 
this.conn 




II Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Reset the connection. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_DTE case 
II The following implements table 15.25. 
else if(irqid == IH.SWI_DB) 
II See if the command is valid now. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 
II Send TSCAN(2) to GCS. 
Vector v =new Vector(); 
v.addElement(new Integer(2)); 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.TSCAN, v); 
II Send TCF to the ULand the DL. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.UPLINK, PacketScheduler.TCF, null); 
this.ps.send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler.TCF, null); 
II Reset mode. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
II Reset HealthCheck. 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Reset the connection. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
return; 
II IH.SWI_DB case 
,, 
·~· ~I,aJ.¥e~~~~tf'r: ·· 
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I** On-board timer interrupts arrive here to be processed. 
This implements parts of table 15.13. *I 
public void timerNotify() 
II If mode is not transmit, ignore this. 
if(Mode.getMode() != Mode.TRANSMIT) return; 




Connection.FULL I I 
Connection.HALF) 
Vector v =new Vector(); 
if(this.conn == Connection.NONE) 
II Send TSCAN(3) to GCS. 
v.addElement(new Integer(3)); 
else if(this.conn == Connection.UPLINK) 
II Send TSCAN(2) to GCS. 
v.addElement(new Integer(2)); 
else if(this.conn == Connection.DOWNLINK) 
II Send TSCAN(l) to GCS. 
v.addElement(new Integer(l)); 
this.ps.send(Transmit.GROUND, PacketScheduler.TSCAN, v); 
II Send TCF to the ULand the DL. 
this.ps.send(Transmit.UPLINK, PacketScheduler.TCF, null); 
this.ps.send(Transmit.DOWNLINK, PacketScheduler.TCF, null); 
II Set mode to none and reset HealthCheck. 
Mode.setMode(Mode.NONE); 
this.hc.reset(); 
II Reset the connection. 
this.conn = Connection.NONE; 
II The following are public class constants that correspond 
II to the various connection statuses. 
public static final int NONE 0; 
public static final int UPLINK 1; 
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public static final int FULL 3; 
public static final int HALF = 4· 
II Private instance variables. 
private HealthCheck he = null; 
private PacketScheduler ps = null; 
private FiringControl fc = null; 
private BLTable blt = null; 
private int conn = Connection.NONE; 
II The following is a private class constant for the number 
II of milliseconds to wait for a connection. 
private static final long CTIME = 30000; 
Production of final code follows the process just shown. All code should be 
verified to confirm that the Java implementation of the state box is correct. The 
verified code would then be tested as described in Chapter 16. 
.. 
",;;-
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16 
Satellite Control System 
Testing and Certification 
16.1 Statistical Testing 
The fundamentals of statistical testing based on usage models were provided in 
Chapter 5. The work flow for testing and certifying the SOS is summarized in 
the following list: 
Step 1: Define certification plan. 
1. Set goals. 
2. Define users, uses, and environments. 
Step 2: Build model structure. 
1. Determine the states of use. 
2. Determine allowable state transitions. 
Step 3: Determine state transition probabilities. 
1. Establish constraints on arc probabilities. 
2. Generate probabilities. 
Step 4: Validate the usage model. 
1. Validate with respect to known or anticipated usage. 
2. Validate with respect to test plans. 
Step 5: Generate test cases, and execute and evaluate results. 
1. Perform nonrandom testing. 
2. Perform random testing. 
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16.2 Step 1 : Define Certification Plan 
16.2.1 Goals 
The goals for the statistical testing of the SOS software are the following: 
To visit every state of use and experience every transition at least one 
time 
To demonstrate that the SOS correctly processes every canonical 
sequence 
To test every requirement 
To demonstrate that the software reliability exceeds 0.999 with at least 
95% confidence in expected general field operations 
To demonstrate that the software reliability exceeds 0.95 with at least 
95% confidence for each error situation 
To acknowledge that the SOS will not be accepted with a known error, 
even if the reliability goals are met 
16.2.2 Users, Uses, and Environments 
The test boundary determines the system under test. All interfaces that are cut 
by the boundary must be "driven" by the test in the following sense: All inputs 
should be controllable by the testers, and all outputs must be observable by the 
testers. If inputs cannot be controlled, the software will not be in a well-defined 
state of use, and results cannot be predicted. If outputs cannot be observed, then 
software success or failure on a test case cannot be determined. 
For the SOS, the test boundary will cut the following external interfaces: 
• The interface between the receiver hardware and the packet parser 
All interfaces to the transmit hardware 
A "use" of the SOS will be either a completion (all events beginning with 
initialization of the SOS through to completion of a successful transmission by 
exiting transmit mode) or a failure (all events from initialization of the SOS to a 
fatal error or reset). Thus, the initial and final states for a use will be software 
initialized prior to entering maintenance mode. A use shall be a nonempty 
sequence of events beginning in the initial state and ending in the final state. 
There are three classes of users: GCS, UL, and DL. These user classes are 
further subdivided and defined as shown in Table 16.1. 
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Table 16.1 Classes of SOS user 
User Class Description 
GCS normal Normal GCS user; initiates valid communications, allows transmissions 
to complete 
GCS error Error-prone GCS user; initiates communications with out-of-sequence 
commands (such as transmit mode commands during maintenance 
mode), invalid sites, and transmission interrupts 
UL good Good uplink site; sends correct sequence of packets with correct infor-
mation, no out-of-sequence messages or transmission interrupts 
UL bad Bad uplink site; sends packets out of sequence or with incorrect check-
sums, sends transmission interrupts and out-of-sequence messages 
(such as UG during Dl packet sequence) 
DL good Good downlink site; all packets received, no out-of-sequence messages, 
only requests resending valid packets, no transmission interrupts 
DL bad Bad downlink site; some packets dropped, PB sent for nonexistent pack-
ets, transmission interrupts 
For certification testing purposes there is only a single environment of use 
for the SOS. Operations under adverse environmental circumstances (e.g., poor 
atmospheric conditions) will be represented through the "bad" user classes. 
General field operations, for which the reliability must be shown to exceed 
0.999, include all eight of the following strata: 
1. GCS normal, UL good, DL good 
2. GCS normal, UL good, DL bad 
3. GCS normal, UL bad, DL good 
4. GCS normal, UL bad, DL bad 
5. GCS error, UL good, DL good 
6. GCS error, UL good, DL bad 
7. GCS error, UL bad, DL good 
8. GCS error, UL bad, DL bad 
The error situations, each of which must be certified separately to have a 
reliability exceeding 0.95, are strata 2 through 8. Statistical sampling will be 
used for all strata to meet testing goals. As will be seen in the following pages, 
the testing goals imply that error situations must be tested far in excess of their 
expected frequency in general operations. The general field operations reliability 
and confidence calculations will include the testing performed for the individual 
error strata but will discount each to its correct proportions. One usage model 
will be developed to guide testing and generate test cases for all strata, and will 
be built with special "bookkeeping" states to facilitate correct sampling. 
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16.3 Step 2: Build Model Structure 
The most likely scenario is given at the start of Chapter 12. Based on this sce-
nario, Figure 16.1 is a high-level view of the SOS use. 
Figure 16.1 Initial usage model 
Mode: MG 
None---
Figure 16.2 Expansion of Mode: Maintenance 
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The high-level model will be refined to the necessary level of detail by suc-
cessively refining states and transitions. The state designated [Mode: 
Maintenance] can be expanded as shown in Figure 16.2, and the state desig-
nated [Mode: Transmit] can be expanded as shown in Figure 16.3. 
Many arcs were excluded from these figures so that the essential structure 
of the model would not be obscured. The complete usage model consists of 68 
states and 1,071 arcs. The model was designed to facilitate sampling control by 
strata, and this required that the basic model be replicated. The replication is 
described, but details are omitted because of space limitations. 
The model is presented in a usage modeling notation. Comments are indi-
cated by II, state names are enclosed in square brackets, arc names are enclosed 
in quotation marks, and probability values or relative frequencies are enclosed 
in parentheses. The general pattern is 
[from state] 
(probability) "arc name" [to state] 
(probability) "arc name" [to state] 
Each state has a probability distribution over its exit arcs, and when probabil-
ity or frequency values are omitted from exit arcs of a state, a default value set by 
the "assume" command in the modeling notation is used. Probabilities are always 
normalized so that the exit arcs have a legitimate probability distribution. 
The model presented reads as follows . Begin in state [Software Not Invoked]. 
There is only one exit arc "IN," therefore it has probability 1.0 of being taken 
(defaulted to 0.0005 and then normalized to 1.0), which will lead to state 
[Mode: None]. There are 21 exit arcs from [Mode: None] . Arc "MG" will be 
taken with probability 0.99 and the remaining 0.01 probability mass will be dis-
tributed equally across the remaining 20 arcs. The arcs are classified and identi-
fied by the comment lines. 
The very last section of the model is a set of bookkeeping states that will be 
used for stratification of sampling. They are named according to the following 
conventions: 
Axxx means GCS aborts 
• xBxx means GCS causes an error 
• xxBx means UL causes an error 
xxxB means DL causes an error 
Stratum 1 is represented by [GGG] and [AGGG], stratum 2 by [GGB] and 
[AGGB], and so forth. Many state names throughout the model include a suffix 
that indicates the bookkeeping states through which the model will ultimately 
pass. Usage model analysis shows for each state its probability of appearing in a 
random walk through the model, in the long run. This reveals, for example, the 
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percentage of test cases that will result in [BBB] in the long run, given the prob-
abilities in the model. 
The model as presented is compiled into a format that is accepted by analy-
sis and script generation tools. Usage models are treated as directed graphs for 
some purposes and as stochastic matrices for other purposes. As directed 
graphs, multiple arcs from one state to another are permitted (see, for example, 
the eight arcs from [Mode: None] to [Mode: None, BGG]). However, when the 
model is represented as a stochastic matrix, only one arc is permitted from one 
state to another and the probability mass on that single arc is the sum of the 
masses on the individual arcs. 
Notice that just above the bookkeeping states, comments indicate that half 
the model has been omitted because of space limitations. The omitted section is 
a replication of the upper half of the model for the case in which the GCS has 
caused a protocol error (i.e., all the states of the form [ . .. ,BGG], [ ... ,BGB], 
[ . .. ,BBG], and [ ... ,BBB]). 
II Usage model for Sat ellite Operations Software (SOS ) 
assume ( . 000 5 ) 
[Software Not Invoked] 




II Reinitializat ion ends the use. 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II Moves t o maintenance mode. A health check is required. 
"MG" [Health Check Pending] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol err ors. 
"HR" [Mode:None,BGG] 
"BR" [Mode:None ,BGG ] 
"FR" [Mode: None,BGG] 
"TG " [Mode :None ,BGG] 
"TGu " [Mode:None,BGG] 
"TGd" [Mode:None,BGG] 
"TGud" [Mode: None ,BGG ] 
"TC" [Mode:None,BGG] 
II The fol l owing signals are ignored. 




[Mode : None] 
• 
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II IN MG 
[Health Check Pending] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II The health check is expected. 
(. 99} "HR" [Checking Health] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 






















II The following signals are ignored. 
II 
"OTE" [Health Check Pending] 
''FSRrt 
11 FFR" 
[Health Check Pending] 
[Health Check Pending] 
The following commands are ignored 
"UG" [Health Check Pending] 
"DI" [Health Check Pending] 
"TE, [Health Check Pending] 
"UBI/ [Health Check Pending] 
"DG" [Health Check Pending] 
11 PB" [Health Check Pending] 
11 DTE" [Health Check Pending] 
''DB" [Health Check Pending] 
II IN MG HR 
[Checking Health] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
if not in transmit mode. 
.. . , 
. } 




~ , ~; 
~ ~ 
";,. 
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II The health check completion signals. 
( . 4 9 5 ) "ASN" 
( .495) "SF" 
[Health Check Complete] 
[Health Check Complete] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"MG" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"BR" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"FR" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"TG" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"TGu" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"TGd" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"TGud" [Checking Health,BGG] 
"TC" [Checking Health,BGG] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"OTE" [Checking Health] 
"FSR" [Checking Health] 
"FFR" [Checking Health] 
II The following commands are ignored if not in transmit mode. 
"UG" [Checking Health] 
"DI" [Checking Health] 
"TE" [Checking Health] 
"UB" [Checking Health] 
"DG" [Checking Health] 
"PB" [Checking Health] 
"DTE" [Checking Health] 
"DB" [Checking Health] 
II IN MG HR ASN 
[Health Check Complete] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II Another health request is valid. 
"HR" [Checking Health] 
II BIL table update requests are valid. 
"BR" [Health Check Complete] 
II Thruster firing requests are valid. 
"FR" [Firing Thrusters] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"MG" [Health Check Complete,BGG] 
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[Health Check Complete,BGG] 
[Health Check Complete,BGG] 
[Health Check Complete,BGG] 
"TGud" [No Connection] 




[Health Check Complete] 
[Health Check Complete] 
[Health Check Complete] 
II The following commands are ignored if not in transmit mode. 
"UG" [Health Check Complete] 
"DI" [Health Check Complete] 
"TE" [Health Check Complete] 
"UB" [Health Check Complete] 




[Health Check Complete] 
[Health Check Complete] 
[Health Check Complete] 
II IN MG HR ASN FR 
[Firing Thrusters] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II Thruster firings can succeed or fail. 
(. 33) "OTE" [Health Check Complete] 
(. 33) "FSR" [Health Check Complete] 
(. 33) "FFR" [Health Check Complete] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"MG" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"TC" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"HR" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"BR" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"FR" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"TG" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
11 TGu" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"TGd" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
"TGud" [Firing Thrusters,BGG] 
II The following commands are ignored if not in transmit mode. 
"UG" [Firing Thrusters] 






; f lt 
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liTE" [Firing Thrusters] 
"UB" [Firing Thrusters] 
"DG" [Firing Thrusters] 
11 PB" [Firing Thrusters] 
"DTE" [Firing Thrusters] 
II DB" [Firing Thrusters] 
II IN MG HR ASN TGud 
[No Connection] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGG] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out, both sites fail. 
11 0TE" [GBB] 





II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBG] 
"DB" [GGB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol erro~-
11 HR" [No Connection,BGG] 
"MG" [No Connection,BGG] 
IIBR" [No Connection,BGG] 
"FR" [No Connection,BGG] 
"TG" [No Connection,BGG] 
"TGu" [No Connection,BGG] 
"TGd" [No Connection,BGG] 
11 TGud" [No Connection,BGG] 





II The following commands generate an error if not fully 








\:, ~ ' '~ .. ' 
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II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG 
[UL Connected] 
II IN II [AGGG] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGG] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, DL fails. 
(. 99) 
11 0TE" [GGB] 




















[UL Connected, EGG] 
[UL Connected,BGG] 
[UL Connected, EGG] 
[UL Connected, EGG] 
[UL Connected, EGG] 
[UL Connected,BGG] 
[UL Connected, EGG] 
[UL Connected, EGG] 
from the GCS 





generate protocol errors. 









II IN MG HR ASN TGud DG 
[DL Connected] 
"IN 11 [AGGG] 
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II If the connection experiences a time-out now, UL fails. 
"OTE" [GBG] 





II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBG] 
"DB" [GGB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [DL Connected,BGG] 
"MG" [DL Connected,BGG] 
IIBR" [DL Connected,BGG] 
"FR 11 [DL Connected,BGG] 
"TGtt [DL Connected,BGG] 
"TGu" [DL Connected,BGG] 
"TGd" [DL Connected,BGG] 
"TGud" [DL Connected,BGG] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [DL Connected] 
"FFRu [DL Connected] 
II The following commands generate an error if not fully connec 











II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGG] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Connected] 
"DG" [Connected] 
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II Data can be transferred now. 
(. 5) 11 DI" [Connected] 
( .2) 11 PB" [Connected] 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
(. 2) "TE" [Half-Closed] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Connected,BGG] 
"MG" [Connected,EGG] 
"ER" [Connected, EGG] 
"FR" [Connected, BGG] 
"TG" [Connected,EGG] 
"TGu" [Connected,EGG] 
"TGd" [Connected, EGG] 
"TGud" [Connected,EGG] 







II The following commands generate an error if not fully connected. 
"DTE" [GGE] 
II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TE 
[Half-Closed] 
"IN" [AGGG] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGG] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Half-Closed] 
"DG" [Half-Closed] 





II Data can be transferred now. 
( .245) "DI" 
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(. 5) 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
"TE" [Half-Closed] 
II The DL can signal end of data . 
"DTE" [GGG] 






"TGu" [Half-Closed, EGG] 
"TGd" [Half-Closed, EGG] 
"TGud" [Half-Closed,BGG] 






II IN MG HR ASN TGud (with UL error) 
[No Connection,GBG] 
"IN" [AGBG] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBG] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out, both sites fail. 
"OTE" [GBB] 





II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBG] 
"DB" [GBB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [No Connection,BBG] 
"MG" [No Connection,BBG] 
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"TGd" [No Connection,BBG] 
"TGud" [No Connection,BBG] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR 11 
11 FFR 11 
[No Connection,GBG] 
[No Connection,GBG] 













II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBG] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, DL fails. 
"OTE" [GBB] 










II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HRrt [UL Connected, BEG] 
IIMG'I [UL Connected, BEG] 
"BR" [UL Connected, BEG] 
"FR" [UL Connected, BEG] 
11 TG 11 [UL Connected, BEG] 
'ITGulf [UL Connected, BEG] 
"TGd" [UL Connected, BEG] 
"TGud" [UL Connected, BEG] 
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II The following commands generate an error if not fully conne 











II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBG] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, UL fails. 
"OTE" [GBG] 










II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"MG" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"BR" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"FR" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"TG// [DL Connected,BBG] 
"TGu" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"TGd" [DL Connected,BBG] 
"TGud" [DL Connected,BBG] 
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II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG (with UL error) 
[Connected,GBG] 
''IN" [AGBG] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
(. 09) "TC" [AGBG] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Connected, GBG l 
"DG" [Connected,GBG] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBG] 
[GBB] 
II Data can be transferred now. 




II The UL can signal end of data. 
"TE" [Half-Closed,GBG] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Connected,BBG] 
"MG" [Connected, BEG] 
"BR" [Connected, BEG] 
"FR" [Connected, BEG] 
"TG" [Connected,BBG] 
"TGu" [Connected, BEG] 
"TGd" [Connected,BBG] 
"TGud" [Connected,BBG] 






II The following commands generate an error if not fully connected. 
"DTE" [GBB] 
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II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBG] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Half-Closed,GBG] 
"DG" [Half-Closed,GBG] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBG] 
"DB" [GBB] 
II Data can be transferred now. 
(.245) "DI" 
( .245) "PB" 
[Half-Closed,GBG] 
[Half-Closed,GBG] 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
"TE" [Half-Closed,GBG] 
II The DL can signal end of data. 
(.5) "DTE" [GBG] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Half-Closed, BEG] 
"MG" [Half-Closed, BEG] 
"BR" [Half-Closed,BBG] 
"FR" [Half-Closed,BBG] 
"TG" [Half-Closed, BEG] 
"TGu" [Half-Closed, BEG] 
"TGd" [Half-Closed,BBG] 
"TGud" [Half-Closed,BBG] 






II IN MG HR ASN TGud (with DL error) 
[No Connection,GGB] 
"IN" [AGGB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGB] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out, both sites fail. 
"OTE" [GBB] 
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II Either site can connect now. 
"UG" [UL Connected, GGB] 
"DG" [DL Connected,GGB] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
"DB" [GGB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [No Connection, BGB] 
"MG" [No Connection,BGB] 









"TGud" [No Connection, BGB] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [No Connection,GGB] 
11 FFR" [No Connection,GGB] 
II The following commands generate an error if not fully connected. 
"DI" [No Connection,GBB] 
"TE" [GBB] 




II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG (with DL error) 
[UL Connected,GGB] 
"IN" [AGGB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGB] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, DL fails. 
"0TE 11 [GGB] 
II Either site can connect now. 
"UG" [UL Connected,GGB] 
(. 99) 11 DG" [Connected,GGB] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
"DB" [GGB] 
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II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol erro~. 
11 HR" [UL Connected,BGB] 
"MG" [UL Connected,BGB] 
"BR 11 [UL Connected,BGB] 
"FR" [UL Connected,BGB] 
"TG" [UL Connected,BGB] 
"TGu" [UL Connected,BGB] 
"TGd 11 [UL Connected,BGB] 
"TGud" [UL Connected,BGB] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [UL Connected, GGB] 
11 FFR 11 [UL Connected,GGB] 
II The following commands generate an error if not fully coD~ec%1 












II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGB] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, UL fails. 
"OTE" [GBB] 










II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
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"TGu" [DL Connected, 8GB] 
"TGd" [DL Connected,BGB] 
"TGud" [DL Connected,BGB] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [DL Connected,GGB] 
"FFR" [DL Connected,GGB] 
II The following commands generate an error if not fully connected. 
"DI" [DL Connected,GBB] 
"TE" [GBB] 
"PB" [DL Connected,GGB] 
"DTE" [GGB] 







II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
11 TC" [AGGB] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Connected,GGB] 
"DG" [Connected, GGB] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
"DB" [GGB] 





II The UL can signal end of data. 
"TE" [Half-Closed,GGB] 
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"TGd" [Connected, BGB] 
"TGud" [Connected, BGB] 
II The following signals are ignored. 





I I Th.e following commands generate an error if not fully connec-~ 
''DTE" [GGB] 
II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TE (with DL error) 
[Half-Closed,GGB] 
"IN" [AGGB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGGB] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Half-Closed, GGB] 
"DG" [Half-Closed,GGB] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
"DB" [GGB] 
II Data can be transferred now. 
( .245) "DI" 
( .245) "PB" 
[Half-Closed,GGB] 
[Half-Closed,GGB] 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
"TE" [Half-Closed,GGB] 
II The DL can signal end of data. 
( .5) "DTE" [GGB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Half~Closed,BGB] 
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"TGd" [Half-Closed,BGB] 
"TGud" [Half-Closed,BGB] 




II IN MG HR ASN TGud (with ULand DL error) 
[No Connection,GBB] 
"IN" [AGBB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBB] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out, both sites fail. 
"OTE" [GBB] 
II Either site can connect now. 
( .495) "UG" 
( .495) "DG" 
[UL Connected,GBB] 
[DL Connected,GBB] 





II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [No Connection,BBB] 
"MG" [No Connection,BBB] 
"BR" [No Connection,BBB] 
"FR" [No Connection, BBB] 
"TG" [No Connection,BBB] 
"TGu" [No Connection,BBB] 
"TGd" [No Connection,BBB] 
"TGud" [No Connection, BBB] 












0 ~ ~' 
c• 
:, 





II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG (with ULand DL error) 
[UL Connected,GBB] 
"IN" [AGBB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBB] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, DL fails. 
"OTE" [GBB] 
II Either site can connect now. 
"UG" [UL Connected,GBB] 
(. 99) "DG" [Connected, GEE] 
II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
"DB" [GBB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol erro~s-
J/HR" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"MG" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"BR" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"FR" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"TG" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"TGu" [UL Connected,BBB] 
"TGd" [UL Connected,BBB] 
11 TGud" [UL Connected,BBB] 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [UL Connected,GBB] 
"FFR" [UL Connected,GBB] 
II The following commands generate an error if not fully 
"DI" [UL Connected,GBB] 
"TE" [GBB] 
"PB" [UL Connected,GBB] 
"DTE" [GBB] 
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II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGEE] 
II If the connection experiences a time-out now, UL fails. 
"OTE" [GBB] 




















[DL Connected, BEE] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
[DL Connected, BilE] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
[DL Connected, EBB] 
from the GCS 
II The following signals are ignored. 
"FSR" [DL Connected,BBB] 
"FFR" [DL Connected,BBB] 
generate protocol errors. 














II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGEE] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" 
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II Either site can fail. 
"UB" [GBB] 
11 DB" [GBB] 
II Data can be transferred now. 
(. 5) "DI" [Connected, GEE] 
(. 2) "PB" [Connected, GEE] 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
(. 2) "TE" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
II The following commands from the GCS generate protocol errors. 
"HR" [Connected, EBB] 
"MG" [Connected, EBB] 
"BR" [Connected, EBB] 
"FR" [Connected, EBB] 
"TG" [Connected, EBB] 
"TGu" [Connected,BBB] 
"TGd" [Connected, EBB] 
"TGud" [Connected, EBB] 







II The following commands generate an error if not fully connected. 
11 DTE" [GBB] 
II IN MG HR ASN TGud UG DG TE (with ULand DL error) 
[Half-Closed,GBB] 
"IN" [AGBB] 
II The GCS can cancel the transmission at any time. 
"TC" [AGBB] 
II Either site can send good status. 
"UG" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
"DG" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
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II Data can be transferred now. 
"DI" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
11 PB" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
II The UL can signal end of data. 
''TE" [Half-Closed,GBB] 
II The DL can signal end of data. 
"DTE" [GBB] 













"TGd" [Half-Closed, EBB] 
"TGud" [Half-Closed, EBB] 







II SECOND HALF OF MODEL GOES HERE 
II Structure of second half is identical to that of first half, and 
consists of the following states: 
II [Mode:None,BGG], [Health Check Pending,BGG], [Checking Health,BGG], 
II [Health Check Complete,BGG], [Firing Thrusters,BGG], 
II [No Connection,BGG], [UL Connected,BGG], [DL Connected, EGG], 
II [Connected,BGG], [Half-Closed,BGG], 
II [No Connection,BBG], [UL Connected,BBG], [DL Connected,BBG], 
II [Connected,BBG], [Half-Closed,BBG], 
II [No Connection,BGB], [UL Connected,BGB], [DL Connected,BGB], 
II [Connected,BGB], [Half-Closed,BGB], 
II [No Connection, EBB], [UL Connected,BBB], [DL Connected,BBB], 
I I [Connected, BBB], [Half-Closed, BBB], 
II Bookkeeping states. 
[GGG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[GBG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
'b,:; 
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[GGB] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[GBB] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[BGG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[BBG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[BGB] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[BBB] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[AGGG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[AGBG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
fr • [AGGB] "End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[AGBB] 
~ ~ ~ 
'''" "End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
0 0 
., [ABGG] . 
,;~ "End of Use" [Software Terminated] ,. 
[ABBG] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
[ABGB] 
"End of Use" [Software Terminated] 
; r r, 
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16.4 Step 3: Determine State Transition 
Probabilities 
Transition probabilities must be assigned to every arc in the usage model. The 
model structure can be used with different sets of transition probabilities to 
make different models. Multiple models will be needed to plan and to conduct 
testing according to the certification criteria. 
The usage model notation shows assigned probabilities in parentheses. The 
arcs with no probabilities shown have been defaulted to 0.0005. In other words, 
the model explicitly accounts for 99% of the probability mass of the exit arcs 
for each state. The controlling probabilities use the following pattern: 
[No Connection] 
( 0. 495) 11 UG" 
( 0. 495) "DG" 
[UL Connected] 




( 0. 010) "TC" 
( 0. 900) "DI" 
( 0. 070) "PB" 
(0.010) "TE" 
[Half-Closed] 
( 0. 245) "DI" 
( 0. 245) "PB" 
(0.500) 11 DTE" 
The probability values shown in the usage model represent the expected use of 
the system in general field operations. These values were determined by instru-
mentation of a similar predecessor system. 
Different usage models can be generated with this same structure but with 
different probability values. The directed graph would remain the same but the 
stochastic matrix would be different. A usage model can also be represented as 
a system of equations (constraints). A solution to the system of constraints 
yields the stochastic matrix of the Markov chain. 
. " 
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16.5 Step 4: Validate the Usage Model 
The first step in model validation is to examine all the states of use and allow-
able transitions in terms of tagged requirements for the system. Next, examine 
requirements in terms of scenarios of use (paths through the model). Then, con-
sider various paths through the model in terms of operational implications for 
the system. 
Analytical calculations on the Markov chain can help to validate the model. 
All such results describe long-run behavior (i.e., what to expect on average in 
the long run). For example, the expected sequence length for the model pre-
sented above is 55 events. Does this make sense in terms of the application? If 
not, then the controlling probabilities must be changed. One could set a con-
straint to determine the expected sequence length and then generate a set of 
model probabilities that will necessarily satisfy the constraint. 
The expected number of test cases (uses) required to cover the least likely 
state is almost 74 million, and, of course, far more will be required to cover all 
states in strictly random testing, and even far more will be required to cover all 
arcs. In this instance, the requirement to visit every state and to experience 
every transition will not be met through random testing. An efficient way to sat-
isfy the requirements is presented next. 
Analytical results for the 12 mainstream states and the 16 bookkeeping 
states are presented in Table 16.2. Not all states of the model are included in the 
table. All those not included have a long-run occupancy of less than 0.0001 . 
Validation of the model should proceed by checking the reasonableness of 
these long-run results. The bookkeeping states consume 3.64% of the long-run 
occupancy, which is not enough to distort the picture. More than 94% of the 
time the system will be in one of the mainstream states: Does this agree with 
experience? Should the system be in the Connected state 68% of the time? All 
values should be checked for reasonableness in the application. If they disagree 
with experience and reason, then the model must be changed. 
The bookkeeping states are mutually exclusive, and every test case runs 
through exactly one of them. A successful test case (no errors of any kind in 
operation) passes through GGG (36.7% of them) or AGGG (39.5% of them), 
thus 76.2% of the test cases in long-run random sampling will represent error-
free operations. The percentages of uses that will occur in the various strata dur-
ing general field operations are represented in Table 16.3. 
Using the binomial model 2,995 test cases must pass for certification of 
general field operation, and 60 are needed to certify an error stratum. Thus any 
stratum getting more than 2% of the traffic should be certified as a consequence 
of certification for general field operations. It would appear safe to assume that 
strata 2, 3, and 5 will be so certified. The other error strata will require prior, 
additional testing. 
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Table 16.2 Analysis of the SOS usage model 
Expected Transitions Probability of 
Long-run Until State First Occurrence in a 
State Occupancy Occurs Test Case 
Software Not Invoked 0.018195 55 1.000000 
Mode: None 0.018295 2 1.000000 
Health Check Pending 0.018212 3 0.995475 
Checking Health 0.018139 4 0.990971 
Health Check Complete 0.018066 5 0.985991 
Firing Thrusters 0.000009 110,710 0.000496 
No Connection 0.017903 6 0.983007 
UL Connected 0.008880 64 0.487319 
DL Connected 0.008880 64 0.487319 
Connected, BGG 0.141452 273 0.171296 
Connected 0.675212 9 0.966342 
Half-Closed, BGG 0.002926 677 0.080800 
Half-Closed 0.013351 144 0.371669 
GGG 0.006682 148 0.367262 
GGB 0.000728 1,372 0.040015 
GBG 0.000392 2,550 0.021544 
GBB 0.000012 85,564 0.000642 
BGG 0.001464 681 0.080478 
BGB 0.000147 6,799 0.008082 
BBG 0.000075 13,378 0.004108 
BBB 0.000001 1,936,574 0.000028 
AGGG 0.007186 138 0.394946 
AGGB 0.000005 206,648 0.000266 
AGBG 0.000007 139,800 0.000393 
AGBB <0.000001 4,564,512 0.000012 
ABGG 0.001492 669 0.081978 
ABGB 0.000003 345,155 0.000159 
ABBG 0.000002 652,418 0.000084 
ABBB <0.000001 23,595,426 0.000002 
Software Terminated 0.018194 54 1.000000 
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Table 16.3 Expected use versus strata 
Stratum Bookkeeping States 
GGG AGGG 
2 GGB AGGB 
3 GBG AGBG 
4 GBB AGBB 
5 BGG ABGG 
6 BGB ABGB 
7 BBG ABBG 
8 BBB ABBB 
16.6 Step 5: Generate Test Cases, and 










Because of the certification requirement that the product will not be accepted 
with a known error, and because of the high degree of reliability required, the 
cost of a failure (in terms of additional testing) after random testing has begun 
will be very expensive. Consequently, a testing protocol will be followed that 
will minimize this possibility. Under less stringent certification requirements, a 
different protocol might be followed. 
16.6.1 Model Coverage 
A graph algorithm was used to generate the "least cost" set of scripts to experi-
ence each transition at least one time. Performing this test will ensure that the 
testers know how to recognize and to evaluate each state of use, and to experi-
ence and to evaluate each transition. Because this is a graph algorithm, multiple 
arcs between two states are recognized and all will be covered. 
Because arc coverage is achieved by "walking the graph," each state and 
arc is reached in a legitimate scenario of use of the system. This means that 
some states and arcs will be visited many times before every arc has been vis-
ited at least once. If the cost of conducting and evaluating each arc test differs 
from arc to arc, this cost can be taken into account so that arc coverage will be 
achieved at the least cost of testing. Using unit costs on the arcs, the least cost 
coverage test consists of 332 test cases with a total of 3,679 transitions and state 
visitations. (These are obviously atypical because the long-run average random 
test case length is about 55 transitions , which would imply more than 18,000 
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transitions.) A copy of the usage model structure can be marked to show exactly 
the paths taken. 
If failures are seen during model coverage testing, the test engineers will 
have to decide when to stop testing and when to order engineering changes to 
the code. Find-one-fix-one is the safest policy, but is often too time-consuming 
and expensive to be followed. Ideally, the model coverage scripts should be 
repeated until they are run without failure. 
16.6.2 Requirements Coverage 
Each canonical sequence is a use case that should be run. These sequences will 
exercise the mathematically essential control state, regardless of how the sys-
tem is implemented. It is likely that the model coverage scripts will have actu-
ally covered some of the canoncial sequences and, if so, they need not be run 
again. If any failures occur, engineering changes should be made and testing 
repeated until the canonical sequences run failure free. 
Each requirement can now be checked against testing already done. If a test 
case for a requirement has not already been run, a suitable test case can be 
traced on the model, produced, and executed on the system. 
Any additional testing that results from requirements coverage should be 
recorded on the usage model to update the testing record and to show the paths 
taken and the number of times each state and arc have been visited. 
16.6.3 SOS Error Strata 
Four of the seven error strata must be tested using test cases generated randomly 
from the model to satisfy the certification criteria. To demonstrate a reliability 
in excess of0.95 with 95% confidence, 60 randomly generated test scripts must 
be run without failure. (This is using the binomial model; other models are pos-
sible. The purpose of the case study is to illustrate general technique, rather than 
advocate any particular models .) If a failure occurs, then additional analysis is 
necessary. 
A model to generate test cases for stratum 8, [BBB] and [GBBB] , could be 
realized in two ways. One could alter the structure of the SOS usage model by 
working backward from the bookkeeping states and deleting arcs and states that 
cannot lead to these two to produce a new model. Alternatively, one could add a 
new constraint, that bookkeeping state [BBB] appears in 100% of the test cases, 
to all other constraints on arc probabilities, and solve the system of equations. 
The solution variables would be the cells in the stochastic matrix of a Markov 
chain usage model suitable for this test. This will be a submodel of the full 
usage model. 
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There will be four such submodels, one for each error stratum requiring 
additional testing. Testing of the error strata should be done in the following 
order: stratum 8, run 60 test cases; stratum 4, run 58 test cases; stratum 7, run 48 
test cases; and stratum 6, run 36 test cases. This plan is based on expected, aver-
age results from sampling. As mentioned, if a failure is seen, additional analysis 
will be necessary, and generally more tests must be run (successfully) to wash 
out the bad news of the failure. 
16.6.4 General Field Operations 
This is the final phase of testing and is based on the full usage model. Using the 
binomial model to demonstrate that the system exceeds a reliability of 0.999 
with 95% confidence, it will be necessary to run 2,995 randomly generated 
sequences without failure. This amount of testing, following the error strata 
testing, is expected to satisfy both certification goals regarding reliability and 
confidence. If the sampling does not conform to the expectations, supplemental 
sampling in the error strata will be necessary. Again, all testing experience 
should be recorded on the model. The cumulative test history can be seen in 
terms of paths taken, and the number of times each state is visited and each arc 
is taken. The cumulative testing history can be compared with the usage model 
using the discriminant as testing progresses to measure the degree to which the 
testing experience differs from expected general field operations. 
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